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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2007), this Court has jurisdiction over 
this appeal between appellant John L. Rich ("Rich") and appellees James J. Kenny, 
Patricia D. Kenny, James E.B. Stuart, Eileen A. Stuart, Robert C. Slettom, Faye Slettom, 
Richard L. Measelle, Chase Peterson, Grethe B. Peterson, and Thaynes Canyon I 
Homeowners Association (collectively, the "Homeowners"). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Rich fails to recite accurately the issues before this Court and the appropriate 
standards of review. The correct issues and standards are summarized as follows: 
Issue No. 1: Did the trial court properly reserve Rich's challenge to personal 
jurisdiction after observing that the Homeowners had filed verified proof of service? 
Standard of Review: "[T]he propriety of the jurisdictional determination, and 
hence the decision not to vacate, becomes a question of law upon which [this court] 
do[es] not defer to the district court." Classic Cabinets, Inc. v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 1999 
UTApp. 88, % 9,978 P.2d 465. 
Issue No. 2: Did the trial court correctly conclude that because the summons 
served on Rich was not fatally defective, Rich's motion to dismiss was without merit? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss on any of the 
grounds available under Rule 12(b) is reviewed for correctness. See Stokes v. Van 
Wagoner, 1999 UT 94, \ 6, 987 P.2d 602; Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768, 
771 (Utah CtApp. 1997). 
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Issue No. 3: Did the trial court act within the bounds of its considerable discretion 
when it issued a temporary restraining order without initially requiring the Homeowners 
to post a security bond? 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews all trial court decisions made pursuant to 
Rule 65 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the abuse of discretion. Corp. of the 
President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Wallace, 573 P.2d 1285, 
1287 (Utah 1978). 
Issue No. 4: Did the trial court properly exercise its discretion in reconsidering its 
interlocutory decision to order arbitration and in subsequently vacating that order as 
erroneous? 
Standard of Review: A trial court has the inherent authority to reconsider and 
vacate or amend its own interlocutory orders. Such actions will be reviewed for an abuse 
of discretion. See U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App 303, \ 57, 990 P.2d 945. 
Issue No. 5: Did the trial court act within the limits of its discretion in sua sponte 
striking the jury trial when the sole issues remaining before the court were equitable 
issues not subject to the right to a jury trial? 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a trial court's decisions under Rule 39 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for abuse of that court's substantial discretion. See 
Corbet v. Cox, 30 Utah 2d 361, 517 P.2d 1318, 1320 n.4 (1974). 
Issue No. 6: Did the trial court act within the limit of its authority in awarding the 
Homeowners their costs and fees pursuant to the terms of the CC&Rs recorded against 
Rich's property prior to his purchase? 
2 
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Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to award attorney fees will be 
reviewed for correctness, see Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 
1988), but the determination of '"what constitutes a reasonable fee'" is left to the trial 
court's sound discretion and will be reversed only if that discretion is exceeded, Jenson v. 
Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, \ 127, 130 P.3d 325 (citation omitted).. 
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
This appeal presents no questions implicating the interpretation of constitutional 
provisions, but relates in some respects to the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-31a-101 to -129 (2007), a copy of which is included as Addendum A 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 19, 2005, the Homeowners filed suit against Rich after he refused to 
comply with the terms of the protective covenants ("CC&Rs") that were recorded against 
his property before he purchased it, and against every property within the confines of the 
Thaynes Canyon I Subdivision (the "Subdivision"). (R.l-8.) Among other things, the 
Homeowners sought to enjoin Rich from pursuing any further construction in violation of 
the CC&Rs. (R.9-15.) The Homeowners first moved for a temporary restraining order. At 
oral argument, counsel for Rich indicated that he was appearing solely to contest the trial 
court's jurisdiction over Rich. (R. 145:3.) * The trial court rejected Rich's jurisdictional 
challenge based on the verified proof of service that the Homeowners had filed, and 
proceeded to issue a TRO against Rich. (R.45-48, 145:21.) 
1
 The hearing transcript is found in the trial court index of record at page 145. To 
ensure precision, all record cites to this hearing will be in the form "R.145," followed by a 
specific page reference, e.g., "R. 145:3" for page 3 of the hearing transcript. 
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Rich requested that the case be referred to arbitration. (R 33-36.) The Homeowners 
responded that arbitration had been waived. (R. 145:4-5.) Over the Homeowners' 
argument, the trial court ordered the parties to engage in arbitration. (R.42, 145:37.) Less 
than two weeks later and prior to the scheduled arbitration date, when notified of Rich's 
ongoing violation of the TRO, the trial court cancelled its order directing the parties to 
arbitrate. (R.84-85.) Although Rich had notice of the trial court's decision, he insisted that 
the arbitration continue, which it did in the absence of the Homeowners, who instead 
chose to respect the trial court's order. (R.200-07.) 
Soon after cancelling its order compelling arbitration, the trial court vacated both 
the order directing the parties to arbitrate and also any decision that the arbitration panel 
had purported to issue after the trial court cancelled its order directing the parties to 
arbitrate. (R. 177-213.) The litigation was then pursued in earnest, and after a two-day 
bench trial, (R.l 091-92), the trial court determined that Rich had failed to prove that the 
Homeowners had abandoned the right to enforce the CC&Rs, and it entered a permanent 
injunction against Rich and in favor of the Homeowners. (R.951-99.) The trial court also 
awarded Homeowners a portion of their requested costs and attorney fees. (R. 1062-80.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Homeowners Association was created in about 1971, contemporaneously with 
the Subdivision. (R.3; Ex.1.) The comprehensive CC&Rs (attached as Addendum B), 
drafted and adopted by the Homeowners Association, were then recorded against every 
lot in the Subdivision, including the lot eventually purchased by Rich. (R.2, 11-15.) The 
CC&Rs required that "[a]ll buildings and Structures on all Lots shall be setback at least 
4 
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10 feet from the side and rear lot lines," CC&Rs § 6.4 (Add. 1), that all improvements to 
any lot within the Subdivision be approved by the Homeowners Association Architectural 
Committee (the "Committee") or by appeal to the community as a whole, id. § 4.2, and 
that "[i]f court proceedings are instituted in connection with the rights of enforcement and 
remedies provided in this declaration, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its 
costs and expenses in connection therewith, including reasonable attorney fees," id. § 7.1. 
The CC&Rs also allowed for members of the Homeowners Association to demand that 
disputes be submitted to arbitration; however, the option to make such a demand lapsed if 
no written request was filed with the Homeowners Association within 30 days of a 
member being notified of an adverse decision by the Homeowners Association. Id. § 8.3. 
In 1998, Rich purchased lot 73 within the Subdivision (the "Property"). Initially, 
Rich complied with the CC&Rs; however, in 2005, Rich decided to increase the size of 
his home and he sought a building permit from Park City, Utah to do so. (R.4.) Rich, as 
required, submitted the plans for the addition to the Committee, and these plans revealed 
that a portion of the addition would encroach into the prohibited side setback area 
between Rich's property and the adjacent property. (R. 145:4-5.) Rich began construction 
soon thereafter, but without obtaining even provisional permission from the Committee. 
On July 19, 2005, representatives of the Committee attempted to inform Rich that 
his plans violated the side setback provisions of the CC&Rs, but to no effect. (R. 145:6.) 
On July 21, 2005, after notifying Rich that they planned to meet, the Committee met to 
discuss Rich's plans and to determine whether to allow Rich to proceed. (R. 145:6.) The 
Committee determined that because the plans allowed only a 6 foot 8 inch setback—and 
5 
not the required ten-foot setback—Rich's proposed addition violated the CC&Rs. He was 
denied permission to build. (R. 145:6.) 
That same day, immediately after the meeting, James Kenny ("Kenny"), then 
president of the Homeowners Association, left a message on Rich's home telephone 
informing Rich of the decision. He then called Rich's architect, who also happens to be 
Rich's son-in-law, and informed him of the decision. (R. 145:6-8; Plaintiffs Ex. 18, Aff. 
of James Kenny, attached as Addendum C.) Rich, however, ignored the Committee's 
decision and continued to build in violation of the CC&Rs. (R. 145:7; 182.) Because Rich 
refused to comply with the CC&Rs and the Committee's decision, the Homeowners filed 
a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against Rich on August 19, 2005. (R.l-4, 
145:7; Add. 2.) On August 29, 2005, more than 30 days after being notified of the 
Committee's decision and after service of the complaint and summons on Rich, that a 
letter appeared on Kenny's doorstep in which Rich attempted to demand arbitration. See 
Addendum C. 
The matter proceeded to a hearing on the Homeowners' motion for a temporary 
restraining order, but on the morning of that hearing, Rich filed a motion to dismiss the 
complaint, asserting that arbitration was mandatory, and a motion to quash, asserting that 
service of process had not been properly effected. (R.30-36, 145:4.) Although the trial 
court reserved a final determination on Rich's motion to quash, it determined that the 
Homeowners had presented sufficient evidence, in the form of a verified proof of service, 
to assert jurisdiction. (R. 145:19-20.) The trial court then, over the Homeowners' 
arguments that Rich had waived arbitration by failing to timely invoke that option, 
6 
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ordered the parties to participate in arbitration, and it issued a TRO that prohibited Rich 
from continuing construction on the Property. (R.37; 145:4, 37.) 
In compliance with the trial court's order, the Homeowners began the arbitration 
process. Through this process, the arbitrators instructed the parties to execute an 
arbitration acknowledgement.3 However, while purporting to sign the acknowledgement, 
Rich altered the document to reflect his ongoing objection to the trial court's jurisdiction, 
and implicitly suggesting through his modification that he would oppose any effort to 
enforce an adverse decision of the panel. (R.53.) 
Rich also continued his construction project, in violation of both the CC&Rs and 
the trial court's TRO. (R.50-58, including exhibits.) Exasperated, the Homeowners filed 
an expedited motion for an order to show cause or, alternatively, an order cancelling or 
vacating the court-ordered arbitration. (R.50-58, 177-213.) The trial court granted the 
expedited motion, issued an order to show cause, and cancelled its arbitration order 
pending further review. (R.62-63.) The arbitration order was thereafter vacated by the 
trial court as improvident, unwarranted under the circumstances, and beyond the trial 
court's authority. (R. 197-98, 200-04.) 
Notwithstanding the trial court's cancellation of the arbitration before it began, 
Rich and his counsel attended the scheduled arbitration hearing together with the 
arbitration panel, which ruled in favor of Rich in the absence of the Homeowners, who 
2
 The Homeowners maintained their position that Rich had waived his right to 
invoke arbitration in opposing Rich's motion to dismiss. (R.64-71, 185.) 
The Homeowners have been unable to locate copies of these documents in the 
trial court record in connection with this appeal. 
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elected to follow the trial court's order vacating the arbitration. (R. 186-188; 197-204) 
After the arbitration panel refused to abide by the district court's order, the trial court 
entered a decision detailing the basis for vacating the arbitration award. (R. 177-213, a 
copy of which is included as Addendum D.).) 
The matter proceeded to trial (R.1091, 1092), where the trial court determined that 
the CC&Rs' setback provisions had not been abandoned by the Homeowners Association 
(R.988-92). The trial court then issued a permanent injunction prohibiting construction 
within the identified setback area, and pursuant the CC&Rs, awarded the Homeowners 
attorney fees and costs. (R.991-99; 1062-80.) 
Rich now appeals. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Rich raises several claims on appeal, each without merit and each without 
satisfying several predicate appellate requirements. Specifically, Rich has failed to cite 
anywhere in the record where he preserved the claims that he has brought on appeal. This 
failure may have been motivated by his failure to preserve certain of his claims below. In 
either case, such conduct is impermissible under this Court's rules. 
Rich has also failed to cite relevant portions of the record or provide relevant 
authority for most, if not all, of his assertions. Instead, Rich has "dumped" on this Court 
and the Homeowners the responsibility to research and develop Rich's arguments. 
Additionally, Rich has made no effort to marshal the evidence that supports the factual 
findings he challenges. Instead, when he challenge fact intensive matters, he refers only to 
the evidence that supports his position and ignores his obligation to present all evidence in 
8 
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support of the findings and to show how the evidence is insufficient to support those 
findings. 
Through these briefing deficiencies, Rich has forced this Court and the 
Homeowners to carry the burden of combing through the record to locate the evidence 
relevant to the issues at hand, conducting research to locate authority material to the 
questions presented, and then articulating themselves how each issue should be addressed 
pursuant to the relevant evidence and authority. Such conduct should not be permitted. 
Rather, due to Rich's material failure to comply with predicate briefing expectations, this 
Court should reject Rich's appeal. 
If, however, this Court chooses to address the merits of Rich's claims, the trial 
court's rulings should still be affirmed. First, the trial court properly asserted personal 
jurisdiction over Rich for the purpose of issuing the temporary restraining order. The trial 
court received and approved a signed and sworn proof of service, which presumptively 
demonstrated that the trial court had jurisdiction over Rich. Based on the proof of service, 
the burden shifted to Rich to rebut the validity of service, and his efforts at the hearing 
were simply insufficient. The trial court properly declined to dismiss the action simply 
because the summons contained one minor, nonprejudicial error. It is undisputed that the 
summons stated that Rich had only twenty days to respond, not the thirty he was 
otherwise due 
In any event, Rich timely responded to the complaint and was afforded an 
opportunity to dispute both the complaint and the TRO and he has yet to show that he was 
prejudiced in any way by the minor error that the Homeowners ultimately resolved. In the 
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absence of prejudice, the error is at worse, harmless; thus, Rich's claims on appeal are 
wholly without merit. 
Second, Rich's argument that the trial court erred in issuing the TRO without 
requiring a bond is equally unavailing. Rich did not request a bond prior to, or during, the 
hearing on the issue. He presented no evidence that the injunction would cause him any 
harm if it were later determined to be wrongfully issued. Later, in response to Rich's 
request, the trial court ordered the Homeowners to post a $20,000 security bond. Finally., 
the purpose of the bond requirement is to protect against wrongful injunctions, but here, 
the Homeowners prevailed. The TRO was issued properly and is unchallenged on appeal. 
Thus, any error was harmless as a matter of law. 
Third, in that same vein, the trial court acted well within its discretion in 
reconsidering its decision to order the parties to arbitrate. Under Rule 54(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may revisit and reconsider any of its interlocutory orders 
prior to entering a final order. The trial court here was asked to do just that, and in 
reconsidering its decision, the court concluded that its earlier order was incorrect. . In 
reconsidering its earlier decision, the trial court properly examined the terms of the 
CC&Rs and determined that Rich was too late to invoke arbitration, thus waiving that 
right, and in the absence of an agreement to arbitrate, the trial court was without authority 
to order the parties to engage in arbitration. In the absence of such authority, the trial 
court's order was void ab initio, and the arbitration panel was never vested with any 
authority over the matter. Because the order was interlocutory in nature, the trial court 
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never ceded jurisdiction over the case to the arbitration panel, which is made clear in its 
discussions of the order 
To the extent that the parties' signing of acknowledgments to arbitrate is to be 
considered, which, given the absence of these documents from the record on appeal, may 
be inappropriate, these documents do not change the outcome. The Homeowners signed 
the acknowledgement only because the trial court had ordered them to participate in 
arbitration, over their objection. Rich's version of the acknowledgement included 
provisions not agreed to by the Homeowners, eliminating any possible "meeting of the 
minds" and no agreement was reached. Moreover, the arbitration panel did not have the 
power or authority to divest the trial court of its continuing jurisdiction, and its statements 
to the contrary are simply incorrect. Consequently, the trial court correctly, and within the 
limits of its discretion, reconsidered, cancelled, and vacated its arbitration order. 
Fourth, the trial court properly refused to allow a jury to oversee the parties' 
equitable claims. When the trial court made this decision, the sole issues remaining were 
the Homeowners' demand for injunctive relief pursuant to the CC&Rs, and Rich's 
abandonment claims. Only if Rich prevailed would any other issues arise, and those 
would have related solely to alleged damage caused by the Homeowners' efforts to obtain 
an injunction and restraining order. It is axiomatic that a trial court has the authority to 
control proceedings in its courtroom, and that it has the authority to grant or deny a party 
access to a jury when the issues presented are equitable in nature. Given that the core 
issues remaining before the trial court were equitable, the trial court acted well within the 
114896 
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bounds of its discretion in ordering the parties to present their claims to the bench, and not 
a jury. 
Fifth, the trial court correctly determined that the CC&Rs provided for the award 
of fees and costs to the prevailing party in any court action involving a dispute over the 
enforcement of the CC&Rs. Rich's refusal to comply with the setback provisions of the 
CC&Rs forced the homeowners to seek a legal remedy and when the Homeowners 
prevailed, they were awarded fees and costs pursuant to the CC&Rs. Rich's efforts to 
invoke provisions of the CC&Rs not material to the award of fees, but instead intended to 
protect the officers of the Homeowners Association, has no impact on the award itself. 
Consequently, the trial court properly awarded the Homeowners their fees and costs under 
the terms of the CC&Rs. 
Finally, to the extent that Rich challenges the reasonableness of the award, the 
Homeowners renew their arguments that Rich failed to marshal the evidence in support of 
the trial court's order, and he has failed to present or apply any relevant authority that 
would bear on that issue. When reviewed in full, it is apparent that the trial court carefully 
examined the affidavit of costs and fees submitted in support of the Homeowners' 
request, and concluded that all but $25,000 of the amount described was reasonable. In 
doing so, the trial court made adequate findings to support its decision, and because this 




This Court should reject each of Rich's claims on appeal, affirm the trial court's 
rulings, and award the Homeowners all costs and attorney fees that they have incurred in 
connection with this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. RICH'S APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO 
PRESERVE ISSUES, MARSHAL EVIDENCE, AND SATISFY BRIEFING 
REQUIREMENTS. 
Rich's arguments to overturn virtually every substantive order and decision the 
trial court made in this case are without merit and are raised without satisfying several 
fundamental, predicate rules of appellate practice, any one of which should result in his 
claims being rejected summarily. The '"rules of appellate procedure clearly specify the 
requirements that litigants must meet when submitting briefs.'" State v. Green, 2004 UT 
76, K 11, 99 P.3d 820 (citation omitted). Specifically, "Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure contains unambiguous requirements for a briefs organization and 
contents" designed to decrease the cost of litigation for both parties and to minimize the 
'"burdens [placed upon] the judiciary's time and energy.'" Id. (quoting Beehive Tel Co. 
v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 2004 UT 18, If 12, 89 P.3d 131 (additional citation omitted)). 
Citation to the record, citation to relevant authority with pin-cite precision and 
application, marshaling the evidence in support of the trial court's fact intensive 
decisions, and preservation of claims are all material requirements under Rule 24. See id.; 
see also Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 42, ffi[ 16-19, 164 P.3d 384 
(discussing marshaling requirements of this Court); State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 
(Utah 1998) (stating that it is impermissible for party to shift burden of research and 
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argument to reviewing court); Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2007 UT 37, fflf 20, 22, 
163 P.2d 615 (discussing Utah's preservation rule). Rich's brief violates each of these 
rules, which should be fatal to his appeal. 
A. Rich Fails to Show Where He Preserved Below the Issues Raised on 
Appeal, and Some Issues Appear Never to Have Been Preserved. 
Rich was required to "provide either a 'citation to the record showing that [each] 
issue was preserved in the trial court' or 'statement of grounds for seeking review of an 
issue not preserved.'" Green, 2004 UT 76, \ 12 (quoting Utah R. App. P. 24(a)). He has 
not done this, and '"as a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be 
raised on appeal.'" State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, \ 9, 46 P.3d 230 (quoting State v. Holgate, 
2000 UT 74, Tj 11, 10 P.3d 346). Preservation occurs when the "[cjlaimed errors [are] 
raised in such a manner that the trial courts have a meaningful opportunity to correct 
them." Tschaggeny, 2007 UT 37, \ 22.4 
In his brief, Rich makes no effort to direct the Court to any specific part of the 
record where he preserved his alleged claims. He instead launches into a discussion of his 
claims as if this Court and opposing counsel can and should identify on Rich's behalf the 
location and nature of each of Rich's preservation efforts. Admittedly, certain aspects of 
Rich's claims appear to have been preserved for appellate review; however, Rich's 
approach places the burden for discovering this preservation on this Court and opposing 
counsel, which violates one of the principal requirements of Rule 24. 
4
 Importantly, even if Rich raised any of these issues in an answer, counterclaim, or 
other pleading, in the absence of supporting evidence or relevant legal authority, he did 
properly present the issue to the trial court, thus he has not preserved the issue for appeal. 
See R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, \ 12, 40 P.3d 1119. 
14 
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While the Homeowners have not combed through the entire record below to 
confirm whether every argument Rich makes now was preserved below, several 
preservation problems are evident. For example, Rich's claim that the trial court erred in 
failing to require a bond, prior to issuing a TRO, was not raised below. A review of 
Rich's briefs, filed prior to the hearing on the Homeowners' motion for TRO, as well as 
the transcript of the hearing, reveals that Rich failed to request that the trial court impose 
a bond at that time, instead, he focused on compelling arbitration. See Point IV(A), below. 
Similarly, by failing to raise an objection to this decision below, Rich failed to 
preserve any claim concerning the trial court's sua sponte decision to eliminate the option 
of a jury trial. Following entry of the trial court's order, Rich filed no objection and 
submitted no request for the trial court to reconsider the decision on any basis. See Point 
V, below.5 Thus, Rich waived any claim of error and it cannot be argued on this appeal. 
B. Rich Fails to Cite Relevant Authority and Portions of the Record. 
Equally troubling is Rich's failure to comply with Rule 24(a)(9). See Utah R. App. 
P. 24(a)(9). Pursuant to Rule 24(a), "an appellant's brief 'shall contain the contentions 
and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented . . . with citation to 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.' 'Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires 
not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis 
based upon that authority." Green, 2004 UT 76, \ 13. Stated bluntly, "'this court is not a 
depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
5
 Although the Homeowners restrict their preservation discussion to the discrete 
issues presented above, Rich's preservation problems are endemic and should result in his 
appeal being summarily dismissed. 
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research.'" Id, (citation omitted). Thus, when "the overall analysis of the issue is so 
lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court," the 
briefing is often deemed inadequate. Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305. Here again, Rich has 
presented this Court with argument in violation of one of its cornerstone rules, and his 
appeal should be rejected as a result. 
1. Rich Fails to Cite or Develop Legal Authority to Support Certain 
Arguments. 
Rich has asserted that the trial court somehow erred in its determination to move 
ahead with the case without making a final determination on the issue of personal 
jurisdiction.6 In an effort to support his argument, Rich presents two cases to this Court: 
Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) and Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). However, these cases present one very glaring problem for Rich: 
both address subject matter jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction. See generally Crump, 
821 P.2d at 1173-76 (discussing subject matter jurisdiction); Curtis, 789 P.2d at 725-26 
(noting that challenges to subject matter jurisdiction and challenges to personal 
jurisdiction differ, but nowhere substantively discussing personal jurisdiction). 
Yet, Rich has presented and relied on these cases alone as dispositive authority on 
the issue of personal jurisdiction. See Appellant's Brief at 24. Rich has presented this 
Court with no relevant authority on the issue of personal jurisdiction, and he has failed to 
6
 To be clear, although Rich asserted that the trial court never properly had 
jurisdiction over his person due to certain alleged errors in service of process and the 
contents of the summons, nothing in the record clearly indicates that Rich preserved a 
challenge to the trial court's decision that it had sufficient evidence to reserve the issue 
for later determination. Thus, Rich likely foiled to preserve this claim. 
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develop any such authority in a reasoned and analytical fashion sufficient to support his 
claim. In essence, Rich violated Rule 24(a)(9) by dumping the burden of research and 
argument on this Court and the Homeowners, and this Court should decline to address 
this claim. 
Similarly, the sole authority that Rich has presented in support of his attorney fees 
claim is Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996), a fractured decision than one 
must read very closely to determine its actual precedential impact. See id. at 891 
(Durham, J., opinion, in which only Stewart, J., concurred in part), 896 (Russon, J, 
dissenting, in which Howe, C.J., and Zimmerman, J., in part, concurred), 900 (Stewart, J., 
opinion), 900 (Zimmerman, J., Opinion concurring in part with Russon, J., and in part 
with Durham, J.). Rich, however, makes no effort to draw clarity from Salmon, and in 
fact, makes no attempt to apply Salmon here. See Appellant's Brief at 33-34. Indeed, Rich 
makes no effort to apply any relevant authority to this issue and instead he does nothing 
more than re-present the factual argument that he presented to the trial court. See id. He 
again unacceptably dumps the burden of research and argument upon the Court and the 
Homeowners. His bald argument, and bald citation to one very difficult to unravel case, 
should not be recognized as a legitimate effort to comply with Rule 24(a)(9). Instead, this 
Court should reject Rich's attorney fee argument. 
A similar fate should befall Rich's "lack of bond" issue. See Appellant's Brief at 
27. In that argument, Rich presents a fragment of language from Rule 65 A, as well as two 
parenthetical case cites, in an effort to convince the Court that payment of a security bond 
17 
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is mandatory prior to a TRO issuing. See id. Rich makes no effort to draw any guidance 
from the cited authority, nor does he attempt to explain the absence of certain important 
and material language from his citation to Rule 65A. Instead, he has again dumped the 
burden of research and argument on this Court and the Homeowners. This Court should 
reject Rich's effort to predicate his claims on bald citation to authority and undeveloped 
argument, and summarily decline to address this issue. 
2. Rich Fails to Cite or Attach to His Brief the Rulings He Is 
Challenging. 
Rich also fails to refer in his brief to any of the multiple trial court rulings he now 
challenges. Indeed, not a single trial court ruling is included as an addendum to Rich's 
brief, notwithstanding the Rule 24(a) requirement that appellants include as an addendum 
"those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the determination of 
the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, or the contract or 
document subject to construction." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(ll)(C). These deficiencies 
make it virtually impossible in some instances to respond to Rich's arguments. For 
example, Rich's personal jurisdiction arguments fail to cite any particular part of the 
record where the trial court addressed these issues, see Appellant's Brief at 24-25, 
Rich's cite to Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. Wallace, 573 P.2d 1285 (Utah 1978), appears to be incorrect. 
8
 Once again, although the Homeowners dedicate no additional argument to Rich's 
failure to meet the expectations of Rule 24(a)(9), the Homeowners do not concede that he 
has satisfied his burden in the unaddressed issues. 
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rendering a response troublesome, see Point II, below. Based on Rich's failure to cite or 
include any trial court rulings, his brief is defective and should be rejected. 
3. Rich Fails to Marshal Evidence Supporting Factual Findings He 
Challenges. 
Rich has failed to challenge properly those issues that involve the trial court's 
factual determinations. "When parties appeal a trial court's fact-sensitive use of its 
discretionary powers, they 'must successfully challenge the factual findings upon which 
the trial court's decision . . . depended.'" United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting 
Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, % 37, 140 P.3d 1200 (quoting Chen v. Stewart, 
2004 UT 82, n.14, 100 P.3d 1177). It is of no import that the trial court made no reference 
to the evidence that supports its ruling; the appellant is "required to present 'every scrap 
of competent evidence introduced . . . which supports the very finding [it] resists.'" Id. 
(alteration in original) (quoting Chen, 2004 UT 82, ^ 77). "The marshaling requirement 
applies when a party challenges a court's . . . factual findings, regardless of the standard 
of review at issue," Martinez, 2007 UT 42, n.3, 164 P.3d 384, and "parties that fail to 
marshal the evidence do so at the risk that the reviewing court will decline, in its 
discretion, to review the trial court's factual findings," id. at f^ 19. 
Here, Rich appeals a variety of claims requiring an examination of the trial court 
predicate factual findings, but he does so without reference to any of the trial court's 
rulings themselves or marshaling the evidence in support of any of those rulings. For 
instance, Rich challenges the trial court's determination that he waived his right to 
arbitration. Generally, the issue of waiver requires an inquiry into the facts of any 
particular case. See Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 857 P.2d 935, 939-40 
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(Utah 1993). But rather than marshaling all of the evidence that would support the trial 
court's waiver determination, and attempting then, and only then, to demonstrate why that 
evidence was insufficient to support the finding, Rich presents this Court only with the 
facts most favorable to his position. At its core, Rich's argument is identical to the 
argument that he presented below, yet he asks this Court to second guess the trial court's 
decision. In doing so, he has failed to satisfy his duty to marshal the evidence, and this 
Court should reject his waiver argument. 
Similarly, Rich failed to marshal the evidence that supports the trial court's 
decision to temporarily assert personal jurisdiction over Rich, reserving any final 
determination for a better developed evidentiary hearing. In particular, Rich fails to 
acknowledge that the Homeowners filed a return of service, demonstrating that service 
had been performed by a professional process server. (R.22-23.) Rich's failure to marshal 
should dispositively resolve his claim. 
Further, Rich fails to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's award of 
attorney fees. See Appellant's Brief at 33-34. Instead, he merely highlights the arguments 
that he presented to the trial court, and that the trial court, in essence, rejected. 
Rich's failure to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's various 
decisions should be fatal to his appeal, at least concerning those claims, and this Court 
should decline to review the challenged decisions on that basis.9 
9
 Again, although the Homeowners dedicate no additional space to Rich's 
marshaling failures, Rich's manifest marshalling problems should end his appeal. 
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IL THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED JURISDICTION OVER 
RICH. 
The Court should reject Rich's jurisdictional challenge, which is utterly devoid of 
any factual or legal authority supporting his claims of jurisdictional defect below. See 
Point 1(C)(1), (2), above. Rich's one-page "jurisdiction" argument fails to cite even a 
single aspect of the trial court's rejection of Rich's motion to dismiss that conflicts with 
any legal standard governing the trial court's decision. See Appellant's Brief at 24-25. 
Rather, Rich makes the unsubstantiated argument that "Mr. Rich was left not knowing 
whether or not there was any jurisdiction over him being asserted by the Third District 
Court." Id. at 24. This argument makes little sense.10 
In dealing with Rich's personal jurisdiction claims below, the trial court examined 
the record as a whole, which included Rich's motions and memoranda—unsupported by 
affidavit or other evidence—and determined that the proof of service filed with the trial 
court provided sufficient grounds to assert jurisdiction over Rich. (R. 145:12, 19-21) 
While "the plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction exists," Benton v. 
Cameco Corp., 375 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotation and citation omitted); see 
also Ringgold v. Theriot, 2004 UT App 350U, 2004 Utah App. LEXIS 371 (Oct. 7, 2004), 
a copy of which is included as Addendum E, the trial court has discretion to make an 
10
 Importantly, Rich has never made a minimum contacts or long-arm challenge in 
this case. (It would be fruitless anyway based on his undisputed ownership of the 
Property, located in Utah.) Rather, Rich's challenge to "jurisdiction" below was centered 
on the sufficiency of service of process, which is addressed in Point III, below. (R.30-32.) 
Thus, Rich has effectively conceded that jurisdiction was proper but for the summons and 
service of process. See Phone Directories Co., Inc. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, ^ j 11-12, 
8 P.3d 256 (discussing elements necessary for full-blown inquiry into specific personal 
jurisdiction and differences between general and specific personal jurisdiction). 
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initial detennination concerning jurisdictional challenges on documentary evidence alone, 
and in such cases "the plaintiff is only required to make a prima facie showing of personal 
jurisdiction," which will suffice unless the plaintiff is later unable to establish jurisdiction 
by a preponderance of the evidence. Neways, Inc. v. McCausland, 950 P.2d 420, 422 
(Utah 1997); see, e.g., Anderson v. American Soc. of Plastic & Reconstructive Surgeons, 
807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1990) (holding that plaintiff "need only have made a prima facie 
showing that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over defendants in order to proceed 
to trial on the merits"). 
Because all process servers "are subject to the same criminal charges for falsifying 
a return of service . . . it follows that their returns of service should be given an equal 
presumption of correctness." Cooke v. Cooke, 2001 UT App 110, If 9, 22 P.3d 1249. 
Consequently, when sufficiency of service of process is challenged, the proof of service 
"is presumptively correct and can be disproved only by clear and convincing evidence." 
Id.; accord Classic Cabinets, Inc. v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 1999 UT App 88, ^  12-13, 978 
P.2d 465. Thus, when the trial court possesses an affidavit of service from a process 
server, that court must "presume the correctness of the [process server's] Affidavit of 
Service, [and] the burden shifts to [the party challenging service] to prove, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that service was improper." Classic Cabinets Inc., 1999 UT App 88 
at H13. 
Here, the Homeowners engaged Bob Shultz, a process server, to serve Rich with 
the summons and complaint in California, which he accomplished. (R.22-23.) Shultz 
executed (and the Homeowners filed) an affidavit of service entitled "Proof of Service," 
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in which he swore that the information contained therein was true and correct.11 
In considering Rich's motion to dismiss (based on the arbitration provision 
addressed in Point V, below) and motion to quash (challenging service of process) (R.26-
36); which Rich sprang on the court the morning of the September 16, 2005 TRO hearing; 
and the return of service on file with the trial court (R.22-23), the trial court asserted 
jurisdiction over Rich for the purpose of entering the TRO, pending an opportunity for the 
parties to fully brief Rich's motions (R.145:19-20; R.375 (wherein trial court states, 
"Initially the court had the return of service from Shultz and so acted on the request for a 
TRO, 'assuming' it had jurisdiction, based on the presumption of regularity concerning 
such service")). Then, in its November 4, 2005 Ruling and Order (later adopted as the 
Order of the court, R.438-40), once briefing was completed, the trial court recognized that 
Rich simply failed to present sufficient evidence to the trial court to rebut the presumption 
of regularity that Shultz's "Proof of Service" carried. (R.365-69; 375-76.) 
Considering the presumptive nature of an affidavit of service, the trial court acted 
within the bounds of its authority in issuing the TRO and ultimately prohibiting Rich from 
completing the construction on his Property in violation of the CC&Rs. 
III. SERVICE OF PROCESS WAS PROPERLY EFFECTED ON RICH. 
The trial court properly found through Schultz's affidavit of service, analyzed in 
Point II, above, that sufficient grounds existed to determine that service of process on 
Rich had been perfected. Rich's sole remaining challenge to the service of process lies in 
11
 Shultz's "Proof of Service" was later supplemented with an additional affidavit 
presented to the court. (R.224-28.) 
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the 20-day time period set forth on the face of the summons for responding to the 
complaint, notwithstanding service of the summons on Rich in California. This challenge 
fails on multiple bases. 
A. The Only Mistake in the Summons Served on Rich Was the 20-Day 
Time Period It Provided for Responding to the Complaint 
The summons properly served upon Rich contained every element required under 
Rule 4(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, with one simple, and in this case, 
nonprejudicial, error. Through the summons, the Homeowners notified Rich that a 
complaint had been filed against him in the Third District Court, in and for Summit 
County, Utah, and they identified the court by address, case number, and assigned judge. 
The Homeowners identified, with particularity, the parties involved in the lawsuit, and 
provided Rich with the name of their attorney, as well as his address and telephone 
number. Rich was notified that if he chose to ignore the summons, the Homeowners 
would seek entry of a default judgment against him, and he was informed that he had 20 
days in which to file his response. (R.22-23.) 
It is undisputed that because Rich was served outside of the State of Utah, by rule, 
he actually had 30 days to file a response to the Homeowners' complaint, not 20. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(a). Yet, Rich has not argued and cannot now argue that the summons 




U. A Mistake in the Time Period Set Forth in a Summons Is Only Error if 
It Is Prejudicial to the Defendant 
reversible error if it does not prejudice the defendant. "It is axiomatic that a court acquires 
power to adjudicate by proper service of process which imparts notice that the defendant 
'i 
Interwest Corp,, 632 P.2d 879, 880 (Utah 1981). But, "Rule 4 is a flexible rule that should 
be liberally construed -o h-ng as a party receives sufficient notice of the complaint." 
v. iuc<« ; J > ^ , - - ommera\:. » -'\ . y.- . 
"
tK
 ' ''consequently, "[ejrrors in the form of original process are . . . ^ u u ; 
viewed as amendable defects, so long as the defendant is not prejudiced." Sammamish 
Pointe Homeowners Assoc v Sammamu:. i ,/...;, : ^ 
'Vfq *ral courts will not grant dismissal on the basis that the 
summons specified the incorrect time for filing of the answer, unless defendants make a 
showing of prejudice,'* 
"[ £ ] defendant's answ ei and appearance in an action ' should be enough to prevent 
any technical error in form from invalidating the process. '" Alpha Beta Co,, 736 F.2d at 
1382 (quoting A r ^K, A fvhlJci, & 1V1. Kane, Fed. Practice Jx . rocedure, L'/i-v/ § 
11 )88. at ibS I in mi....|: I ' l !" i ' < > i , ) ; si '< :!• i d st » Mi ye? s. 6.3,2 P X :!, i I. 881 ( m: ...otiiig that althcveb the 
summons had provided an incorrect filing deadline, the error did not prejudice defendant 
and was "inconsequential") Finally, "the validity of [an] amendment under Rule I 
Rich's reliance on Martin v. A. . ~a b*j, ^ u u i ,y . ;>;, is misplaced. 
The Supreme Court has limited Martin to its facts. See Meyers v. Interwest Corp,, 632 
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turns on actual notice, not on whether process has been served." Sulzen v. Holton, 1999 
UT App 76, \ 26, 977 P.2d 497 (discussing Rule 15(c) in context of service of process).13 
C. Rich Suffered No Prejudice from the Summons' Use of a 20-Day Time 
Period, 
When examined as a whole, Rich has failed to show both below and on appeal how 
he suffered any prejudice from the 20-day time period set forth on the summons. First, the 
summons provided Rich with sufficient notice to allow him to retain counsel, file a 
motion to quash and motion to dismiss, and to have counsel appear at oral argument to 
defend his interest with vigor. (R.26-36; 38-39.) Second, Rich filed his first substantive 
pleading with the trial court exactly 20 days after service of process was effected; thus 
Rich was never defaulted or otherwise adversely ruled against as a result of the shortened 
time period indicated on the summons. (R.26-36.) Third, the trial court, at least 
temporarily, awarded Rich some of the relief that he requested in his responsive filing, a 
motion to dismiss, by directing the parties to engage in a good faith effort to arbitrate. 
(R. 145:20-21.) Under these circumstances where no prejudice is shown, Rich's claims 
concerning the summons are without merit. See Meyers, 632 P.2d at 881 ("Although the 
P.2d 879, 880 (Utah 1981) (stating that "Martin should not be extended beyond its 
facts"). Moreover, the court also made clear that its holding in Martin, though unclear, 
was predicated in large part on the "falsification of vital information on the return [that] 
directly [affected] the fairness of the court's proceeding." Id. The court then held that so 
long as a summons is timely filed, affording the defendant an opportunity to respond and 
appear, a defect in the summons related to the time to respond will be deemed 
"inconsequential." Id at 881. 
As the court stated in Myers, "[i]ncanting the word 'jurisdictional,' . . . does not 
raise the defect in the summons to the level of interdicting the exercise of the all power by 
the court to act." Meyers, 632 P.2d at 881. 
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summons may have been defective (in its description of the time allotted to respond), the 
defect was inconsequential"}z Alpha BCU*K </.. M-* i Jv,..-. 12. 
in a Responsive Motion. 
Rich waived any argument regarding the summons because he failed to raise u ^ 
his initial in ill <n ( » «111• i';11 in molion I Irani,,\; .Vri I ll.tli I ' ' i \ 1 I '(j',1, (h) '"" 
rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, '[ajparty waives all defenses and objections 
h he does not present either by motion ~r. if he has made no motion, in his 
atiswti ei icplj. kcliii r unnhmuui e /' 
LJJS). Moreover, failure to raise an available i^ v^y defense in an initial motion made 
under the rule results in waiver. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(g) (stating that "the party shall not 
|i, , ,aiter make a molum hut .tl tMI any u! IIK defenses in ubf \ lion,, ?a» ,HI111 led. e\t ep" a( 
provided in subdivision (h) of this rule); Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Sons, 808 P.2d 
1061, 1066-67 (Utah 1991) ("It is evident that the policy of Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules 
of Ci v il I Procedure is to require all such motion . . .^v.. v. 
a! Ilia same linie so its lo pruiuoU* judicial efficiency, and to reduce litigation expense."), 
overruled on other grounds by Gillette v. Price, 2006 UT 24, 135 P.3d 861. 
Rich's September l! Mli|1 Mofioi: U (Ja1 ash alleged merd) lJ:,'i! 1'hi sj/mn tits *WL, 
defective benmsf 11r i-moans server hail failed to endorse and date the summons at the 
time of service. (R.30-32.) Nowhere in the motion did R ich claim that the summons 
should be quashed due to an error concerning the time allotted iui his response, (R.MJ 
32.) Riih'ij iiiutJ'jj! lu dismiss, 
response time, but instead this motion centered on arbitration, citing Rule 12(b)(1). (R.33-
27 
36.) The trial court addressed both motions in its September 16, 2005 hearing, granting 
Rich's motion to dismiss in part, while reserving a ruling on the motion to quash pending 
the Homeowners' response. (R. 145:19.) Admittedly, Rich's counsel raised the issue 
during the hearing (R. 145:16), but not in either written motion. As a result, Rich's 
argument about the summons was waived and should not be considered. 
E. The Homeowners Cured Any Defect in the Summons by Serving 
Another Summons on Rich in Utah. 
Additionally and alternatively, the Homeowners cured any defect in the summons 
served in California by Mr. Schultz by serving yet another summons and complaint on 
Rich during a visit to the Property in Utah on December 6, 2005. (R.44-448.) Based on 
this supplemental service of a summons and complaint in Utah—which properly provided 
a 20-day response time—any error in service of the initial summons was cured and 
inconsequential. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN ISSUING 
THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER WITHOUT REQUIRING A 
BOND, 
By rule, the trial court had ample discretion to issue a temporary restraining order 
without also ordering the Homeowners to post a security bond. Pursuant to Rule 65(A) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "The court shall condition the issuance of the order or 
injunction on the giving of security by the applicant, in such sum and form as the court 
deems proper, unless it appears that none of the parties will incur or suffer costsy attorney 
fees or damage as the result of any wrongful order or injunction" Id. (emphasis 
supplied). "[I]f there is an absence of proof showing a likelihood of harm, certainly no 
bond is necessary." Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
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Saints v. Wallace, 573 P.2d 1285, 1287 (Utah 1978). Because the decision to issue a bond 
is left to the trial court's sound discretion, i eversai is on 1> \ v ai ranted i f the decision i s 
'k-'-m • -!^n;sical, or manifestly unreasonable judgment.'" 
Winnebago Tribe v. Stovall, 341 F.3d 1202. 1205-06 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Coletti v. 
CuddPressure Control, i o.- ^ "s was not the case here. 
A. o N i ^ , Ai^u^u .», ^ , „ ntil Alu i the TRO Issued. 
The (viri should reject Rich's argument thai the tn.il conn cired in failing to 
condition the TRO on the payment oi m , . ,.._, . . . . . , - A uu ;•. i 
on l;y a ftei the FR 0 issi led On September 16, 2005, the trial court held a hearing on the 
_meowners' motion for TRO. (R38-39; 145.) Rich was aware that the hearing had been 
scheduled, and in fact, his attorney appeareu ai u.v rearing ana ined suiisiaiiu . 
-•Liument to the trial court 
concerning security until well after the TRO had issued. (R33-36;145; 379-383.) 
Consequently, the trial court's issuance of the r - v> nhout requiring a bond was neither 
JLP. Rich Presented No Evidence That He Would Suffer Damage from a 
Wrongful Injunction. 
(perhaps because Rich insisted on appearing "specially" at the TRO hearing (R. 145:3, 21, 
Rich's counsel maintained that he was appearing "specially, * solely for the 
purpose of contesting jurisdiction even though "the distinction between general and 
special appearances has been effectively abolished by Rule 12(b), which permits 
jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional defenses to be joined " Curtis v, Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 
725 n. 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
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30, 31)), Rich presented to the trial court absolutely no evidence that the order might 
expose Rich to any legitimate additional costs or harm. Rich submitted no affidavit 
evidence, offered no testimony from experts or otherwise, and in fact offered the trial 
court no specific argument of harm beyond counsel's unsubstantiated contention at oral 
argument that the injunction may cost Rich the "building season" and that it might cost 
"added expense." (R. 145:25.) As a result, decision to issue the TRO without a bond was 
no abuse of discretion. 
C. Any Error Was Cured by the Bond Subsequently Filed by the 
Homeowners, 
Even if the trial court erred in failing to initially order the Homeowners to issue 
security—which as discussed above was not the case—the trial court later rectified the 
error rendering the alleged error harmless.15 (R.384). Here, although the trial court did not 
initially require the Homeowners to post a bond, in its November 4, 2005 Order, the court 
issued a preliminary injunction, (R.360-84), and ordered the Homeowners to post a 
security bond (R.383). The Homeowners did so. (R.394). Thus, Rich's grievance should 
be rendered moot because any perceived error was cured when the bond was later posted. 
D, Any Error Was Mooted by Rich's Eventual Defeat at Trial. 
Likewise, any error resulting from the trial court's initial refusal to impose a 
bond—and there was no error—was mooted when the Homeowners prevailed below and 
15
 "'Harmless' errors are 'errors which, although properly preserved below and 
presented on appeal, are sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no 
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.'" Harline v. 
Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 442 (Utah 1996) (quotations omitted) (quoting State v. Hamilton, 
827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 61; Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. 
Harrison, 2003 UT 14, % 22, 70 P.3d 35. 
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obtained a permanent injunction against Rich, (R>N4-V^ . , ^  uoiiu u> intended to protect 
the party al lcck.il h> I In, I'K* > hum I;\[HISUH lu possible hiinu .shuuM (In1 urdn lain 1 
deemed wrongfully issued. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(c) advisory committee's notes. That 
purpose played no part in this litigation because the Homeowners' position was proven 
correct. Rich was determine- • <vJ<-
<!'-'?? i: * leowners acted properly in seeking to foreclose Rich from any 
further attempts "•- > ioiai the CCAiKs. rluis \h • \C i >, T; decision was 
inconsequential, and any alleged error harmless to kicn. 
• illL 1KIAJL cu l jRi AL. iED WELL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ITS 
AUTHORITY IN VACATING ITS ORDER DIRECTING THE PARTIES 
TO ARBITRATE THEIR DISPUTE, 
I lit tnal eouii ii biOiid auiliomv i manage tins i .i t |teniiillul in i .n [in ii 
decision to reqi lire the parties to arbitrate. Among the 'trial court's available options in 
managing matters before it is the power to revisit and revise, prior to entry of final 
judgment, any interlocutory order that it has entered. Here, the ti ial :() i ii t gi anted in pai t 
R ich's motion t : dism iss the I lomeowners' claims, but rather than dismiss, the trial court 
diiected the parties to arbitrate, notwithstanding the Homeowners' argument that Rich had 
waived arbitration. I Jpon reconsideration, the Court fii st determined that it had sntei ed 
the ordei Iiih aste w h Icli led the coi ii 1:1 :) cancel the order. Then, upon reflection, the court 
^.craiined that the Homeowners had been correct and that Rich had waived the right to 
• ' ^rate, Consequently, the trial court vacated its earlier order directing the parties to 
a* * Kill, wliiili Ii";, ii'|KTalioni nil! t,ir< ' iliivrslnl llic iirhilwilioii pirndl ol fiuthorilv will nuilt1 
any documents issued by the arbitration panel a legal nullity. 
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A. The Trial Court Was Vested with Inherent Authority to Revisit and 
Revise Its Earlier, Interlocutory Decisions, 
Trial courts have inherent discretion to reexamine any decision made prior to the 
entry of final judgment and the trial court's decision to do so in this case was proper. 
Under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a trial court is permitted "'to 
change its position with respect to any order or decision before a final judgment has been 
rendered in the case.'" U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App 303, \ 55, 990 P.2d 
945 (quoting Trembley v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994)). In fact, "Rule 54(b) allows courts to readjust prior rulings in . . . cases . . . unless 
those ruling disposed of entire claims or parties and those rulings were specifically 
certified as final." Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 44 n.5 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); see also Trembley, 884 P.2d at 1310 n.2 (stating that Rule 54(b) 
"allows a court to change its position with respect to any order or decision before final 
judgment has been rendered in the case"). 
So long as the trial court does not exceed the limits of its discretion in doing so, 
"any judge is free to change his or her mind on the outcome of a case until a decision is 
formerly rendered." Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 757, 760 (Utah 1985). Trial courts have 
been granted such expansive power because such decisions may "facilitate^ the just and 
speedy resolution of disputes in the trial court," and revisiting decisions can save time and 
effort that otherwise may be required later in the litigation or on appeal. Kennedy v. New 
Era Indus., Inc., 600 P.2d 535, 536 (Utah 1979); see also Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 
1178, 1185 (Utah 1993). 
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This Court has outlined certain factors that may support the reconsideration of a 
prior ruling, including whether the trial court has considered the matter "in a 'different 
injustice" results from the order. 7 rembley, 884 P.2d at 1311 (quoting State v. O'Neil, 848 
P.2d 694, 697 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). Clearly, "[i]f a court believes one of its prior 
t 0 aCqUi re that belief, " Le Francois v. Prabhe Goel, 112 P.3d 636, 645 (Cal. 2005), 
'"[a] court could not operate successfully under the requirement of infallibility in 
its interim rulings. [A iiijiscarriage of justice results \;v liei e a com t is unable to coi i ect its 
o vn perceived legal errors '" U I (citation omitted). 
Here, on the morning of the hearing on the Homeowners' motion for TRO, Rich 
presented a motion to dismiss in which lie argued mat lie IKK, » vcv^u iigh. to arbitration 
The Homeowners advised the trial court that Rich had waived any right he otherwise had 
to arbitration when he failed to file timely notice with the iiomeowners Association, but 
llu'li'idl i mill 'Mil, iiihUMvnl ll* i 1") -1 K i A HIT first iiolm}' llliiil tin I loiiieowncrs linull IIUHI 
had time to address the motion, (R. 145:20-22, 37-38, 40-43), the court ordered the parties 
"to engage in arbitration within 14 days" m 1/1* and the Homeowners reluctantly 
of complying with an adverse arbitration order, and he demonstrated his disdain for the 
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process by, among other things, refusing to comply with the terms of the TRO issued 
contemporaneously with the order to arbitrate. (R.45-48, 50-58, 177-213.)16 
On September 27, 2005, the Homeowners, responding to Rich's provocative 
conduct, and prior to the scheduled arbitration, asked the trial court to reconsider its 
arbitration decision, in essence to ensure that no manifest injustice occurred as a result of 
the order. (R.50-58.) The trial court, quickly concluded that the Homeowners' position 
had merit, and it cancelled its arbitration order until further notice, effectively vacating 
the arbitration that had been scheduled pursuant to the trial court's order. (R.62-63.) 
Subsequently, after permitting Rich an opportunity to respond to the Homeowners' 
request, the trial court determined that it had erred in issuing the arbitration order. (R.200-
06 (stating that trial court's earlier order to arbitrate was "improvident and incorrect").) 
As should be eminently clear from the record, the trial court's September 16, 2005 
order was issued without the benefit of an examination of substantive, material 
information concerning the arbitration issue. (R.145.) First, an order directing arbitration 
is not a final order. See Cade v. Zion 's First Nat Bank, 956 P.2d 1073, 1076-77 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998) (concluding that "orders compelling arbitration and staying the underlying 
actions are not final orders"). Second, Rich filed his motion to dismiss immediately prior 
to the hearing on the TRO, providing the Homeowners with no substantive opportunity to 
16
 The trial court's findings and conclusions in its October 6, 2005 Minute Entry 
Ruling and Order remain unchallenged by Rich. Instead, Rich has obliquely challenged 
the trial court's authority to make the decision to first cancel, and then vacate, the 
September 16, 2005 Order that directed the parties to arbitrate. See Appellant's Brief at 
15-22. Thus, if this Court concludes that the Court acted within its authority in 
reconsidering the September 16, 2005 Order, the results of that reconsideration should be 
affirmed as effectively unchallenged. 
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respond to the motion in writing.. (R.145.) Yet, even in the face of the Homeowners' 
arguments concerning Rich's failure to invoke, thereby waiving the arbitration clause of 
the • CC&R s, the t t: ial : • : 1 u 1: c • t: ;i 2 1: e dthepai ties to arbiti ate • (P 1 5 18 ) 
Prior to the arbitration hearing, and after receiving information from the 
Homeowners that reflected upon Rich's noncompliance with the trial court's iKCT the 
aibitiation order and expressly dete^um^d that its order was made in haste, and possibly 
in error. (R.45-48.) Having come that that decision, the trial court's cancellation of its 
September 1 ...... ^  
* ^ • *' s permitted range of discretion. 
"N o final order had been entered in the case—whether by the court 01 by the 
arbitration panel—ana the ;i. . .>u.. .. decision to cam.. ... .ler pending fui thei 1 e v ie vv 
e n s u r e d lli-il (In m.ii.HiL* -* ! *gai cnur. Consequently, the trial 
court's decision to cancel its arbitration order was proper, and this Court should reject 
Rich's claims to the contrary. 
1
' The trial court also could have simply waited until the arbitration panel had 
completed its task before vacating the order. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-124 (l)(c), 
(d), (e) (2007). The trial court found that its order directing the parties to arbitrate was 
incorrect, and that no agreement to arbitrate existed at the time that the order was made. 
(11,202, 206.) In the absence of an agreement to arbitrate, the court could not order the 
tneowners to do so. See Cade v. lion's First Nat Bank, 956 P.2d 1073, 1076-77 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998) ("Arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to 
submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed to submit."). Moreover, it is 
clear in Utah that a party that submits to arbitration pursuant to a trial court's orde" In 
arbitrate does not waive the right to challenge either the trial court's decision or the 
arbitration award. See id. at 1080. Consequently, because the trial court has the authority 
under Rule 54(b) to revisit its decisions, and the authority under section 78-3 la-124 to 
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B. The Trial Court Properly Determined That the Parties Were Not 
Bound by Any Arbitration Agreement and It Properly Vacated Its 
Order Directing the Parties to Arbitrate 
Upon reconsideration, the trial court properly concluded that the parties' dispute 
was not subject to any arbitration agreement because Rich had waived the right to 
arbitrate. (R. 192-207.) "Waiver requires three elements: (1) an existing right, benefit, or 
advantage; (2) knowledge of its existence; and (3) an intention to relinquish the right." 
Soter's Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc, 857 P.2d 935, 940 (Utah 1993). 
Generally, silence alone is insufficient to justify the finding of waiver; however, that 
general principle is suspended when "there is some duty or obligation to speak." Plateau 
Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands, 802 P.2d 720, 730 (Utah 1990) (quoted favorably 
in Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Utah 1991), and 
Brinton v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 973 P.2d 956, 965 (Utah 1998)). "The issue of whether a 
contractual right of arbitration has been waived involves mixed questions of law and 
fact" Cedar Surgery Ctr. v. Bonelli, 2004 UT 58, H 6, 96 P.3d 911. '"[T]he actions or 
events allegedly supporting waiver are factual in nature and should be reviewed as factual 
determinations."' Id. (quoting Pledger v Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, \ 16, 982 P.2d 572). 
The parties agree that under the CC&Rs, Rich had a latent right to submit his 
dispute with the Homeowners to arbitration, but that his right to do so was limited. See 
Addendum A, § 8.3. Moreover, the parties further agree that for the right to arbitrate to 
trigger, Rich was required to "file a written notice of the existence and nature of the 
vacate arbitration awards when no agreement to arbitrate existed, Rich's argument 
concerning the binding effect of the purported arbitration award simply is without merit 
and should be rejected. 
134826 
36 
dispute with the Association within 30 days after he discovers, learns or has notice of 
such determination, decision or action." Id. The parties part ways, however, when Rich 
i eqiiii emei it an i:i thus failed to trigger the arbitration clause of the CC&Rs. Yet, the trial 
court's unchallenged factual findings resolve this dispute in the Homeowners' favor, 
The trial court examined me f. 'y .vi\ ; 
d;iuse was triggered mil1, i\\) >n service of proper notice within 30 days of the decision in 
dispute. (R.206.) The trial court then found that Rich "knew of the decision" rejecting his 
planned construction on July " . . j ^ . - . ....v. ,u*. ^. . .JHI" In;111>iiia(i' was ddivnal, ;il 
!i cai lh^}. . =• \u«ust 29,2005, and that the demand 
was not served by certified or registered mail. (R.202-06.) Thus, because Rich's demand 
was not properly served, pursuant tc • . • ^ Ami. ^ • . . and because It \ v as 
delivei ed moi e than t1:i ii t] r d -J ". * ommittee's adverse 
decision, the trial court found that he had waived his right to arbitration, (R, 197-207 ) 
Rich fails to mount any proper challenge to these iihdings, fails to cite them and 
iiij: ^ * fundamental 
briefing requirements, the trial court's findings are amply supported in the record. The 
trial court noted that Kenny, president of the Homeowners Association, test.iwu . v 
affidavit dial ,ai llit c\mm\!: ol July /'"I Mil '> Ii li,,i I , ailed Rich mimediir^ 
Committee had met concerning Rich's project. (R.182.) Kenny further testified that he 
T O 
By implication, the court found that Rich was aware of the arbitration provision 
and its triggering provision. 
J / 
informed Rich by voicemail, that he risked legal action if he failed to halt his construction 
project. (R.183.) Kenny then testified that he called Rich's architect, who happens to be 
Rich's son-in-law, and informed him directly of the Homeowners Association's decision, 
only to be met with defiance. (R.183.) Finally, Kenny testified that on August 29, 2005, 
he found a letter on his doorstep written by Rich's architect. (R.183.) In that letter, for the 
first time, Rich demanded that the dispute be resolved through arbitration. (R.183.) The 
trial court noted that Kenny's testimony was confirmed by the affidavit testimony of 
Kenny's wife, and his neighbor and fellow Homeowners Association member, James E.B. 
Stuart. (R.202-04.)19 
This record evidence supports the trial court's decision, and the careful analysis 
evidenced in the trial court's October 6, 2005 memorandum decision advocates just one 
result: This Court should conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
finding that Rich waived his right to arbitration by failing to timely file his arbitration 
demand, and determine that the findings supporting this ultimate finding are not clearly 
erroneous. See Brinton, 973 P.2d at 966 (noting that appellant was "contractually bound 
to raise any objections during the process or relinquish them as waived"). Accordingly, 
In his effort to overturn the trial court's waiver decision, Rich cites "R.961," 
which is a page of the trial court's final substantive memorandum decision, issued on 
March 16, 2007. However, nowhere in that order is the issue of waiver or notice 
addressed. Instead, this ruling solely addresses the Homeowners' request for permanent 
injunction and Rich's abandonment defense. (R.951-93.) The court's decision on the 
waiver issue was filed October 6, 2005, nearly two years prior to the decision referenced 
by Rich. (R. 177-213.) Rich's attempt to reverse the October 6, 2005 decision through 
reference to a finding entered almost two years later, and without marshaling evidence in 
support of the court's decision and showing how it is insufficient, or even pointing to 




this Court should affirm the trial court's determination that R ich waived his right to 
arbitrate.20 
£9 jlie Xrial Court Properly Determined that the Acknowledgment to 
Arbitrate was Insufficient to Create a Binding Agreement to Arbitrate. 
The trial court.'s admission that it erred in ordering the parties to arbitrate should 
moot .. . argument i -.u . - -.L uu iw •. i£jv-^" 
however, this Court should reject Rich's claims because the acknowledgment does not 
represent a voluntary agreement between the parties. Instead, as the trial court expressly 
found, Uic nomeowners signed the acknowledgemen t c n I) T because the coiii t had 01 dei e d 
them lu \ nopcrate, Further, because Rich executed material, handwritten changes to the 
document, no meeting of the minds occurred, void the agreement. (R. 198-204.) "A 
condition precedent to the enforcement of any contrail i;, '(IMI llint k a mediug o1 lln 
... .n . j
 o u ^ either expressly or impliedly, with 
sufficient definiteness to be enforced," Pingree v. Cont'l Group, 558 P.2d 1317, 1321 
(Utah 1976). Here, as the trial court, ivun*i. tin homeowners "signed the agreement 
ON I Y BEC t \ I JSE th< = • r i, I : >r< h * e d tlic mi 1 .< i m ; j i i i: I < f t h e ' IE O process." (R.202 
"' Rich offers other arguments in his effort to reverse the trial court's waiver 
finding; however, these arguments are undeveloped and without merit and should be 
rejected on that basis. 
' Although Rich asserts various arguments in reliance on the acknowledgement, 
the Homeowners have been unable to locate copies of the acknowledgements in the 
record. Rich cites "R.89, ex. 2" and "R.248, ex. 1 at 3." However, the first cite leads ooly 
to the purported "Interim Award" of the arbitration panel, and the second to Rich's 
"Petition for Interlocutory Appeal," filed as an exhibit to his renewed motion to dismiss. 
(R.89, ex. 1.) In neither case does Rich point this Court to anywhere in the record 
containing the acknowledgements he would rely on as an alternative means to vest the 
arbitration panel with jurisdiction above the trial court's. 
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(emphasis in original).) They had not agreed to arbitration, had not conceded that Rich 
was correct in requesting arbitration, and in fact, maintained that Rich had waived his 
right to arbitrate by failing to make a timely arbitration demand. (R.202.) In short, as the 
trial court found, the Homeowners had not voluntarily submitted to the process, including 
the acknowledgment, but instead, they had been ordered to participate by the trial court. 
(R.202.) Rich's failure to challenge these findings, should result in summary affirmation.. 
The trial court further found that the parties had failed to agree upon certain 
material terms applicable to the putative arbitration. (R.200-03.) The trial court found that 
Rich had inserted "additional 'conditions' which effectively would allow him to claim the 
arbitration was not binding" upon him. (R.203.) This language, in effect, reserved to Rich, 
the right to assert that the trial court had no jurisdiction over him in the event of an 
adverse award, thus eliminating any possible avenue available to the Homeowners to 
enforce such an order. (R.200 ("Based upon the language [the Homeowners] interpreted, 
correctly and wisely in the court's view, that [Rich] was willing to have an arbitration 
panel examine the issues, but if that panel action was unfavorable to [Rich, he] could still 
claim the court had no jurisdiction to order the arbitration or enforce the arbitration 
award.").) The trial court's findings, in effect, agreed with the Homeowners' position that 
Rich had attempted to alter the acknowledgment terms; so, to the extent that the 
acknowledgement had any bearing on the trial court's decision that arbitration had been 
waived, the trial court found that it had no legal effect and was void as a matter of law. 
(R.200-06.) 
Rather than address the trial court's decision directly—or even challenge any of 
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the trial court 's factual findings—Rich offers h is own interpretation of events. However, 
the record fully supports the trial court 's decision. 'NK. Homeowners never would have 
contemplated the ackno v\ l e d g e m e n t absent the ti ial con n t 's c i der to arbitrate,,. le 
absence of that order, the Homeowners would have maintained their position that Rich 
waived the right to arbitrate the dispute. Thus, the acknowledgment had no authority 
voluntarily entered into an agreement to arbitrate. 
Moreover, the Homeowners never would have agreed to a term that would have 
pe rmnu ;em< vision ad\ erse to his intei est and th 
court properly recognized that fact. The ability to enforce an arbitration order is central to 
any party's expectations concerning arbitration, and in the absence of such power, 
submitting to arbitration would be willimii \alut, ('uitsequenily Ittvausi' the llomniwiu'is 
were coerced into signing the acknowledgment by the trial court's own order, and because 
ELich injected material terms into the agreement that the Homeowners never would have 
accepted, thus precluding a meeting 01 u\c i....;j... .... ..,„. ~ ..:; p;, , ~. . 
th»* ^ i-.'^\ It^ locniiM ' effect. 
1 1 . T H E TRIAL C O U R T A C T E D W I T H I N ITS D I S C R E T I O N A R Y P O W E R S 
IN STRIKING T H E J U R Y D E M A N D . 
The ti la 1 :oi in: I: v as enti i :i stedb] i i lie ; v ith the discretion to deny a party access to a 
jury in equitable matters. See Utah R, Civ. P. 39(a), (a)(2). "When trial by jury has been 
demanded . . . [t]he trial of all issues so demanded shall be by jury, unless
 ; ,j,.e court 
u p o n il mi 11 ill in in 1 in Il ill > ill i i i i i i a l i v e f i n d s ' flu ill j mi i > I  i I i i f IHIUI! 1 ^ | HI I I i>f s o n i c i n il l nilf 
those issues does not exist." Id. " I n circumstances where doubt exists as to whether the 
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cause should be regarded as one in equity, or one in law wherein a party can insist on a 
jury as a matter of right, the trial court should have some latitude of discretion.'" Corbet 
v. Cox, 30 Utah 2d 361, 517 P.2d 1318, 1320 (1974) (quoting Sweeny v. Happy Valley, 18 
Utah 2d 113, 427 P.2d 126 (1966)). When making this determination, the trial court is 
permitted to '"examine into the nature of the rights asserted and the remedies sought in 
the light of the facts of the case.'" Id. 
Where the trial court is presented with issues of equity and law, "the equitable 
issue raised should first be disposed of as in a court of equity, and then if an issue at law 
remains, it is triable to a jury." Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat Bank, 260 U.S. 235, 242 
(1922). An equitable claim raised before the trial court "makes the issue equitable and it 
is to be tried to the judge as a chancellor." Id. Fundamentally, however, '"it is the 
prerogative of the judge who actually tries the case to make the determination'" as to 
whether the issues presented lie in equity or law, and that judge's ruling should not be 
disturbed absent an abuse of its discretion. Corbet, 517 P.2d at 1320 (quoting Happy 
Valley, All P.2d 126); see also Golberg v. Timmons & Assocs., 869 P.2d 1241, 1242 n.2 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) (stating that "it is for the court to decide the legal or equitable 
nature of the case after assessing the substance of the issues involved"). 
In the instant case, prior to the scheduled trial date, the trial court limited Rich's 
damage claims (R.786-95), and the Homeowners abandoned all claims except their claim 
for injunctive relief, and fees associated with that relief (R.802-07). In an effort to 
22
 As recognized in the federal rules, "[w]hen certain of the issues are to be tried by 
jury and others by the court, the court may determine the sequence in which the issues 
shall be tried." Fed. R. Civ. P. 39 advisory committee notes. 
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streamline the remaining litigation, the Homeowners moved to withdraw their jury 
demand and asked to present their case to the bench. (R.802-07.) The trial court 
ultimately denied the Homeowners' motion pursuant to Rule 38 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; thus, Rich prevailed. (R.930.) 
However, the trial court, in an exercise of its inherent authority and discretion 
under Rule 39(a)(2), proceeded to evaluate the parties' remaining claims. (R.930.) The 
trial court fully and fairly examined the nature of the remaining claims and the remedies 
sought by both parties (R.930-38), and determined that the primary issues remaining were 
the Homeowners' request for injunctive relief and Rich's claim that the Homeowners had 
abandoned the section of the CC&Rs they were seeking to enforce against him (R.930-
48). The trial court then concluded that u[i]n a very real sense, the remedy sought by 
plaintiffs is purely equitable at this point, and the claims of defendant as to why there 
should be no injunction are also purely equitable." (R.945.) 
It remains largely undisputed that the primary claims before the trial court at the 
time of its ruling were equitable in nature, and that Rich filed no objection, of any kind, to 
the trial court's exercise of its inherent jurisdiction.23 See Golberg, 869 P.2d at 1242 ("A 
request for injunctive relief for violation of CC&Rs is brought in equity."). Thus, Rich 
failed to bring this claimed error to the trial court's attention, eliminating any opportunity 
for the trial court to correct the alleged error. As a result, Rich's claim regarding the trial 
The Homeowners could not locate such an objection, and in any case, the duty to 
cite where in the record an issue is preserved lies squarely on the appellant. 
17/1COA 
43 
court's decision to require the parties to present their cases to the bench, and not a jury, 
was not preserved below and is not properly before this Court. 
Moreover, Rich's claim focuses on his complaint that he had been preparing for a 
jury trial, not a bench trial. Appellant's Brief at 30. This argument, supported by the 
distinguishable case of Zions First National Bank v. Rocky Mountain Irrigation, Inc., 795 
P.2d 658 (Utah 1990), should be rejected. 
In Zions, the Supreme Court addressed when a trial court has the obligation to 
present equitable issues to a jury and concluded that such action is required "when legal 
and equitable issues turn on the same operative facts." Id. at 662. Here, as it is entitled to 
do, the trial court evaluated the issues remaining before it, and concluded that the sole 
question was whether the setback provisions of the CC&Rs remained enforceable, and if 
so, whether an injunction should issue. (R.938-45.) Rich's sole defense was that the 
provision had been abandoned, and only if he was successful in his effort would any other 
issues arise. (R.938-45.) The outcome of these issues would in no way turn on Rich's 
claims of bad faith and trustee liability, and in fact, these claims were cognizable only if 
he succeeded in his abandonment claim.24 Thus, in contrast to Zions, the trial court was 
not confronted with any legal issues whose outcome would turn on the same facts as the 
equitable issues. In short, the trial court determined that the equitable issues presented by 
the parties must be resolved before a jury could perform even the simplest of its required 
tasks; thus, the trial court's decision was not contrary to Zions and was instead well within 
24
 Rich's failure to cite to the record concerning material aspects of this argument 
creates a substantial barrier for providing this Court with a meaningful response to his 
assertions. Thus, the Homeowners have limited their response. 
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the trial court's inherent discretion. 
Because the trial court's decision was merely an exercise of its inherent discretion, 
and embodied the trial court's decision to exercise its authority to manage the matter 
currently before it, this Court should affirm the trial court's decision. 
VIL THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED THE HOMEOWNERS 
THEIR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
Following the resolution of the principal dispute between the parties, pursuant to 
the CC&Rs the trial court awarded the Homeowners, as the prevailing party, their costs 
and reasonable attorney fees. The Court should reject Rich's challenges to the trial court's 
award, because the award was contractually based, and the evidence supports the award. 
A. The Trial Court Properly Construed the CC&Rs in Awarding Fees to 
the Homeowners, 
The plain language of the CC&Rs authorized the award of the Homeowners' 
attorney fees. If attorney fees are awardable by contract, the award "is allowed only in 
accordance with the terms of the contract." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 
988 (Utah 1988). There is no dispute here that the CC&Rs form a binding contract 
between the parties. 
Under the terms of the CC&Rs, "If court proceedings are instituted in connection 
Although Rich has cited other authority in his effort to prevail on this issue, that 
authority is inapplicable. Specifically, these cases, almost universally, involve the trial 
court taking the case from a seated jury, often after the issues had been submitted to the 
jury. See, e.g.,Flynn v. Harlin Construction Co, 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P.2d 356, 357 
(1973) (directed verdict); First Sec. Bank v. Lundahl, Inc. 22 Utah 2d 433, 454 P.2d 886, 
889 (1969) (after jury rendered verdict, trial court awarded plaintiff amount different than 
jury verdict); Uptown Appliance & Radio Co. v. Flint, 122 Utah 298, 249 P.2d 826, 827, 
829 (1952) (new trial ordered following jury's verdict); Goldberg v. Timmons & Assocs., 
896 P.2d 1241,1241 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (case tried to jury). 
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with the rights of enforcement and remedies provided in this Declaration, the prevailing 
party shall be entitled to recover its costs and expenses in connection therewith, including 
reasonable attorney fees." Addendum A, § 7.1. This language is easily interpreted. When 
parties subject to the CC&Rs engage in litigation in an effort to enforce, or stop the 
enforcement of, the terms of the CC&Rs, attorney fees and costs are available to the party 
that prevails in the action. This language leaves no room for any reasonable alternative 
interpretation. Thus, under the terms of the CC&Rs, the trial court properly determined 
that the prevailing party to this litigation was eligible for an award of costs and fees. 
Rich, in an effort to avoid responsibility for the Homeowners fees and costs, asked 
the trial court, and now this Court, to ignore the plain language of section 7.1 and to 
instead read section 7.3 as somehow limiting section 7.1. This argument is without merit. 
First, it is a basic tenet of contract interpretation that everything within a contract 
should be given effect, if possible. See Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, \ 
17, 84 P.3d 1134. In that vein, the language of section 7.1 clearly sets forth the conditions 
under which costs and fees can be awarded, and nothing within section 7.1 suggests that it 
is limited or modified by other provisions within the CC&Rs. In other words, the 
language of section 7.1 is clear, unambiguous, and subject to only one reasonable 
interpretation, which should be given effect, unencumbered by the limiting language that 
Rich seeks to apply. 
Second, section 7.3 itself reflects a meaning that does not apply to section 7.1, but 
instead indicates that it is intended to protect the officers and management of the 
Homeowners Association from any potential direct liability associated with their 
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decisions. It does not extend to the residents of the Subdivision. Specifically, section 7.3 
sets forth that "[n]either the Declarant, the Association, the Board of Trustees of the 
Association, the Architectural Committee nor any member, agent or employee of any of 
the same shall be liable to any party for any action or for any failure to act with respect to 
any matter if the action taken or failure to act was in good faith and without malice." See 
Addendum A, § 7.3. The list of those protected under section 7.1 is specific and limited. 
Only those who participate in managing the Subdivision, and those who are authorized to 
make decisions related to the Subdivision or who execute the manager's decisions, are 
shielded from direct liability. Moreover, although it is not clearly set forth, the "liability 
shield" applies to those actions, or failures to act, related to management of the 
Subdivision through the exercise of powers granted by the CC&Rs. Consequently, section 
7.3 plays no role in the application or interpretation of section 7.1, and the sole 
requirements that must be met for the award of attorney fees under the CC&Rs exist 
within section 7.1. Therefore, Rich's arguments to the contrary should be rejected. 
B. The Trial Court Should Affirm the Trial Court's Fee Award, Which 
Was Based on Unchallenged Findings. 
Rich's arguments concerning the amount of the trial court award is also without 
merit. The Homeowners first renew their argument that Rich failed to marshal the 
evidence in support of the award and they also renew their argument that Rich has shifted 
The language of section 7.3 also suggests that its protections extend solely to 
direct liability for damages caused by the decisions of those protected. The language does 
not suggest, necessarily, that these parties would be immune from responsibility for 
awards under section 7.1. 
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the burden of research and argument to this Court. For these reasons alone, this Court 
should reject Rich's claim. However, Rich's argument also fails on the merits. 
First, the "[calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound discretion of the 
trial court" and will not be reversed absent a "clear abuse of discretion." Dixie State Bank 
v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 989 (Utah 1988). The award, however, must be supported by 
"evidence in the record," id., and the record must reflect that the trial court considered a 
variety of factors, Amyx v. Columbia House Holdings, Inc., 2005 UT 118, |^ 3, 110 P.3d 
176 (mem). The trial court's eventual decision is not bound by the prevailing party's 
"affidavit of expenses," id., but instead a trial court should examine the nature of the work 
performed, the difficulty of the litigation, the number of hours required by the case, the 
customary hourly fee charged by attorneys in the area, and the expertise and experience of 
the attorneys involved. Id. "When a trial court's findings are insufficient to permit 
meaningful review, this court ordinarily does not make its own factual findings, but 
remands the case for the entry of additional findings." Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 
890, 902 (Utah 1996) (Zimmerman, C.J., concurring in Russon, J.'s, maj. op.). 
In the instant case, after the trial, the Homeowners' trial counsel submitted an 
affidavit of costs and fees to the trial court. The court examined this affidavit, along with 
Rich's objections, and then issued a comprehensive ruling on the issue. (R. 1062-82.) The 
trial court found that the affidavit sufficiently identified each person who performed legal 
work in furtherance of the Homeowners' case and that through the application of simple 
arithmetic the amount of time each person expended on the case was easily determined. 
(R. 1068-70.) The trial court then found that trial counsel's rates were reasonable for the 
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area, (R.1070) and that the because of the nature of the case, the Homeowners were 
entitled to "substantial fees" (R.1071). In support of this decision, the trial court found 
that Rich was "responsible for the bulk of [the] litigation," and noted that it had 
considered the factors established in Bracken. (R.1071.) After applying the Bracken 
factors, the trial court found that the amount requested by the Homeowners was not 
entirely reasonable, in part because portions of the affidavit of costs and fees were 
incomplete or required the trial court to guess as to its application to the case. (R.1071-
73.) Thus, the trial court reduced the award by a total of $25,000. (R. 1073-80.) 
The trial court made a concerted effort to comply with the requirements established 
under Utah law. It considered the Bracken factors, see Bracken, 746 P.2d at 989-991, and 
the factors later articulated mAmyx, 2005 UT 118, f 3. Through the application of these 
factors, the trial court determined that the majority of the Homeowners' requested costs 
and fees were reasonable. To the extent that Rich challenges the reasonableness of the 
amount of the award, as stated by Justice Zimmerman, a trial court's "ruling from the 
bench that [the] bills were 'excessive'" is sufficient to survive a challenge to either the 
findings or the reasonableness determination itself, and here the trial court's ruling clearly 
exceeded this minimal standard. Salmon, 916 P.2d at 902 (Zimmerman, C.J., concurring 
in Russon, J., maj. op.). Therefore, the Court should reject Rich's challenge to the trial 
court's award of attorney fees. 
VIIL THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD TO THE HOMEOWNERS THE COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED TO DEFEND THIS APPEAL. 
Assuming that the Homeowners prevail on appeal, this Court should award to them 
all of their costs and fees incurred through defending the trial court's decisions. "[W]hen 
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a party who received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, 'the party is also entitled to 
fees reasonably incurred on appeal.'" Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 
1998) (quoting Utah Dep't ofSoc. Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991)). Rich issues on appeal are meretricious and he has failed to comply with several 
predicate requirements of this Court under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, as detailed in Point I, above. Rich's failure to comply with Rule 24 has forced 
the Homeowners' counsel to expend substantial time and resources to respond 
appropriately to the issues Rich purports to present on appeal. Consequently, Rich should 
be ordered to reimburse the Homeowners for all of their costs and fees incurred on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should reject every issue 
that Rich has presented on appeal, affirm the trial court's decisions in total, and award the 
Homeowners their attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
134826 
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DU 
Erik A. Olson 
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Electronic Signatures in Global and National 
Commerce Act. 
Effect of chapter on prior agreements or pro-
ceedings. 
2002 7g.3la-l to 78-31a-20. Repealed. 
^Sla-101. Title. 
This chapter is known as the "Utah Uniform Arbitration 
Act." 2002 
<78-3la-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Arbitration organization" means an association, 
agency, board, commission, or other entity that is neutral 
and initiates, sponsors, or administers an arbitration 
proceeding or is involved in the appointment of an arbi-
trator. 
(2) "Arbitrator" means an individual appointed to ren-
der an award, alone or with others, in a controversy that 
is subject to an agreement to arbitrate. 
(3) "Court" means a court of competent jurisdiction in 
this state. 
(4) "Knowledge" means actual knowledge. 
(5) "Person" means an individual, corporation, busi-
ness trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability 
company, association, joint venture, government, govern-
mental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, public 
corporation, or any other legal or commercial entity. 
(6) "Record" means information that is inscribed on a 
tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other 
medium and is retrievable in perceivable form. 2002 
78-31a-103. Notice. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a person 
gives notice to another person by taking action that is reason-
ably necessary to inform the other person in ordinary course, 
whether or not the other person acquires knowledge of the 
notice. 
(2) A person has notice if the person has knowledge of the 
notice or has received notice. 
(3) A person receives notice when it comes to the person's 
attention or the notice is delivered at the person's place of 
residence or place of business, or at another location held out 
by the person as a place of delivery of such communications. 
2002 
78-31a-104. Application. 
(1) This chapter applies to any agreement to arbitrate made 
on or after May 6, 2002. 
(2) This chapter applies to any agreement to arbitrate made 
before May 6, 2002, if all the parties to the agreement or to the 
arbitration proceeding agree on the record. 2002 
78-3la-105. Effect of agreement to arbitrate — Non-
waivable provisions. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Subsections (2) and (3), 
a
 party to an agreement to arbitrate or to an arbitration 
Proceeding may waive or, the parties may vary the effect of, 
we requirements of this chapter to the extent permitted by 
law. 
(2) Before a controversy arises tha t is subject to an agree-
ment to arbitrate, a party to the agreement may not: 
(a) waive or agree to vary the effect of the requirements 
of Subsection 78-31a-106(l), 78-31a-107(l), 78-31a-118(l) 
or (2), or Section 78-31a-109, 78-31a-127, or 78-31a-129; 
(b) agree to unreasonably restrict the right under Sec-
tion 78-31a-110 to notice of the initiation of an arbitration 
proceeding; 
(c) agree to unreasonably restrict the right u n ( j e r Sec-
tion 78-31a-113 to disclosure of any facts by
 a neutral 
arbitrator; or 
(d) waive the right under Section 78-31a-117
 0f a party 
to an agreement to arbitrate to be represented by
 a lawyer 
at any proceeding or hearing under this chapter but an 
employer and a labor organization may waive the'nght to 
representation by a lawyer in a labor arbitration 
(3) A party to an agreement to arbitrate or arbitration 
proceeding may not waive, or the parties may not vary the 
effect of, the requirements of this section or Sections 78 31a 
108, 78-31a-115, 78-31a-119, 78-31a-123 through 78-3la" 125 
78-31a-130, Subsection 78-31a-104(l), 78-31a-121(3)
 0 r m o r 
78-31a-126(l) or (2). \ m 
78-31a-106. Application for judicial relief. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-31a-i29 an 
application for judicial relief under this chapter shall be made 
by motion to the court and heard in the manner provided by 
law or rule of court for making and hearing motions. 
(2) Unless a civil action involving the agreement to arbi-
trate is pending, notice of an initial motion to the court under 
this chapter shall be served in the manner provided by law for 
the service of a summons in a civil action. Otherwise, notice of 
the motion must be given in the manner provided by law or 
rule of court for serving motions in pending cases
 2002 
78-31a-107. Validity of agreement to arbitrate. 
(1) An agreement contained in a record to submit to arbi-
tration any existing or subsequent controversy arising be-
tween the parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable and 
irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at l a w o r i n 
equity for the revocation of a contract. 
(2) The court shall decide whether an agreement to arbi-
trate exists or a controversy is subject to an agreement to 
arbitrate. 
(3) An arbitrator shall decide whether a condition prece-
dent to arbitrability has been fulfilled and whether a contract 
containing a valid agreement to arbitrate is enforceable 
(4) If a party to a judicial proceeding challenges the exis-
tence of, or claims that a controversy is not subject to an 
agreement to arbitrate, the arbitration proceeding may con-
tinue pending final resolution of the issue by the court, unless 
the court otherwise orders. '
 2002 
78-31a-108. Motion to compel arbitration. 
(1) On motion of a person showing an agreement to arbi-
trate and alleging another person's refusal to arbitrate pursu-
ant to the agreement: 
(a) if the refusing party does not appear or does not 
oppose the motion, the court shall order the parties to 
arbitrate; and 
(b) if the refusing party opposes the motion, the court 
shall proceed summarily to decide the issue and order the 
parties to arbitrate unless it finds that there is no enforce-
able agreement to arbitrate. 
(2) On motion of a person alleging that an arbitration 
proceeding has been initiated or threatened but that there is 
no agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily 
to decide the issue. If the court finds that there is an enforce-
able agreement to arbitrate, it shall order the parties to 
arbitrate. 
(3) If the court finds that there is no enforceable agreement, 
it may not, pursuant to Subsection (1) or (2), order the parties 
to arbitrate. 
(4) The court may not refuse to order arbitration because 
the claim subject to arbitration lacks merit or grounds for the 
claim have not been established. 
(5) If a proceeding involving a claim referable to arbitration 
under an alleged agreement to arbitrate is pending in court, a 
78-31a-109 JUDICIAL CODE 1168 
motion under this section must be made in that court. Other-
wise a motion under this section may be made in any court &s 
provided in Section 78-31a-128. 
(6) If a party makes a motion to the court to order arbitra-
tion, the court on just terms shall stay any judicial proceeding 
that involves a claim alleged to be subject to the arbitration 
until the court renders a final decision under this section. 
(7) If the court orders arbitration, the court on just terms 
shall stay any judicial proceeding that involves a claim subject 
to the arbitration. If a claim subject to the arbitration is 
severable, the court may limit the stay to that claim. 2002 
78-31a-109. Provis ional remedies. 
(1) Before an arbitrator is appointed and is authorized and 
able to act, the court, upon motion of a party to an arbitration 
proceeding and for good cause shown, may enter an order for 
provisional remedies to protect the effectiveness of the arbi-
tration proceeding to the same extent and under the same 
conditions as if the controversy were the subject of a civil 
action. 
(2) After an arbitrator is appointed and is authorized and 
able to act: 
(a) the arbitrator may issue orders for provisional 
remedies, including interim awards, as the arbitrator 
finds necessary to protect the effectiveness of the arbitra-
tion proceeding and to promote the fair and expeditious 
resolution of the controversy, to the same extent and 
under the same conditions as if the controversy were the 
subject of a civil action; and 
(b) a party to an arbitration proceeding may move the 
court for a provisional remedy only if the matter is urgent 
and the arbitrator is not able to act timely or the arbitra-
tor cannot provide an adequate remedy. 
(3) A party does not waive a right of arbitration by making 
a motion under Subsection (1) or (2). 2002 
78-31a-110. Init iat ion of arbitration. 
(1) A person initiates an arbitration proceeding by giving 
notice in a record to the other parties to the agreement to 
arbitrate in the agreed manner between the parties or, in the 
absence of agreement, by certified or registered mail, return 
receipt requested and obtained, or by service as authorized for 
the commencement of a civil action. The notice must describe 
the nature of the controversy and the remedy sought. 
(2) Unless a person objects for lack or insufficiency of notice 
under Subsection 78-31a-116(3) not later than the beginning 
of the arbitration hearing, the person, by appearing at the 
hearing, waives any objection to lack of or insufficiency of 
notice. 2002 
78-31a- l l l . Consol idation of separate arbitration pro-
ceedings . 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (3), upon 
motion of a party to an agreement to arbitrate or to an 
arbitration proceeding, the court may order consolidation of 
separate arbitration proceedings as to all or some of the clairns 
if: 
(a) there are separate agreements to arbitrate or sep-
arate arbitration proceedings between the same persons 
or one of them is a party to a separate agreement to 
arbitrate or a separate arbitration proceeding with a third 
person; 
(b) the claims subject to the agreements to arbitrate 
arise in substantial par t from the same transaction or 
series of related transactions; 
(c) the existence of a common issue of law or fact 
creates the possibility of conflicting decisions in the sep-
arate arbitration proceedings; and 
(d) prejudice resulting from a failure to consolidate is 
not outweighed by the risk of undue delay or prejudice to 
the rights of or hardship to parties opposing consolida-
tion. 
(2) The court may order consolidation of separate arbitra-
tion proceedings as to some claims and allow other claims to 
be resolved in separate arbitration proceedings. 
(3) The court may not order consolidation of the claims of a 
party to an agreement to arbitrate if the agreement prohibits 
consolidation. 2002 
78-3la-112. Appointment of arbitrator — Service as a 
neutral arbitrator. 
(1) If the parties to an agreement to arbitrate agree on a 
method for appointing an arbitrator, that method must be 
followed, unless the method fails. If the parties have not 
agreed on a method, the agreed method fails, or an arbitrator 
appointed fails or is unable to act and a successor has not been 
appointed, the court, on motion of a party to the arbitration 
proceeding, shall appoint the arbitrator. An arbitrator ap-
pointed by the court has all the powers of an arbitrator 
designated in the agreement to arbitrate or appointed pursu-
ant to the agreed method. 
(2) An individual who has a known, direct, and material 
interest in the outcome of the arbitration proceeding or a 
known, existing, and substantial relationship with a party 
may not serve as an arbitrator required by an agreement to be 
neutral. 2002 
78-31a-113. Disclosure by arbitrator. 
(1) Before accepting appointment, an individual who is 
requested to serve as an arbitrator, after making a reasonable 
inquiry, shall disclose to all parties to the agreement tt> 
arbitrate and arbitration proceeding and to any other arbitra-
tors any known facts that a reasonable person would consider 
likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator in the arbi-
tration proceeding, including: 
(a) a financial or personal interest in the outcome of the 
arbitration proceeding; and 
(b) an existing or past relationship with any of the 
parties to the agreement to arbitrate or the arbitration 
proceeding, their counsel or representatives, a witness, or 
another arbitrator. 
(2) An arbitrator has a continuing obligation to disclose to 
all parties to the agreement to arbitrate and arbitration 
proceeding and to any other arbitrators any facts that the 
arbitrator learns after accepting appointment which a reason-
able person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of 
the arbitrator. 
(3) If an arbitrator discloses a fact required by Subsection 
(1) or (2) to be disclosed and a party timely objects to the 
appointment or continued service of the arbitrator based upofl 
the fact disclosed, the objection may be a ground under 
Subsection 78-31a-124(l)(b) for vacating an award made by 
the arbitrator. 
(4) If the arbitrator did not disclose a fact as required by 
Subsection (1) or (2), upon timely objection by a party, the 
court under Subsection 78-31a-124(l)(b) may vacate a# 
award. 
(5) An arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator wh° 
does not disclose a known, direct, and material interest in the 
outcome of the arbitration proceeding or a known, existing 
and substantial relationship with a party is presumed to ac* 
with evident partiality under Subsection 78-31a-124(l)(b). 
(6) If the parties to an arbitration proceeding agree to the 
procedures of an arbitration organization or any other proce-
dures for challenges to arbitrators before an award is mad0> 
substantial compliance with those procedures is a conditio*? 
precedent to a motion to vacate an award on that ground 
under Subsection 78-31a-124(l)(b). 2°°* 
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78-31a-114. Action by majority. 
If there is more than one arbitrator, the powers of an 
arbitrator must be exercised by a majority of the arbitrators, 
but all of them shall conduct the hearing under Subsection 
78-3 l a 116(3) 2002 
78-31a-115. Immunity of arbitrator — Competency to 
testify — Attorney's fees and costs. 
(1) An arbitrator or an arbitration organization acting in 
that capacity is immune from civil liability to the same extent 
as a judge of a court of this state acting in a judicial capacity 
(2) The immunity afforded by this section supplements any 
immunity under other law 
(3) The failure of an arbitrator to make a disclosure re-
quired by Section 78-3 l a 113 does not cause any loss of 
immunity under this section 
(4) In a judicial, administrative, or similar proceeding, an 
arbitrator or representative of an arbitration organization is 
not competent to testify, and may not be required to produce 
records as to any statement, conduct, decision, or ruling 
occurring during the arbitration proceeding, to the same 
extent as a judge of a court of this state acting in a judicial 
capacity This Subsection (4) does not apply 
(a) to the extent necessary to determine the claim of an 
arbitrator, arbitration organization, or representative of 
the arbitration organization against a party to the arbi-
tration proceeding, or 
(b) to a hearing on a motion to vacate an award under 
Subsection 78-3la 124(l)(a) or (b) if the movant estab 
hshes prima facie evidence that a ground for vacating the 
award exists 
(5) If a person commences a civil action against an arbitra-
tor, arbitration orgamzation, or representative of an arbitra 
tion organization arising from the services of the arbitrator, 
organization, or representative or if a person seeks to compel 
an arbitrator or a representative of an arbitration organiza-
tion to testify or produce records in violation of Subsection (4), 
and the court decides that the arbitrator, arbitration organi-
zation, or representative of an arbitration organization is 
immune from civil liability or that the arbitrator or represen 
tative of the organization is not competent to testify, the court 
shall award to the arbitrator, organization, or representative 
reasonable attorney's fees and other reasonable expenses of 
l i t igation 2002 
78-31a-116. Arbitration process. 
(1) An arbitrator may conduct an arbitration m a manner 
the arbitrator considers appropriate for a fair and expeditious 
disposition of the proceeding The authority conferred upon 
the arbitrator includes the power to hold conferences with the 
parties to the arbitration proceeding before the hearing and, 
among other matters, determine the admissibility, relevance, 
materiality, and weight of any evidence 
(2) An arbitrator may decide a request for summary dispo-
sition of a claim or particular issue 
(a) if all interested parties agree, or 
(b) upon request of one party to the arbitration pro-
ceeding if tha t party gives notice to all other parties to the 
proceeding, and the other parties have a reasonable 
opportunity to respond 
(3) If an arbitrator orders a hearing, the arbitrator shall set 
a time and place and give notice of the hearing not less than 
five days before the hearing begins Unless a party to the 
arbitration proceeding makes an objection to lack or insuffi-
ciency of notice not later than the beginning of the hearing, the 
party's appearance at the hearing waives the objection Upon 
request of a party to the arbitration proceeding and for good 
cause shown, or upon the arbitrator's own initiative, the 
arbitrator may adjourn the hearing from time to time as 
Necessary but may not postpone the hearing to a time later 
than that fixed by the agreement to arbitrate for making the 
award unless the parties to the arbitration proceeding consent 
to a later date The arbitrator may hear and decide the 
controversy upon the evidence produced although a par ty who 
was duly notified of the arbitration proceedmg did not appear 
The court, on request, may direct the arbitrator to conduct the 
hearing promptly and render a timely decision 
(4) At a hearing under Subsection (3), a party to the 
arbitration proceeding has a right to be heard, to present 
evidence material to the controversy, and to cross-examine 
witnesses appearing at the hearing 
(5) If an arbitrator ceases or is unable to act during the 
arbitration proceeding, a replacement arbitrator must be 
appointed in accordance with Section 78-3la-112 to continue 
the proceeding and to resolve the controversy 2002 
78-3 la-117. Representation. 
A party to an arbitration proceeding may be represented by 
an attorney 2002 
78-31a-118. Witnesses — Subpoenas — Depos i t ions — 
Discovery. 
(1) An arbitrator may issue a subpoena for the attendance 
of a witness and for the production of records and other 
evidence at any hearing and may administer oaths A sub-
poena must be served m the manner for service of subpoenas 
in a civil action and, upon motion to the court by a party to the 
arbitration proceeding or the arbitrator, enforced m the man-
ner for enforcement of subpoenas in a civil action 
(2) In order to make the proceedings fair, expeditious, and 
cost-effective, upon request of a party to or a witness in an 
arbitration proceeding, an arbitrator may permit a deposition 
of any witness to be taken for use as evidence at the hearing, 
including a witness who cannot be subpoenaed for or is unable 
to attend a hearing The arbitrator shall determine the condi-
tions under which the deposition is taken 
(3) An arbitrator may permit any discovery the arbitrator 
decides is appropriate m the circumstances, taking into ac-
count the needs of the parties to the arbitration proceeding 
and other affected persons and the desirability of making the 
proceeding fair, expeditious, and cost-effective 
(4) If an arbitrator permits discovery under Subsection (3), 
the arbitrator may order a party to the arbitration proceeding 
to comply with the arbitrator's discovery-related orders, issue 
subpoenas for the attendance of a witness and for the produc-
tion of records and other evidence at a discovery proceeding, 
and take action against a noncomplymg party to the extent a 
court could if the controversy were the subject of a civil action 
m this state 
(5) An arbitrator may issue a protective order to prevent 
the disclosure of privileged information, confidential informa-
tion, trade secrets, and other information protected from 
disclosure to the extent a court could if the controversy were 
the subject of a civil action m this state 
(6) All laws compelling a person under subpoena to testify 
and all fees for attending a judicial proceeding, a deposition, or 
a discovery proceeding as a witness apply to an arbitration 
proceeding as if the controversy were the subject of a civil 
action m this state 
(7) The court may enforce a subpoena or discovery-related 
order for the attendance of a witness within this state and for 
the production of records and other evidence issued by an 
arbitrator in connection with an arbitration proceedmg in 
another state upon conditions determined by the court so as to 
make the arbitration proceeding fair, expeditious, and cost-
effective A subpoena or discovery-related order issued by an 
arbitrator in another state must be served in the manner 
provided by law for service of subpoenas in a civil action in this 
state and, upon motion to the court by a party to the arbitra-
tion proceeding or the arbitrator, enforced in the manner 
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provided by law for enforcement of subpoenas in a civil action 
in this state. 
(8) Upon stipulation of the parties, or where a statute or the 
written agreement of the parties provides that discovery shall 
be conducted in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure, 
an attorney may issue a subpoena for the attendance of a 
witness and for the production of records and other evidence at 
any hearing. A subpoena must be served in the manner for 
service of subpoenas in a civil action and, upon motion to the 
court by a party to the arbitration proceeding, enforced in the 
manner for enforcement of subpoenas in a civil action. 2005 
78-31a-119. Judic ia l enforcement of preaward rul ing 
by arbitrator. 
If an arbitrator makes a preaward ruling in favor of a party 
to the arbitration proceeding, the party may request the 
arbitrator to incorporate the ruling into an award under 
Section 78-31a-120. A prevailing party may make a motion to 
the court for an expedited order to confirm the award under 
Section 78-3la-123, in which case the court shall summarily 
decide the motion. The court shall issue an order to confirm 
the award unless the court vacates, modifies, or corrects the 
award under Section 78-31a-124 or 78-31a-125. 2002 
78-31a-120. Award. 
(1) An arbitrator shall make a record of an award. The 
record must be signed or otherwise authenticated by any 
arbitrator who concurs with the award. The arbitrator or the 
arbitration organization shall give notice of the award, includ-
ing a copy of the award, to each party to the arbitration 
proceeding. 
(2) An award must be made within the time specified by the 
agreement to arbitrate or, if not specified in the agreement, 
within the time ordered by the court. The court may extend or 
the parties to the arbitration proceeding may agree on the 
record to extend the time. The court or the parties may do so 
within or after the time specified or ordered. A party waives 
any objection that an award was not timely made unless the 
party gives notice of the objection to the arbitrator before 
receiving notice of the award. 2002 
78-31a-121. Change of award by arbitrator. 
(1) On motion to an arbitrator by a party to an arbitration 
proceeding, the arbitrator may modify or correct an award: 
(a) on any grounds stated in Subsection 78-3 la -
125(l)(a) or (c); 
(b) if the arbitrator has not made a final and definite 
award upon a claim submitted by the parties to the 
arbitration proceeding; or 
(c) to clarify the award. 
(2) Amotion under Subsection (1) must be made and notice 
given to all parties within 20 days after the movant receives 
notice of the award. 
(3) A party to the arbitration proceeding must give notice of 
any objection to the motion within ten days after receipt of the 
notice. 
(4) If a motion to the court is pending under Section 
78-31a-123, 78-31a-124, or 78-31a-125, the court may submit 
the claim to the arbitrator to consider whether to modify or 
correct the award: 
(a) on any grounds stated in Subsection 78 -31a-
125(l)(a) or (c); 
(b) if the arbitrator has not made a final and definite 
award upon a claim submitted by the parties to the 
arbitration proceeding; or 
(c) to clarify the award. 
(5) An award modified or corrected pursuant to this section 
is subject to Subsection 78-3a-120(l) and Sections 78-31a-123, 
78-31a-124, and 78-31a-125. 2007 
78-31a-122. Remedies — Fees and expenses of arbitra-
t ion proceeding. 
(1) An arbitrator may award punitive damages or other 
exemplary relief if the award is authorized by law in a civil 
action involving the same claim and the evidence produced at 
the hearing justifies the award under the legal standards 
otherwise applicable to the claim. 
(2) An arbitrator may award reasonable attorney's fees and 
other reasonable expenses of arbitration if the award is 
authorized by law in a civil action involving the same claim or 
by the agreement of the parties to the arbitration proceeding. 
(3) As to all remedies other than those authorized by 
Subsections (1) and (2), an arbitrator may order any remedies 
as the arbitrator considers just and appropriate under the 
circumstances of the arbitration proceeding. The fact that a 
remedy could not or would not be granted by the court is not 
a ground for refusing to confirm an award under Section 
78-31a-123 or for vacating an award under Section 78-31a-
124. 
(4) An arbitrator's expenses and fees, together with other 
expenses, must be paid as provided in the award. 
(5) If an arbitrator awards punitive damages or other 
exemplary relief under Subsection (1), the arbitrator shall 
specify in the award the basis in fact justifying, and the basis 
in law authorizing, the award and state separately the 
amount of the punitive damages or other exemplary relief. 
2002 
78-31a-123. Confirmation of award. 
After a party to an arbitration proceeding receives notice of 
an award in a matter not pending before a court, the party 
may petition the court for an order confirming the award. If 
the notice of award is in a matter pending before the court, the 
party may file a motion for an order confirming the award. The 
court shall issue a confirming order unless the award is 
modified or corrected pursuant to Section 78-3 la-121 or 78-
3 la-125 or is vacated pursuant to Section 78-31a-124. 2005 
78-31a-124. Vacating an award. 
(1) Upon motion to the court by a party to an arbitration 
proceeding, the court shall vacate an award made in the 
arbitration proceeding if: 
(a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or 
other undue means; 
(b) there was: 
(i) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as 
a neutral arbitrator; 
(ii) corruption by an arbitrator; or 
(iii) misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the 
rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding; 
(c) an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon 
showing of sufficient cause for postponement, refused to 
consider evidence material to the controversy, or other-
wise conducted the hearing contrary to Section 78-3 la-
116, so as to substantially prejudice the rights of a party 
to the arbitration proceeding; 
(d) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's authority; 
(e) there was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the 
person participated in the arbitration proceeding without 
raising an objection under Subsection 78-31a-116(3) not 
later than the beginning of the arbitration hearing; or 
(f) the arbitration was conducted without proper notice 
of the initiation of an arbitration as required in Section 
78-31a-110 so as to substantially prejudice the rights of a 
party to the arbitration proceeding. 
(2) Amotion under this section must be filed within 90 days 
after the movant receives notice of the award pursuant to 
Section 78-31a-120 or within 90 days after the movant re-
ceives notice of a modified or corrected award pursuant to 
Section 78-31a-121, unless the movant alleges tha t the award 
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was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means, in 
which case the motion must be made within 90 days after the 
ground is known or by the exercise of reasonable care would 
have been known by the movant. 
(3) If the court vacates an award on a ground other than 
that set forth in Subsection (l)(e), it may order a rehearing. If 
the award is vacated on a ground stated in Subsection (l)(a) or 
(b), the rehearing must be before a new arbitrator. If the 
award is vacated on a ground stated in Subsection (l)(c), (d), or 
(f), the rehearing may be before the arbitrator who made the 
award or the arbitrator's successor. The arbitrator must 
render the decision in the rehearing within the same time as 
that provided in Subsection 78-3la-120(2) for an award. 
(4) If the court denies a motion to vacate an award, it shall 
confirm the award unless a motion to modify or correct the 
award is pending. 2002 
78-31a-125. Modification or correction of award. 
(1) Upon motion made within 90 days after the movant 
receives notice of the award pursuant to Section 78-31a-120 or 
within 90 days after the movant receives notice of a modified 
or corrected award pursuant to Section 78-31a-121, the court 
shall modify or correct the award if: 
(a) there was an evident mathematical miscalculation 
or an evident mistake in the description of a person, thing, 
or property referred to in the award; 
(b) the arbitrator has made an award on a claim not 
submitted to the arbitrator and the award may be cor-
rected without affecting the merits of the decision upon 
the claims submitted; or 
(c) the award is imperfect in a matter of form not 
affecting the merits of the decision on the claims submit-
ted. 
(2) If a motion made under Subsection (1) is granted, the 
court shall modify or correct and confirm the award as 
modified or corrected. Otherwise, unless a motion to vacate is 
pending, the court shall confirm the award. 
(3) A motion to modify or correct an award pursuant to this 
section may be joined with a motion to vacate the award. 
2002 
78-3la-126. Judgment on award — Attorney's fees and 
litigation expenses. 
(1) Upon granting an order confirming, vacating without 
directing a rehearing, modifying, or correcting an award, the 
court shall enter a judgment conforming to the award. The 
judgment may be recorded, docketed, and enforced as any 
other judgment in a civil action. 
(2) A court may allow reasonable costs of the motion and 
subsequent judicial proceedings. 
(3) On application of a prevailing party to a contested 
judicial proceeding under Section 78-31a-123, 78-31a-124, or 
78-31a-125, the court may add reasonable attorney's fees and 
other reasonable expenses of litigation incurred in a judicial 
proceeding after the award is made to a judgment confirming, 
vacating without directing a rehearing, modifying, or correct-
ing an award. 2002 
78-31a-127. Jurisdict ion. 
(1) A court of this state having jurisdiction over the contro-
versy and the parties may enforce an agreement to arbitrate. 
(2) An agreement to arbitrate providing for arbitration in 
this state confers exclusive jurisdiction on the court to enter 
ludgment on an award under this chapter. 2002 
78-31a-128. Venue. 
A motion pursuant to Section 78-3 la-106 must be made in 
the court of the county in which the agreement to arbitrate 
specifies the arbitration hearing is to be held or, if the hearing 
has been held, in the court of the county in which it was held. 
Otherwise, the motion may be made in the court of any county 
in which an adverse party resides or has a place of business or, 
if no adverse party has a residence or place of business in this 
state, in the court of any county in this state. All subsequent 
motions must be made in the court hearing the initial motion 
unless the court otherwise directs. 2002 
78-31a-129. Appeals. 
(1) An appeal may be taken from: 
(a) an order denying a motion to compel arbitration; 
(b) an order granting a motion to stay arbitration; 
(c) an order confirming or denying confirmation of an 
award; 
(d) an order modifying or correcting an award; 
(e) an order vacating an award without directing a 
rehearing; or 
(f) a final judgment entered pursuant to this chapter. 
(2) An appeal under this section must be taken as from an 
order or a judgment in a civil action. 2002 
78-3la-130. Electronic Signatures in Global and Na-
tional Commerce Act. 
The provisions of this chapter governing the legal effect, 
validity, or enforceability of electronic records or signatures, 
and of contracts formed or performed with the use of such 
records or signatures conform to the requirements of Section 
102 of the Electronic Signatures in Global and National 
Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 Stat. 464, and 
supersede, modify, and limit the Electronic Signatures in 
Global and National Commerce Act. 2002 
78-31a-131. Effect of chapter on prior agreements or 
proceedings. 
This act does not affect an action or proceeding commenced 
or right accrued before this chapter takes effect. Subject to 
Section 78-31a-104 of this chapter, an arbitration agreement 
made before May 6, 2002 shall be governed by the arbitration 
act in force on the date the agreement was signed. 2002 
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78-31b-l. Title. 
This act is known as the "Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Act." 1994 
78-31b-2. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "ADR" means alternative dispute resolution and 
includes arbitration, mediation, and other means of dis-
pute resolution, other than court trial, authorized by the 
Judicial Council under this chapter. 
(2) "ADR organization" means an organization which 
provides training for ADR providers or offers other ADR 
services. 
(3) "ADR provider" means a neutral person who con-
ducts an ADR procedure. An arbitrator, mediator, and 
early neutral evaluator are ADR providers. An ADR 
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DECLARATION OF 
PHOTECTIVE COVENANTS TOR 
TI1AYNES CANYON SUBDIVISION 
THIS DECLARATION is made this - < V — day of s^sss/,, 7^ , 19 2£L 
by GREATER PAKK CITY COMPANY, a Utah corpoiation. 
L PURPOSE O r COVENANTS. 
1#1 It is the intention of Gicater Paik City Company, expressed by its 
execution of this inst iumcnt, that the pioperty within Thayncs Canyon Subdivision be 
developed and maintained as a highly desk able lesidential a i ca . It is the purpose of 
these covenants that the present natural beauty, view and surrounding of Thaynes 
<r\] 
Canyon Subdivision shall always be piotectcd insofar as is possible in connection with the 'V** 
uses and s t ructures permitted by this instiumcnt. Greater Park City Company hereby £ ^ 
declares that the Property and every par t thereof is held and shall be held, com c\ ed, &-
<>-\ 
devised, leased, rented, cncumbeied, used, occupied and improved and otherwise affected. \ ? 
in any mannar subject to the provisions of this Dcclaiation, each and all of which v<: 
O 
provisions arc hereby declared to be in fuithcrance of the general plan and scheme of ^ 
ownership re fc r icd to herein and are further declared to be for the benefit of the Property 
and every part thereof and for the benefit of each owner thereof. All provisions hereof shall 
be deemed to run with the land as covenants running with the land or as equitable servitudes as 
the case may be, and shall constitute benefits and buidens to the Declarant, i ts successors 
and assigns, and to all par t ies hcicaf tcr owning any interest in the Pioper ty . 
U. DEFINITIONS 
2 .1 Dcclai.mt "Declarant" means Gicaicr Paih City Company, together with 
Its succos'-ftrs and assigns. 
2.2 TSbpcrly f , Piopci l>" means that ccitnln real piopcity located in Summit 
County, IH.ih, described in Exhibit A attached hereto. 
Exhibi t B 
2.3 Building: "Building" means any building constructed on the Property. 
2.4 Lot; A "Lot" shall mean any parcel of property shown on the record Subdivision plat. 
2.5 Subdivision; "Subdivision1* shall mean Thaynes Canyon Subdivision as recorded in 
the records of Summit County. 
IH. THAYNES CANYON HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION. 
3.1 General Purposes and Powers: Thaynes Canyon Homeowners Association 
("Association") has been formed and incorporated as a Utah nonprofit corporation to be con-
stituted and to perform functions as provided in this Declaration and to further the common 
interests of all owners of property which may be subject, in whole or in part, to any or all of 
the provisions, co\enants, conditions and restrictions contained in this Declaration. The 
Association shall be obligated to and shall assume and perform all functions and obligations 
imposed on it or contemplated for it under this Declaration and any similar functions or 
obligations imposed on it or contemplated for it under any Supplemental or Amended Declara-
tion with respect to any Property now or hereafter subject to this Declaration. The Association 
shall have all powers necessary or desirable to effectuate these purposes. It shall not 
engage in commercial, profit making activity. 
3.2 Membership in Thaynes Canyon Homeowners Association: All persons who own 
or acquire the title in fee to any of the lands in the Subdivision (other than lands dedicated as 
public roads), by whatever means acquired, shall automatically become Members of the 
Association, in accordance with the Articles of Incorporation of said Association as presently 
in effect and recorded or filed in the records of Summit County, Utah, and as the same may be 
duly amended from time to time and also filed or recorded in the Summit County records. 
IV. ARCHITECTURAL COMMITTEE. 
4
« * Architectural Committee: The Architectural Committee shall consist of five 
members. The Committee shall consist of three members selected by the Declarant with the 
tv»o remaining memberships being selected by the Thaynes Canyon Homeowners Association. 
At such a time as 00% of the lots are sold or in 5 years, whichever comes first, one 
(1) of the Declarant's memberships shall pass to the Homeowners Association. Said 
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Architectural Committee shall have and exercise all of the powers, duties, and responsi-
bilities set out in this instrument. 
4.2 Approval by Architectural Committee: No improvements of any kind, including 
but not limited to dwelling houses, swimming pools, ponds, parking areas , fences, walls, 
garages, drives, antennae, flag poles, curbs and walks shall ever be erected, altered or 
permitted to remain on any lands within the Subdivision, nor shall any excavating, alteration 
of any stream, clearing, removal of trees or shrubs, or landscaping be done on any lands 
within the Subdivision, unless the complete architectural plans and specifications, a site 
plan, and a grading or excavation plan showing the location and orientation thereof for such 
erection or alteration and lanscaping are approved by the Architectural Committee prior to 
the commencement of such work. All of such plans and specification shall be prepared and 
signed by a practicing licensed architect and a fee of $50 shall be paid to the Architectural 
Committee to cover costs and expenses of review. Improvements to be done after the initial 
improvements costing less than $500 shall be submitted as directed to the Architectural 
Committee for approval but the fee of $50 shall not be required. The Architectural Committee 
shall consider the materials to be used on the external features of said buildings or structures, 
Including exterior colors, harmony of external design with existing structures within said 
subdivision.location with respect to topography and finished grade elevations and harmony of 
landscaping with the natural setting and surrounding native t r ees , bushes and other vegetation. 
The complete architectural plans and specifications must be submitted in duplicate, must 
include at least four different elevation views, and must be in accordance with the then current 
Architectural Guide for Thaynes Canyon Subdivision. One complete copy of plans and 
specifications shall be signed for identification by the owner and left with the Architectural 
Committee. In the event the Architectural Committee fails to take any action within 45 days 
after complete architectural plans for such work have been submitted to it, then all of such 
submitted architectural plans shall be deemed to be approved. In the event the Architectural 
Committee shall disapprove any architectural plans, the person submitting such architectural 
plans may appeal the matter at the next annual or special meeting of the Members of the 
Association, where an affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of the membership shall be 
required to change the decision of the Architectural Committee. 
4 .3 Variances: Where circumstances, such as topography, hardship, location of 
property lines, location of t r ees , brush, s treams or other matters require , the Architectural 
Committee may, by an affirmative vote of a majority of the members of the Architectural 
Committee, allow reasonable variances as to any of the covenants and restr ict ions contained 
in this instrument, on such terms and conditions as it shall require. 
4.4 General Requirements: The Architectural Committee shall exercise its best 
Judgment to see that all improvements, construction, landscaping, and alterations on the lands 
within the Subdivision conform and harmonize with the natural surroundings and with existing 
structures as to external design, materials, color, siting, height, topography, grade and 
finished group elevation. The Architectural Committee shall exercise its best efforts to 
protect the natural view of each Lot insofar as such protection is consistent with the overall 
development. 
4.5 Preliminary Approvals: Persons who anticipate constructing improvements on 
lands within the Subdivision, whether they already own lands or are contemplating the 
purchase of such lands, shall submit preliminary sketches of such improvements to the 
Architectural Committee in accordance with the then current Architectural Guide for Thaynes 
Canyon Subdivision, for informal and preliminary approval or disapproval. All preliminary 
sketches shall be submitted in duplicate and shall contain a proposed site plan together with 
sufficient general information on all aspects that will be required to be in the complete 
architectural plans and specifications to allow the Architectural Committee to act intelligently 
on giving an Informed and preliminary approval or disapproval. The Architectural Committee 
shall never be finally committed or bound by any preliminary or Informal approval or 
disapproval until such time as complete architectural plans are submitted and approved or 
disapproved. 
4.6 Architectural Guide: The Architectural Committee shall prepare and may amend 
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from time to time, and shall make available to owners of Lots , an Architectural Guide for 
the Subdivision, which Guide may specify styles, mater ia ls , colors and any other architectural 
requirements, landscaping or any other mat te r affecting the appearance of the property a s well 
a s improvements thereon. 
4 .7 Arcliitcctuval Plans: The Architectural Committee shall disapprove any 
architectural plans submitted to it which arc not sufficient for it to exercise the judgment 
required of it by these covenants. 
4 .8 Architectural Committee Not Liable: The Architectural Committee shall not be 
liable in damages to any person submitting any architectural plans for approval, or to any 
owner or owners of lands within the Subdivision, by reason of any action, failure to act, 
approval, disapproval, or failure to approve or disapprove, with regard to such archi tectural 
plans. Any person acquiring the title to any Property in the Subdivision or any person submitting 
plans to the Architectural Committee for approval, by so doing shall be*deemed to have agreed 
and covenanted that he or it will not bring any action or suit to recover damages against the 
Architectural Committee, Us members as individuals, or i ts advisors, employees, or agents. 
4, 9 Written Records: The Architectural Committee shall keep and safeguard complete 
written records of all applications for approval submitted to it (including one set of all 
preliminary sketches and all architectural plans so submitted) and of all actions of approval or 
disapproval and all other actions taken by it under the provisions of this instrument which 
records shall be maintained for a minimum of five yea r s after approval or disapproval. 
4 '1° Occupancy: No Building within the Property shall be occupied until and unless the 
owner of any Building shall first have obtained a written final inspection and approval from the 
Architectural Committee stating that the owner has completed the Building in accordance with, 
and complied with, all approved plans and is entitled to occupancy. 
V. GENERAL RESTRICTIONS ON ALL PROPERTY. 
5.1 Zoning Regulation*;: No lands within the Subdivision shall ever be occupied or 
used by or for any Building or purpose or in any manner which is contrary to the zoning 
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regulations applicable thereto validly in force from time to time. 
5.2 No Mining, Drilling o r Quarrying: No mining, quarrying, tunneling, excavating 
or drilling for any substances within the earth, including oil, gas, minerals , gravel, sand, 
rock, and earth, shall ever be permitted on the surface of the Property. 
5.3 No Business Uses: The lands within the Property shall be used exclusively 
for single family residential living purposes, such purposes to be confined to approved 
residential Buildings within the Property. No lands within the Property shall ever be 
occupied or used for any commercial or business purpose, provided, however, that nothing 
In this paragraph 5.3 shall be deemed to prevent (a) Declarant or its duly authorized agent 
from using any Lot owned by Declarant as a sales office, sales model, property management 
office or rental office, or (b) any owner or his duly authorized agent from renting or leasing 
said owner's residential Building from time to t ime, subject to all of the provisions of this 
Declaration. This section shall not be construed to prevent an owner or renter from housing 
guests within the Building owned or rented, as long as such guests pay no rent or other fee or 
consideration for such housing and owner or renter signs an affidavit to such effect pr ior to 
any guest occupancy and delivers same to the Declarant. 
5.4 Kestriction on Signs: With the exception of a sign no la rger than three square 
feet identifying the architect and a sign of similar dimension identifying the pr ime contractor 
to be displayed only during the course of construction and a sign no larger than three square 
feet for the owner to advertise his home or lot for sale, no signs or advertising devices, 
including but without limitation, commercial , political, informational or directional signs or 
devices, shall be erected or maintained on any of the Property, except signs approved in 
writing by the Architectural Committee as to size, materials, color and location: (a) as 
necessary to identify ownership of the Lot and its address; (b) as necessary to give directions; 
(c) to advise of rules and regulations; (d) to caution or warn of danger; and (e) as may be required 
by law. 
5. 5 Restrictions on Animals: No animals or other pets shall be kept or allowed to remain 
on any of the Property unless and until written authorization is obtained from the Board of 
Trustees of the Association. The Board of Trustees , in its sole discretion, shall have the 
right to revoke such authorization at any time in its sole discretion and shall have the power 
-
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to require any owner or lessee of lands in the Subdivision to remove any animal or other pet 
belonging to it which is not disciplined or which constitutes an uaduc annoyance to other owners 
or lessees of land in the Subdivision. 
5.6 No Besubdivision: No Lot shall be resubdivided and no Building shall be constructed 
or allowed to remain on less than one full lot. 
5.7 Underground Utility Lines: All water, gas, electrical, telephone and other 
electronic pipes and lines and all other utility lines within the. limits of the Property must 
be buried underground and may not be exposed above the surface of the ground. 
5. 8 Service Yards: All clothes lines, equipment, service yards or storage piles on any 
Lot in the Property shall be kept screened by approved planting or fencing so as to conceal 
them from the view of neighboring Lots, s t reets , access roads and areas surrounding the Property. 
5. 9 Maintenance of Property: All Property and all improvements on any Lot shall be kept 
and maintained by the owner t'hereof in clean, safe, at tractive and sightly condition and in good repa 
5.10 No Noxious or Offensive Activity: No noxious or offensive activity shall be carried 
on upon any Property nor shall anything be done or placed on any Property which Is or may 
become a nuisance or cause embarrassment, disturbance or annoyance to others. 
5.11 No Hazardous Activities: No activities shall be conducted on any Property and no 
improvements constructed on any Property which are or might be unsafe or hazardous to any 
person or property. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, no f i rearms shall be 
discharged upon any Property; and no open fires shall be lighted or permitted on any Property 
except In a contained barbecue unit while attended and in use for cooking purposes or within 
& safe and well-designed interior fireplace. 
5.12: No Unsightlincss: No unsightlincss shall be permitted upon any of the Property. 
Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, (a) any unsightly structures, facili t ies, 
equipment, tools, boats, vehicles other than automobiles, objects and conditions shall be 
enclosed within an approved Building or appropriately screened from view, except 
equipment and tools when in actual use for maintenance or repairs ; (b) no t r a i l e r s , mobile 
homes, t ractors , truck campers or trucks other than pickup trucks shall be kept or 
permitted to remain upon the Property; (c) no vehicle, boat or equipment shall be con-
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structed, reconstructed, repaired or abandoned upon any of the Property; (d) no lumber, 
g rass , shrub or tree clippings, plant waste, metals , bulk materials or scrap shall be kept, 
stored or allowed to accummulate on any of the Property, except in service yards meeting the 
requirements of Section 5.9; (e) refuse, garbage and t rash shall be placed and kept at all times 
in a covered container and such container shall be kept within an enclosed structure or 
appropriately screened from view; (f) hanging, drying or airing of cbthing or household fabrics 
shall not be permitted within Buildings or on Lots if visible from Buildings, Lots or areas 
surrounding the Property; (g) utility meters or other utility facilities and gas, water or other 
tanks, and sewage disposal systems or devices shall be kept and maintained within an enclosed 
structure within the Property. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if, at the time of occupancy of 
any approved structure on the Property, a connection to a nearby television cable is not 
available, and if a signal from a booster or translator is not being adequately produced into 
the area in the sole discretion of the Declarant, then a Lot owner may install a temporary 
television antenna on his Building provided said antenna is approved by the Architectural 
Committee as to size, height and location. If, at any time, a connection to a nearby television 
cable is or becomes available, owner shall promptly remove all television antennae previously 
installed, at owner' s expense. Thereafter, no television antenna shall be permitted on the 
exter ior of Buildings or any portion of the Property not improved with a Building. 
5.13 No Annoying Lights, Sounds or Odors: No light shall be emitted from any Lot or 
Property which is unreasonably bright or causes unreasonable glare; no sound shall be 
emitted from any Lot or Property which is unreasonably loud or annoying including but without 
limitation, speakers, horns, whistles, bells or other sound devices, except security and fire 
alarm devices used exclusively to protect any of the Property or Buildings; and no odors shall 
be emitted from any Lot or Property which is noxious oroffensive to others. 
5.14 No Cesspools or Septic Tanks: No cesspools or septic tanks shall be permitted on 
any Property. Any other type of sewage disposal system shall be installed only after approval 
by the Architectural Committee and all governmental hcalih authorities having jurisdiction. 
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5.15 Rules and Regulations; No owner shall violate the rules and regulations 
the use of the Lots as adopted from time to time by the Association. No such ru les 
0 r
 Regulations shall be established which violate the intention or provisions of this Declaration 
Much shall unreasonably res t r i c t the use of any Lot by the owner thereof. 
V I
' RESTRICTIONS ON LOTS. 
6.1 Number and Location of Buildings: No Buildings or structures shall be 
£d, erected, al tered, or permitted to remain on any Lot other than one single family 
Ming house, and one garage. Each Lot must be improved with a garage with at least 
& t\v 
V c a r capacity at the time of construction of the dwelling house on the Lot. 
The building si tes for all such Buildings and s t ructures shall be approved by 
Architectural Committee. In approving or disapproving the building s i tes , the 
nitcctural Committee shall take into consideration the locations with respect to 
^raphy and finished grade elevations and the effect thereof on the setting and surroundings 
<e Subdivision. 
6. 2 Residence Floor Area: The residence structure which may be constructed on 
* in the Property shall have a minimum living floor area , exclusive of garages , balconies, 
p
 ^hcs,and patios of 1200 square feet. 
6. 3 Dwelling House to be Constructed F i r s t : No garage or other structure shall be 
^tructed on any Lot until after commencement of construction of the dwelling house on the 
^ S Lot except as otherwise specifically permitted by the Architectural Committee, All 
^truction and alteration work shall be prosecuted diligently, and each Building, s t ructure , 
or Iv 
^improvements which is commenced on any Lot shall be entirely completed within IS months 
^ commencement of construction. 
6. 4 Setback?: All Buildings and s tructures on all Lots shall be setback at least 10 
feet 
from the side and r ea r lot lines. The Architectural Committee shall establish the setback 
1
 irement from the front Lot line for each Lot. The "front Lot l incn is defined to mean that 
inc of a Lot abutting on a dedicated road or on a private road. In the event a Lot abuts on 
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both a dedicated road and a private road, or abuts on more than one of such roads , the 
owner or owners of such Lot shall select and designate the front Lot line on the p lans 
and specifications to be submitted to the Architectural Committee. Such selection and 
designation of the front Lot line shall be binding upon said owner or owners and may not 
be revoked without prior written approval obtained from the Architectural Commit tee . 
6 - 5 Hcir.ht Limitations: No building or structure shall be placed, erec ted , 
altered or permitted to remain on any Lot which exceeds a height of 25 feet measured 
vertically from the average finished grade elevation of the foundation of such building or 
s t ruc ture . 
6, 6 Towers and Antennae: No towers , and no exposed or outside radio, television or 
other electronic antennae, with the exception of television antennae as provided in 5.12, shall 
be allowed or permitted to remain on any Lot. 
6. 7 Used or Temporary Structures: No used or previously erected or temporary 
house, s t ructure , house t ra i ler , mobile home, camper, or nonpermanent outbuilding shall 
ever be placed, erected, or allowed to remain on any Lot except during construction periods, 
and no dwelling house shall be occupied in any manner pr ior to its completion and approval 
in accordance with Section 4.10 hereof. 
6. 8 Fences: It is the general intention that all per imeter fencing within the Property 
have a continuity of appearance in keeping with the setting and surroundings of the Proper ty . 
The te rm "perimeter fencing" is defined to mean fences along or near Lot lines o r fencing 
not connected with a Building or s t ruc ture . All per imeter fencing shall be as specified in the 
Architectural Guide. No fence shall be allowed to be constructed or remain ac ro s s a s t ream 
on the Propcriy. Interior fences, sc reens or walls which a re associated o r connected with a 
Building or structure may be of such design, material and height as may be approved by the 
Architectural Committee. 
C. 0 Flashings and Roof Cut te rs : Flashing or roof gutters or other metal fittings on 
the exterior of Buildings shall be painted to match adjacent mater ia ls on Buildings. 
C. 10 Garbage Disposal Units: Each Building used as a dwelling house on the Property 
~
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shall contain a functioning garbage disposal unit in the kitchen of such Building. 
VII. ENrOUCEMENT. 
7 .1 Enforcement and ftcmedics; The obligations, provisions, covenants, 
restr ict ions and conditions contained in this Declaration or any Supplemental or Amended 
declaration with respect to the Association or Lots shall be enforceable by Declarant or 
by any owner of a Lot subject to this Declaration by a proceeding for a prohibitive or 
mandatory* injunction. The obligations, provisions, covenants, restr ict ions and conditions 
contained in this Declaration or any Supplemental or Amended Declaration with respect 
to a person or entity or property of a person or entity other than the Association or DeclaraK, 
shall be enforceable by Declarant or the Association by a proceeding for a prohibitive or 
mandatory injunction or by a suit or action to recover damages or to recover any amount 
due or unpaid. If court proceedings are instituted in connecuon with the rights of enforcen^ 
and remedies provided in this Declaration, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover 
i ts costs and expenses in connection therewith, including reasonable attorneys' fees. 
7. 2 Protection of Encumbrancer: No violation or breach of any provision, 
restr ict ion, covenant o r condition contained in this Declaration or any Supplemental or 
Amended Declaration and no action to enforce the same shall defeat, render invalid or 
Impair the lien of any mortgage or deed of trust taken in good faith and for value and perfect 
by recording pr ior to the time of recording of an instrument giving notice of such violation 
or breach, or the title or interest of the holder thereof or the title acquired t y any purchase 
upon foreclosure of any such mortgage or deed of trust. Any such purchaser shall, however 
take subject to this Declaration or any Supplemental or Amended Declaration except only 
that violations or breaches which occur pr ior to such foreclosure shall not be deemed brcack 
or violations hereof with respect to such purchaser, his heirs , personal representat ives, 
successors and assigns. 
7.3 Limited Liability: Neither Declarant, the Association, the Board of Trus tees 
of the Association, the Architectural Committee nor any member, agent or employee of any 
of the same shall be liable to any party for any action or for any failure to act with respect 
to any mattor if the action • ' :n or failure to net was In good faith and without malice. 
VIII. GENERAL PROVISIONS. 
8.1 Duration of Declaration: Any provision, covenant, condition or restr ict ion 
contained in this Declaration or any Supplemental or Amended Declaration which is subject 
to the common law rule sometimes referred to as the rule against perpetuities, shall 
continue and remain in full force and effect for the period of fifth years or until this 
Declaration is terminated as hereinafter provided, whichever first occurs . All other 
provisions, covenants, conditions and restrictions contained in this Declaration or in any 
Supplemental or Amended Declaration shall continue and remain in full force and effect 
until January 1, 2021 A .D . , provided, however, that unless at least one year pr ior to said 
time of expiration, there is recorded an instrument directing the termination of this 
Declaration, executed by the owners of not less than two-thirds of the Lots then subject 
to this Declaration, said other provisions, covenants, conditions and restr ic t ions shall 
continue automatically for an additional ten years and thereafter for successive periods 
of ten years unless, at least one year pr ior to the expiration of any such extended period 
of duration, this Declaration is terminated by recorded instrument directing termination 





 Amendment or Revocation: At any time while any provision, covenant, 
condition or restriction contained in this Declaration or any Supplemental or Amended 
Declaration is in force and effect, it may be amended or repealed by the recording of a 
written Instrument specifying the amendment or the repeal, executed by the owners of not 
less than two-thirds of the Lots then subject to this Declaration. No such amendment or 
repeal shall be effective with respect to the holder or successor or assign of the holder of 
a mortgage or deed of trust recorded prior to recording of the instrument specifying the 
amendment or repeal unless such holder executes the said instrument. 
8. 3 Arbitration of Disputes: All controversies arising under or with respect to this 
Declaration or any Supplemental or Amended Declaration shall be submitted to arbitration 
-12- 200KH32 PAGE703 
in accordance with the following procedure. All determinations, decisions and actions 
of the Association, of the Board of Trustees of the Association, or of Declarant or of 
Members at any meeting of such Members which is made or taken or purportedly made 
or taken under or pursuant to any provision of or with respect to this Declaration shall 
be binding and conclusive on every person including the Association, Declarant, and each 
owner of property and each such owner's he i rs , personal representatives, successors 
and assigns unless notice of dispute is given as herein provided and the matter is submitted 
to arbitration in accordance with the following procedure. 
Any party desiring to arbitrate any controversy shall file written notice of his-
desire with the Association and any party desiring to dispute any determination, decision 
or action as aforesaid shall file a writ ten notice of the existence and nature of the dispute 
with the Association within 30 days after he discovers, learns or has notice of such 
determination, decision or action. As promptly as possible after receipt of such notice, 
the party or parties interested in the matter or dispute shall be notified of the notice by the 
Association; the matter shall be heard by the Board of Trustees; if not settled or resolved at 
such hearing the party or parties on each side of the matter or dispute shall select an 
arbitrator; the arbitrators so selected shall select an additional arbitrator; the matter of 
dispute shall be heard by the arbi trators at a convenient location in Park City, Utah; and a 
decision in the arbitration shall be rendered by the arbi trators . The decision of a majority 
of the arbitrators shall be binding and conclusive on all part ies . Any disputed determination, 
decision or action as aforesaid shall be upheld by the arbitrators if it is or was authorized or 
proper under or consistent with the overall purposes of the Declaration or any Supplemental 
or Amended Declaration. Costs of any arbitration shall be borne equally by the party or 
par t ies on each side of the controversy or dispute. 
8.4 Severability: Invalidity or unenforceability of any provision of this Declara-
tion or of any Supplemental or Amended Declaration in whole or in part shall not affect 
the validity or enforceability of any other provision or valid and enforceable part of a 
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provision of this Declaration. 
8.5 Captions: The captions and headings in this instrument are for convenience 
only and shall not be considered in construing any provision, restriction, covenant or 
condition contained in this Declaration. 
8. 6 No Waiver: Failure to enforce any provision, restriction, covenant or 
condition in this Declaration or in any Supplemental or Amended Declaration shall not 
operate as a waiver of any such provision, restriction, covenant or condition or of any 
other provision, restriction, covenant or condition. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF Greater Park City Company has.executed this Declaration 
the day and year first above written. 
GREATER PARK CITY COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation 
By: 3/sW > '//. s' ''/C.
 v / / 
6$. Warren King, President' 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: s s . 
COUNTY OF ) 
"7"* 
On the -?{* —^ day of '7 s •'>, >"/" , 1971, personally appeared 
before mc J. WARREN KING, who, being by me duly sworn, did say that he is the President 
of GREATER PARK CITY COMPANY, a Utah corporation, and that the within and foregoing 
Declaration of Protective Covenants for Thaynes Canyon Subdivision was signed in behalf of 
said corporation by authority of a Resolution of its Board of Directors, and said 
J . WARREN KING didy acknowledged to me that sai'd corporation executed the same and 
thatptho'-ccnl affixed is the seal of said corporation. 
:
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EXHIBIT A 
TO DECLARATION OF PROTECTIVE COVENANTS 
FOR THAYNES CANYON SUBDIVISION 
The land referred to in this report Is situated in the County of Summit, State of Utah, 
and is described as follows: 
PARCEL 1: BEGrNNING at a point West 2G39.77 feet and South 99.50 feet and West 
330. 00 feet from the Northeast corner of Section 8, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence East 330.00 feet; thence North 50.00 
feet; thence East 1326. 9G feet to the West right-of-way line State Highway U-248; thence 
South 21°16' East along said West right-of-way line 53.65 feet; thence West 195.00 feet; 
thence South 140. 00 feet; thence West 185. 00 feet; thence South 80°00' West 630. 00 feet; 
thence South S5o00' West 347.31 feet; thence South 89°30f West 267.44 feet to a point on 
a curve to the left, the radius point of which is 79o30'55" West 305.00 feet; thence 
Northwesterly along the arc of said curve 103. 88 feet to a point of a 200.00 foot radius 
curve to the right; thence Northerly along the arc of said curve 104. 72 feet to a point 
of tangency; thence North 85. 00 feet to the point of beginning. 
PARCEL 2: BEGINNING at a point on the West right-of-way line of State Highway U-248, 
said point being South 99. 50 feet and West 1293. 35 feet from the Northeast corner of 
Section 8; Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running 
thence South 21°16' East along said West right-of-way line 1295.00 feet; thence South 
61°00' West 80.00 feet; thence North 51°30» West 150.00 feet; thence North 62°00' 
West 135. 00 feet; thence North 54°30' East 45. 00 feet; thence North 19°00 West 25. 00 
feet; thence South 77°00' West 98.00 feet; thence North 66°00' West 200.00 feet; thence 
North 8°00' East 120.00 feet; thence North 60^00' East 138.00 feet; thence North 21°00! 
West 40.00 feet; thence South 85°00' West 93.29 feet; thence North 1°00« East 230.19 
feet; thence North 55°00f East 44.30 feet; thence North 30°00' West 183.90 feet; thence 
North 11°00' West 155. 00 feet; thence North 55O001 East 85. 00 feet; thence North SS^O1 
West 50. 00 feet; thence South 55°00' West 59. 22 feet; thence West 48. 61 feet; thence 
North 140. 00 feet; thence East 195. 00 feet to the point of beginning. 
Beginning at a point West 2639, 77 feet and South 99. 50 feet and West 330. 00 feet from 
the Northeast Corner of Section 8, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, and running thence South 85. 00 feet to a point of a 200. 00 foot radius curve to 
the left; thence along the arc of said curve 104. 72 feet to a point of a 305. 00 foot radius 
reverse curve to the right; thence along the arc of said curve 127. 76 feet to a point of 
tangency; thence South 6°00' East 330.00 feet; thence North 84°00» East 60.00 feet; thence 
South 49°q0' East 804.24 feet; thence South 4O30' East 411.55 feet; thence South 79°00' 
West 243.34 feet; thence North 74°00» West 545. 00 feet; thence North 16°00' West 75. 00 
feet; thence North 18°00' East 111.00 feet; thence North 61o30f East 122. 00 feet; thence 
South 7C°00' East 344.74 feet; thence North 7°00' West 65.00 feet; thence North 44°00' 
West 163. 00 feet; thence North 6S°00f West 155. 00 feet; thence South 41°00» West 25.00 
feet; thence South 5S°00' West 105.00 feet; thence South 40°30' West 370.00 feet; thence 
South 87°00' West 175.00 feet;'thence North 41°30' West 122.00 feet; thence North 25°00» 
East 200.00 feet; thence'North 45°00' East 336.52 feet; thence North 8°00» East 264.57 
feet; thence North S4o00' East 80. 00 feet; thence North 6^00' West 330. 00 feet to a point 
of a 255. 00 foot radius curve to the left; thence along the arc of said curve 106. 81 feet 
to a point of 250. 00 foot radius reverse curve to the right; thence along the arc of said 
curve 130. DO feet to the point of tangency; thence North 85.00 feet; thence East 50.00 feet 
to the point of beginning. 
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Exhibit "2" 
15-2.11-3. LOT AND SITE REQUIREMENTS. 
Except as may otherwise be provided in this Code, no Building Permit shall be issued for a Lot 
unless such Lot has Frontage on a Street shown as a private or Public Street on the Streets 
Master Plan, or on a private easement connecting the Lot to a Street shown on the Streets 
Master Plan. All Development must comply with the following: 
(A) DENSITY. The maximum density for Subdivisions is three (3) units per acre. Subdivisions 
must Cluster Development to maximize common Transferred Development Right (TDR) Open 
Space. 
(B) FRONT, REAR, AND SIDE YARDS. All Development activity must comply with the following 
minimum Yards. See Section 15-2.11-3(H) for Yard exceptions for Thaynes Canyon Subdivision I 
and II, Prospector Village Subdivision, and Prospector Park Subdivision 1, 2, and 3. 
(C) FRONT YARD. The minimum Front Yard is twenty feet (20'). New Front Facing Garages for 
Single Family and Duplex Dwellings must be at least twenty-five feet (25') from the Front Lot Line. 
(D) FRONT YARD EXCEPTIONS. 
(1) The Planning Commission may designate specific Single Family Lots on which the Front Yard 
Setback is ten feet (10') for the Main Building and fifteen feet (15') for a new Front Facing Garage 
or garage element, including any habitable space above the garage. This exception may be 
granted to: 
(a) solve Access problems with relatively steep Grades, 
(b) preserve Significant Vegetation, 
(c) eliminate or minimize cut and fill Areas, 
(d) promote Clustered Development, and 
(e) preserve Open Space. 
Lots to which this exception applies must be so designated on the Subdivision Plat at the time the 
plat is approved. 
(2) See Section 15-2.11-3(C) for Setback exceptions for Thaynes Canyon Subdivision I and II, 
Prospector Village Subdivision, and Prospector Park Subdivision 1, 2, and 3. 
(3) The Front Yard must be open and free of any Structure except: 
(a) A Fence or wall not more than four feet (4') in Height. On Corner Lots, Fences more than 
three feet (3') in Height are prohibited within twenty-five feet (25') of the intersection at back of 
curb. 
(b) Uncovered steps leading to the Main Building provided the steps are not more than four feet 
(4') in Height from Final Grade, not including any required handrail, and do not cause any danger 
or hazard to traffic by obstructing the view of a Street or intersection. 
(c) A deck, porch, or Bay Window, not more than ten feet (10') wide, projecting not more than five 
feet (5') into the Front Yard. 
(d) A roof overhang, eave, or cornice projecting not more than three feet (3') into the Front Yard. 
(e) Sidewalks and pathways. 
(f) A driveway leading to a garage or Parking Area. No portion of a Front Yard, except for 
approved driveways, allowed Parking Areas, and sidewalks may be Hard-Surfaced or graveled. 
(g) Circular driveways meeting all requirements stated in Section 15-3-4. 
(E) REAR YARD. The minimum Rear Yard is fifteen feet (15'). 
(F) REAR YARD EXCEPTIONS. The Rear Yard must be open and free of any Structure except: 
(1) A Bay Window not more than ten feet (10') wide projecting not more than two feet (2') into the 
Rear Yard. 
(2) A chimney not more than five feet (5') wide projecting not more than two feet (2') into the Rear 
Yard. 
(3) A window well or light well projecting not more than four feet (4') into the Rear Yard. 
(4) A roof overhang or eave projecting not more than three feet (3') into the Rear Yard. 
(5) A window sill, belt course, cornice, trim, or other ornamental feature projecting not more than 
six inches (6") into the Rear Yard. 
(6) A detached Accessory Building not greater than eighteen feet (18') in Height and maintaining 
a minimum Rear Yard Setback of five feet (5'). Such Structure must not cover over fifty percent 
(50%) of the Rear Yard. 
(7) A Hard-Surfaced Parking Area subject to the same location requirements as a detached 
Accessory Building. 
(8) Screened mechanical equipment, hot tubs, and similar Structures located at least five feet (5') 
from the Rear Lot Line. 
(9) A Fence or wall not more than six feet (6') in Height. A retaining wall may have multiple steps, 
however, each exposed face cannot exceed six feet (6') in Height and the horizontal distance 
between the walls, front face to rear face, must be at least three feet (3') and planted with 
approved vegetation. The Community Development Director may approve minor deviations to the 
Height and stepping requirements based on Site specific review. (A Fence greater than six feet 
(61) in Height requires a Conditional Use Permit) 
(10) A patio, deck, steps, or similar Structure, not more than thirty inches (30") above Final 
Grade, provided it is located at least five feet (5') from the Rear Lot Line. 
(G) SIDE YARD. 
(1) The minimum Side Yard is twelve feet (12'). 
(2) A Side Yard between connected Structures is not required where Structures are designed with 
a common wall on a Property Line, and the Lots are burdened with a party wall agreement in a 
form approved by the City Attorney and Chief Building Official. 
(H) SIDE YARD EXCEPTIONS. The Side Yard must be open and free of any Structure except: 
(1) A Bay Window not more than ten feet (10') wide projecting not more than two feet (21) into the 
Side Yard. 
(2) A chimney not more than five feet (5') wide projecting not more than two feet (2') into the Side 
Yard. 
(3) A window well or light well projecting not more than four feet (4') into the Side Yard. 
(4) A roof overhang or eave projecting not more than three feet (31) into the Side Yard. 
(5) A window sill, belt course, cornice, trim, or other ornamental feature projecting not more than 
six inches (6") into the Side Yard. 
(6) Decks, patios, paths, or steps not over thirty inches (30") in Height above Final Grade, 
provided there is at least one foot (V) Setback to the Side Lot Line. 
(7) A Fence or wall not more than six feet (6*) in Height. A retaining wall may have multiple steps, 
however, each exposed face cannot exceed six feet (6') in Height and the horizontal distance 
between the walls, front face to rear face, must be at least three feet (3') and planted with 
approved vegetation. The Community Development Director may approve minor deviations to the 
Height and stepping requirements based on Site specific review. (A Fence greater than six feet 
(6') in Height requires a Conditional Use Permit) 
(8) A driveway leading to an approved garage or Parking Area maintaining a three foot (3') 
landscaped Setback to the Side Lot Line. 
(9) A detached Accessory Building not greater than eighteen feet (18') in Height, located a 
minimum of five feet (5') behind the front facade of the Main Building, and maintaining a minimum 
Side Yard Setback of five feet (5'). 
(10) Screened mechanical equipment and hot tubs, or similar Structure, provided it is located a 
minimum of five feet (5') from the Side Lot Line. 
(i) OTHER EXCEPTIONS. 
(1) In Thaynes Canyon Subdivision I and II, and Prospector Village Subdivision, minimum 
required Yards are as follows: 
(a) FRONT YARD. The minimum Front Yard for Main Buildings is twenty feet (20*) and the Front 
Yard for garages is ten feet (10'); 
(b) SIDE YARD. The minimum Side Yard is five feet (5'). On Corner Lots the minimum Side Yard 
abutting a Street is ten feet (10'); 
(c) REAR YARD. The minimum Rear Yard is ten feet (10'). 
(2) In Prospector Park Subdivisions 1, 2, and 3, minimum required Yards are as follows: 
(a) FRONT YARD. The minimum Front Yard is twenty feet (20'). 
(b) SIDE YARD. The minimum Side Yard is ten feet (10'). On Corner Lots the Side Yard that 
faces the Street must not be less than fifteen feet (15'). 
(c) REAR YARD. The minimum Rear Yard is ten feet (10'). 
TabC 
Joseph E. Tesch, (A3219) 
P. Christian Hague (09343) 
Paul R.Poulsen (10132) 
TESCH LAW OFFICES, P.C. 
314 Main Street, Suite 201 
P.O. Box 3390 
Park City, Utah 84060-3390 
Telephone: (435) 649-0077 
Facsimile: (435) 649-2561 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
James J. Kenny, an individual, Patricia D. 
Kenny, an individual, James E. B. Stuart, an 
individual, Eileen A. Stuart, an individual, 
Robert C. Slettom, an individual, Faye 
Slettom, an individual, Richard L. Measelle, 
an individual, Chase Peterson, an individual, 
Grethe B. Peterson, an individual, and 
Thaynes Canyon 1 Homeowners Association, 
an unincorporated association, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
John L. Rich, an individual, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
JAMES J. KENNY 
Case No.: 050500428 MI 
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck 
JAMES J. KENNY, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am over 18 years of age. 
2. I currently reside at 58 Thaynes Canyon Drive (Lot 53), Park City, Utah. 
Affidavit of James 7. Kenny Page 1 of 5 
3. I currently serve as President of the Thaynes Canyon I Homeowners Association 
("HOA") and on the HOA Board of Trustees for over seven years. 
4. I currently serve on the Architectural Committee of the Thaynes Canyon I 
Homeowners Association Board of Trustees, and have done so for over seven 
years. 
5. On or about July 19, 2005,1 was advised by Jim Piper (who has since passed 
away), Chairman of the Architectural Committee, that plans for an addition to 57 
Thaynes Canyon Drive (Lot 73), Park City, Utah, had been submitted by Michael 
W. DeCarlo ("DeCarlo") which would violate the recorded Declaration of 
Protective Covenants ("CCRs") and the owner, John L. Rich ("Rich"), was 
threatening to nevertheless proceed with construction. 
6. On or about July 19, 2005,1 advised other members of the Board of Trustees that 
a special meeting needed to be held as soon as possible to discuss the matter. 
7. On July 21, 2005, a special meeting of the Board of Trustees was held at my 
home. 
8. At the special meeting, James Piper advised the Board of Trustees that he had 
reviewed the plans submitted by the architect for the addition to 57 Thaynes 
Canyon Drive and they failed to comply with the side yard setback of 10 feet 
established by the Thaynes Canyon I Declaration of Protective Covenants 
("CCRs"). 
9. At the special meeting, James Stuart, a Board member and Architectural 
Committee member, advised the Board of his previous conversations with 
DeCarlo and DeCarlo's intention to go ahead with construction. 
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10. After a lengthy discussion concerning the consistent enforcement of the 10 foot 
setback established by the CCRs, the Board of Trustees unanimously determined 
that the plans submitted by DeCarlo did not comply with the 10 foot side yard 
setback mandated by the CCRs, and the CCRs would be enforced, through 
litigation if necessary. 
11. Immediately thereafter, the Board of Trustees determined that DeCarlo and Rich 
should be advised of the Board's decision regarding the non-compliance of the 
side yard setback and the intent of the Board to enforce the 10 foot setback 
mandated by the CCRs. 
12. During the special meeting, I called Rich at his home in Cypress, California, and 
left a message on his answering machine informing him that the Thaynes Canyon 
Homeowners Association objected to the setback shown on the submitted plans 
because they did not comply with the CCRs requirements; requested that Rich 
modify the plans to comply with the setback; the HOA would take legal action if 
necessary to enforce the CCRs; and requested that Rich call me to further discuss 
the matter. 
13. As the meeting was breaking up, I, in the presence of others, made a phone call to 
DeCarlo at 801-518-6501. I advised DeCarlo of the Board's decision and asked 
DeCarlo to consult with his client and modify the plans. DeCarlo replied that 
Park City would give them a building permit and they had no intention of 
complying with the CCRs. I advised DeCarlo that the HOA would take legal 
action to enforce the CCRs and asked DeCarlo to please consult with his client 
before proceeding any further. 
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14.1 reviewed a copy of the building permit issued by Park City on August 10, 2005. 
15. On or about August 13, 2005, excavation commenced. 
16. On August 14, 2005,1 called Rich at his home in Cypress, California, and advised 
him that he was proceeding with construction at his own risk and the HOA was 
prepared to enforce the CCRs through legal action if necessary. Rich replied that 
he planned to proceed and that the HOA should proceed as it wishes. 
17. On August 14, 2005,1 sent a letter to Rich summarizing our phone conversation 
from earlier that day, and again stated that he was proceeding at his own risk and 
peril. See attached Exhibit 1. 
18. Late on August 18, 2005, Mr. Stuart and I used a tape measure and observed that 
the framed foundation was about 6 feet 8 inches from the property line. 
19. On August 29, 2005,1 discovered an envelope containing a letter addressed to me 
from DeCarlo on my front door step. In the letter, DeCarlo indicated a desire to 
arbitrate the matter in accordance with the CCRs. See attached Exhibit 2. 
20. On August 30, 2005, in response to the letter I received on August 29, 2005,1 sent 
DeCarlo a letter indicating: (1) that the Board of Trustees had unanimously 
determined not to approve his submitted plans, (2) in light of his expressed threat 
to go forward despite the HOA's disapproval, the HOA also unanimously agreed 
to enforce the CCRs through legal action, and (3) his attempted request to 
arbitrate the decision was well beyond the 30 day period established by the CCRs. 
See attached exhibit 3. 
21. Over the course of construction, I have taken photos demonstrating its progress. 
Those photos are attached hereto as exhibits 
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true and accurate depiction of the construction located on Lot 73. 
., and are 
DATED, this t C ^ a y of ^ g j p T g ^ S & f t - , 2005. 
Jam^s J. Kenny 
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EXHIBIT -1 
THAYNES CANYON I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION 
58 Thaynes Canyon Drive 
Park City, UT 84060 
435-649-0764 
August 14, 2005 
BY FEDEX 825093636927 
John L. Rich 
4162 Dover Circle 
Cypress CA 9 0 6 3 0 
Re: Legal Action to Enforce Thaynes Canyon Subdivision Protective Covenants 
Dear Mr. Rich: 
As I advised by phone this morning, 1 am writing to give you an opportunity to avoid the 
expense that may result from proceeding with the construction of the portion of the addition 
to your residence at 57 Thaynes Canyon Drive, Park City which does not comply with the 
10 foot side yard setback requirement in the Thaynes Canyon Subdivision Protective 
Covenants ("the CCRs"). As we previously advised, we will take legal action to enforce the 
CCRs and if the Court rules against you, you may be required at your expense to remove the 
construction encroaching into the required 10 foot side yard requirement set forth in 
paragraph 6.4 of the CCRs. 
Excavation equipment for digging the encroaching footings was moved into place on your 
property within the last two days. I want to make sure that you know that you are 
proceeding, after explicit warning that legal action would be taken if necessary to enforce the 
CCRs, at your own risk and peril. 
The CCRs are recorded in the Public Records of Summit County, Utah at Book M 32 , Page 
692 through Book M 32, Page 707 . The CCRs "are covenants running with the land or as 
equitable servitudes as the case may be, and shall constitute benefits and burdens to the 
Declarant, its sucessors and assigns, and to all parties hereafter owning any interest in the 
property." 
Paragraph 6.4 of the CCRs with respect to side yard setbacks, states: "All buildings and 
structures on all lots shall be setback at least 10 feet from the side and rear lot lines." As 
you know, the plans for your addition show a side yard setback of only 6.8 feet from your 
North property line. As you know, the Homeowners Association and the owners of the 
homes on adjoining lots to the North and to the South have objected and advised your 
Architect, Michael DeCarlo, that legal action would be taken if you nevertheless proceeded 
with construction that encroached into the required 10 foot side yard setback on the North 
side of your lot. We had hoped that you would respond to the objections and warnings by 
changing your planned addition to bring it into compliance with the CCRs. The activity on 
your property Friday and Saturday {August 12 lh and 13th) make it clear that you are 
proceeding with excavation for the footings within the required setback. As we advised we 
John L. Rich, August 14, 2005, page two 
would, we have retained counsel and unless you promptly advise that you will voluntarily 
comply with the CCRs, we will take legal action to enforce the CCRs. 
We also call to your attention the provisions of Section V11 of the CCRs on Enforcement of 
the CCRs. Paragraph 7.1 provides: "If court proceedings are instituted in connection with 
enforcement and remedies provided in this Declaration, the prevailing party shall be entitled 
to recover its costs and expenses in connection therewith, including reasonable attorneys' 
fees." It also provides that the CCRs are enforceable by the Homeowners Association "or 
by any owner of a Lot subject to this Declaration." 
A copy of the CCRs was furnished to your Architect on about July 22, 2005, and another 
copy is enclosed with this letter, 
WE WANT TO MAKE SURE YOU KNOW THAT IF YOU PROCEED BEFORE A COURT CAN 
CONSIDER AND DECIDE THIS DISPUTE, YOU WILL BE PROCEEDING AT YOUR OWN RISK 
AND PERIL. 
WE STRONGLY URGE YOU TO NOT TAKE, OR STOP, ANY CONSTRUCTION WHICH 
RELATES TO THE PORTION OF YOUR PROJECT WITHIN THE REQUIRED 10 FOOT SIDE 
YARD SETBACK. 
We regret that this dispute between neighbors has arisen, and we again request you to 
comply with the CCRs. 
Sincerely, 
A-—{v- 1 
Thaynes Canyon 1 Homeowners Association 
by James J. Kenny, President 
Enclosure: Declaration of Protective Covenants for Thaynes Canyon Subdivision 
Copies, without enclosure, furnished to: 
Michael DeCarlo, Architect 
Jim and Eileen Stuart 
Rob and Faye Slettom 
EXHIBIT - 2 
MICHAEL W. DECARLO 
ARCHITECT 
8 0 1 - 5 1 8 - 6 5 0 1 CELL 
A U G U S T 26, 2 0 0 5 
M R . JAMES K E N N Y 
5 8 THAYNES C A N Y O N DRIVE 
PARK CITY, UTAH 8 4 0 6 0 
R E : PERMITTED ADDIT ION T O 57 THAYNES C A N Y O N DRIVE 
DEAR MR. KENNY, 
PURSUANT T O YOUR LETTTER, J O H N R ICH W O U L D LIKE THIS MATTER T O BE RESOLVED UNDER 
'ARBITRATION O F DISPUTES' CLAUSE I N T H E C C R S . 
M R . RICH IS ASKING FOR THIS HEARING BY A N ARBITRATOR DUE T O T H E F O L L O W I N G 
REASONS; 
T H E C ITY HAS GRANTED A BUILDING PERMIT FOR THIS PARTICULAR REMODELING 
PROJECT. A L L FEES HAVE BEEN PAID A N D WORK HAS BEGUN. 
I HAVE TAKEN REASONABLE EFFORTS I N STEPPING T H E FOUNDATION (TWICE), 
LIMITING THE POTENTIAL ENCROACHMENT, T H E ACTUAL ENCROACHMENT IS LESS 
THAN 1 0 % (1 1 SQUARE FEET) O F T H E ALLOWABLE ENCROACHMENT A L L O W E D BY 
PARK CITY 'S REQUIREMENTS. 
T H I S W I L L BE PRESENTED AS A 'HARDSHIP C A S E ' D U E T O T H E NON-PARALLEL 
PROPERTY LINES. T H E CONVERGING PROPERTY LINES PROVIDE A VERY L IMIT AREA T O 
BUILD THIS MODEST ADDITION. 
M R . KENNY, W E HAVE VERBALLY PRESENTED OUR CASE TO YOU, MR. STUART A N D M R . PIPER 
A N D THERE HAS BEEN VERY LITTLE UNDERSTANDING O F T H E HARDSHIP A N D REASONABLE 
EFFORTS TAKEN IN T H E DESIGN TO MINIMIZE T H E E N C R O A C H M E N T W E HAVE N O T BEEN 
A L L O W E D T O PRESENT OUR CASE IN F R O N T O F THE ARCHITECTURAL COMMITTEE A N D W E 
HAVE N O T SEEN T H E MINUTES O F T H E MEETING WHERE OUR CASE WAS HEARD 
M R S . STUART, T H E NEIGHBOR T O T H E N O R T H O F THIS PROPERTY W A S SOLICITED BY 
M R STUART IN F R O N T O F ME ABOUT HER THOUGHTS O N OUR PLANED ADDITION. 
M R S . STUART'S RESPONSE WAS " J U S T L E T THEM D O WHAT THEY W A N T T O D O " IN ADDITION, 
THERE IS N O 'ARCHITECTURAL GUIDE' THAT IS REFERENCED IN T H E C C R I S THAT A H O M E 
O W N E R C A N USE W H E N CONSIDERING AN ADDITION. 
W E ARE ASKING T H E H O A T O STEP ASIDE A N D SUGGEST AN ARBITRATOR T O HEAR THIS 
MATTER A N D REMOVE T H E EMOTION O U T O F T H E DECISION MAKING PROCESS. W E FEEL O U R 
REQUEST A N D PROPOSED ADDITION IS REASONABLE AS A L L O W E D IN T H E C C R S . 
RESPBCTFUfcbY s~*v S~\ 
M I C H A E L D E C A R L O 
A R C H I T E C T FOR MR. J O H N RICH 
EXHIBIT - 3 
Thaynes Canyon 1 Homeowners Association 
58 Thaynes Canyon Drive 
Park City, Utah 84060 
August 30, 2005 
Michael DeCarlo 
Aldive & Associates, L.C. 
1532 South 500 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Dear Mr. DeCarlo: 
I received your hand delivered letter dated August 26, 2005 yesterday morning, 
August 29, 2005. 
You were clearly advised on July 21, 2005 that the Trustees of the Thaynes 
Canyon 1 Homeowners Association had met on that date at the request of Jim 
Piper to review the plans you submitted for approval by the HOA. The meeting 
was held because Mr. Piper advised that, when he told you that the plans violated 
the setback requirements in the CCRs, you told him that you intended to go 
forward with construction because the City had approved your plans. At the 
meeting, after careful review of the plans and the CCRs, the Trustees unanimously 
determined: (1) in light of the clear violation shown in the plans of the required 10 
foot side yard setback requirement set forth in paragraph 6.4 of the CCRs, to not 
approve the plans, and: (2) in light of your expressed threat to go forward despite 
the HOA's disapproval of your plans, the Trustees also unanimously determined 
to take legal action to enforce the CCRs if Mr. Rich in fact went forward with 
construction in accordance with the disapproved plans. You telephoned as the 
meeting was ending and I accepted your call at that time and, in the presence of 
other Trustees, advised you of the HOA's decisions. You argued that the violation 
of the CCRs was minor and should be waived and advised that you had a permit 
from the City and were going to go ahead with project despite the HOA's 
disapproval. I advised you that the Trustees believed that the more than 3 foot 
encroachment into the required 10 foot required setback was not minor and 
approval would create an unacceptable precedent. I also then advised you again 
that the HOA had determined that it would take legal action if necessary to enforce 
the CCRs, and I urged you to confer with your client and change the plans to 
conform to the CCRs. 
With respect to your attempt to request arbitration, the 30 day period during which 
Mr. Rich could have requested arbitration expired before your backdated letter of 
August 29, 2005. Construction work on Mr. Rich's project has occurred on 
weekends and evenings (until 7:10 p.m. yesterday). It is obvious that Mr. Rich is 
proceeding with construction as fast as possible while attempting to delay a 
decision by the Court. Certainly, you are aware that continued construction 
1 
comes at great risk. Judge Bruce Lubeck, a highly experience Judge who is 
scheduled to hear this matter, will certainly be able to recognize your "build it 
quick" strategy and enforce the CCRs. 
Additionally, although I wanted to specifically respond to your backdated letter, I 
have been advised that because this matter is before the Third District Judicial 
Court, and you are not an attorney, further communications with respect this 
matter should be directed to our attorney, Paul Poulsen, Tesch Law Offices, P.O. 
Box 3390, Park City, UT 84060-3390. 
Jlames J. Kenny on behalf of the Thaynes 
Canyon 1 Homeowners Association 
cci^aul Poulsen, Esq. 
John L. Rich 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES J. KENNY, PATRICIA D. 
KENNY, JAMES E.B. STUART, 
EILEEN A. STUART, ROBERT C. 
SLETTOM, FAYE SLETTOM, RICHARD 
L. MEASELLE, CHASE PETERSON, 
GRETHE B. PETERSON, and THAYNE 
CANYON 1 HOMEOWNERS 




JOHN L. RICH, 
Defendant. 
RULING and ORDER 
Case No. 050500428 
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: October 6, 2005 
The above matter came before the court on October 5, 2005, 
for oral argument on various issues. Plaintiffs were present 
through Joseph E. Tesch and defendant was present through Denver 
C. Snuffer. The case has taken on a unique life of its own and 
substantial background is needed to understand the issues and 
arguments and the court's ruling. 
The court has reviewed the pleadings of the parties and the 
entire file, and heard oral argument, concludes as follows. 
BACKGROUND 
On August 19, 2005, plaintiffs filed a complaint. It 
alleged they were owners of property in Thayne's Canyon, Summit 
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County, and that plaintiff Association was created in 1971 and 
there was a Declaration recorded. The contained the conditions, 
covenants and restrictions on the property, commonly CC&Rs but 
herein Declaration. All parties took their title to property 
subject to that Declaration. Section 6.4 of that Declaration 
requires a 10 foot setback from the side and rear lines for any 
buildings and structures. During or before July, 2005, defendant 
was given a building permit by Park City, based on the Park City 
Municipal Code which requires only a five foot setback, and as 
planned the addition would have a setback of only 6.8 feet from 
an adjoining lot. On July 21, 2005, the Trustees of the 
Association advised the architect for defendant, DeCarlo, that 
the Declaration would be violated if the addition to defendant's 
home was built as planned. DeCarlo allegedly stated that court 
action would be required to halt the construction, and the 
construction began. Later on August 12, 2005, plaintiffs advised 
defendant that court action would be filed unless the matter 
could be resolved. When it was not resolved this complaint was 
filed, and plaintiffs seek an injunction against defendant and 
his agents from continuing construction on Lot 73 and seek a 
declaration that the Declaration of 1971 does not permit 
construction within 10 feet of other lots and seek damages for 
breach of contract. 
Plaintiffs also moved for a temporary restraining order on 
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August 19, 2005. The court originally set a hearing on the 
request for August 29, 2005, advising plaintiffs through the 
clerk of the court that notice must be given to defendant. On 
August 26, 2005, Denver C. Snuffer sent a letter to counsel for 
plaintiffs indicating that defendant, who resides in California, 
was out of the country and asked that the hearing set for August 
29, 2005, be rescheduled. The letter further indicated the court 
had no jurisdiction because there was an arbitration provision in 
the Declaration. On August 30, 2005, the court sent notice that a 
hearing on the request for the TRO would be held September 16, 
2005. 
Plaintiff sent certified letters to defendant and Snuffer on 
September 6, 2005, advising them of the September 16, 2006, 
hearing. 
On the day of hearing, September 16, 2005, defendant filed a 
motion to quash the summons and a motion to dismiss and indicated 
counsel was there only to contest jurisdiction. Defendant alleged 
the summons was served but it did not have an endorsed date nor a 
signature of the person serving the summons nor the title of the 
server, and was in other ways in violation of Rule 4, URCP. The 
motion alleged the summons was left on a porch of defendant and 
he found it and does not know when it was left. As to the 
dismissal motion, defendant alleged that Section 8.3 of the 
Declaration governs and requires arbitration and that the court 
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was without jurisdiction. 
The summons defendant had required an answer within 20 days. 
An affidavit of Snuffer indicated he had been asked to represent 
defendant. 
Also on the date of hearing, plaintiffs filed a memo and 
exhibits in support of the request for the TRO. The loss and 
irreparable harm was alleged to be that the Declaration needed to 
be enforced or it would be meaningless, and there was a loss of 
open space, privacy and value to adjoining lots. The motion for 
the TRO alleged defendant was building a 25 foot high addition 
which was only 6.8 feet from the property line. It was claimed 
that the addition would also restrict any possible fire lane 
between the residences of the Stuarts and defendant's lot, Lot 
73. 
One of the attachments was a letter dated August 26, 2005, 
from DeCarlo, the architect for plaintiff, to plaintiff Kenny, 
asking that arbitration occur under the Declaration. In response 
on August 30, 2005, plaintiffs, through a letter from Kenny, 
advised DeCarlo that the arbitration had been waived. 
Another attachment showed that on September 8, 2005, Snuffer 
advised plaintiffs he did not have authority to accept service 
and that defendant demanded that he, defendant, be personally 
served. 
A proof of service was filed also as an attachment by 
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plaintiffs. It was signed by Bob Shultz, September 6, 2005, 
indicating he served "Jane Doe, wife, 45 yrs, cau, fe, 5'5, 145 
lb, brn hair" at the address of defendant, 4162 Dover Cir., 
Cypress, California, on August 27, 2005 at 9:30 a.m. Shultz 
represented himself to be a Registered California process server, 
and the proof was sworn to under penalty of perjury. The summons 
and complaint and motion for TRO was served according to the 
certification. The process server also swore he mailed a copy of 
the above materials on August 29, 2005, to the same address, from 
Long Beach, California. Shultz had previously made unsuccessful 
attempts at service of process at the same address on August 23 
and 25, 2005. 
In a pleading filed October 4, 2005, Shultz filed an 
affidavit that indicated he returned to the same residence of 
defendant Rich on September 22, 2005, and the same woman he 
served in August answered the door at about 6:00 a.m. She was in 
sleeping attire and indicated Shultz had just awakened her and 
Rich was not available. She had also stated Rich was not 
available on August 27, 2005, and on each occasion stated she 
would not sign for anything. 
Kenny filed an affidavit indicating that a special meeting 
of the Trustees of the Association was held July 21, 2005, and 
that plaintiff Stuart reported DeCarlo's intent to proceed with 
construction. Kenny called defendant and left a message on his 
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voice mail about the Declaration requirements of a 10 foot 
setback and that legal action would be taken if defendant did not 
halt his construction which was contemplated. Kenny also called 
DeCarlo who said Park City had issued a permit and only required 
a five foot set back and he and defendant would not comply with 
the Declaration. Kenny advised legal action would be taken. 
Excavation commenced August 13, 2005. Kenny called defendant 
August 14, 2005, and advised him to cease and defendant stated he 
was going ahead with construction and the Association could 
proceed as it wished. Kenny sent a letter to defendant that same 
date. Kenny states he received on August 29, 2005, a letter on 
his doorstep from DeCarlo, dated August 26, asking for 
arbitration. Kenny responded August 30, 2005, stating arbitration 
had been waived. Kenny attached photos which show some 
construction work in progress. 
Also attached was the affidavit of Patricia Kenny. She 
confirmed most of the information from James Kenny and attached a 
copy of the minutes she made of the July 21, 2005, Trustee 
meeting. 
Stuart attached an affidavit indicating he also took photos. 
He stated that the head of the architectural committee, Piper 
(who passed away since July 21, 2005) saw the plans of defendant 
earlier in July, before the July 21 meeting of the Trustees. On 
July 19, 2005, DeCarlo who said he was the architect appeared at 
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Stuart's home with plans, which showed the addition to 
defendant's home that would be 6.8 feet from Stuart's property 
line. Stuart said he objected and DeCarlo said he was going 
ahead as Park City had issued the permit and DeCarlo had not 
seen, nor did he care about, the Declaration. On July 20, 2005, 
Stuart gave DeCarlo the Declaration, and DeCarlo said again he 
would not comply with those requirements. Stuart confirmed the 
July 21 meeting and stated he was the adjoining property owner to 
Lot 73 and that DeCarlo knew that the building as planned was 
opposed by the Association. 
At the hearing held September 16, 2005, counsel appeared. 
The court heard argument and required that the parties complete 
arbitration within 14 days and granted the TRO, to be effective 
until further order of the court. 
Defendant argued that arbitration was required and 
plaintiffs argued it had been waived, but indicated they would 
submit to arbitration in any event if the court ordered 
arbitration. The court did not rule on the motion to quash nor on 
the motion to dismiss, those motions having only been filed the 
day of the hearing and no response having been filed. The court 
signed an order that date, later supplemented September 21, 2005, 
that defendant and his agents and servants and all persons acting 
under defendant or in concert with him stop continued 
construction of the addition on Lot 73, in any manner which 
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impinged on the 10 foot set back provision of the Declaration. 
The parties were to cooperate fully with each other to complete 
the arbitration and the order was to be in effect until further 
order of the court as orally stated. The court ordered the 
parties to contact the court after arbitration, if necessary, for 
further hearing. 
On September 21, 2005, defendant filed a letter to 
plaintiffs' counsel indicating defendant did not have a wife and 
that the service was improper. 
The docket shows that on September 27, 2005, plaintiffs 
responded to defendant's motion to quash and motion to dismiss 
though as of October 3, 2005, those responses were not in the 
file. Plaintiffs sent by facsimile those responses and the 
originals, docketed, have evidently been misfiled in another 
case. 
In opposition to the motion to quash, plaintiff asserts Rule 
4 has been complied with. There is no requirement for notations 
on the summons as to who served the summons. 
In response to the motion to dismiss plaintiffs argue that 
arbitration was waived under the Declaration, as defendant knew 
his position had been rejected July 21, 2005, and before, and his 
request for arbitration was at earliest August 26, 2005. 
On September 27, 2005, plaintiffs filed an ex parte motion 
for an expedited order to show cause as to why defendant, 
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Snuffer, DeCarlo and Brent Reich should not held in contempt. 
The request recited the September 16, 2005, TRO and history. 
Plaintiffs alleged defendant had refused arbitration, in that 
when he signed an acknowledgment to arbitrate, Snuffer set forth 
additional conditions, that he did not waive the insufficiency of 
service of process argument, and the motions under advisement, 
and that the appearance of Snuffer did not subject Rich to the 
court's jurisdiction. Plaintiffs argued and alleged that 
insertion and condition was an attempt to disavow any arbitration 
award and was as an effort to state the arbitration panel was 
without jurisdiction if the arbitration award should go against 
defendant. 
Further plaintiffs alleged that on September 26, 2005, 
construction was continuing. Plaintiffs on September 16, 2005, 
sent an e-mail to Snuffer that the court had signed the TRO, and 
a copy was attached. On September 19, 2005, plaintiffs told 
Snuffer they assumed he represented Rich and had advised Rich of 
the TRO and if that was wrong, plaintiffs should be advised. 
Snuffer indicated he did represent Rich. Kenny attached an 
affidavit which indicated that he saw concrete being pumped into 
the disputed area on September 26, 2005. DeCarlo was on the site 
and Kenny tried to give DeCarlo a copy of the TRO. DeCarlo said 
he was aware of the TRO but it was invalid and he would not 
accept it. Kenny read the TRO to DeCarlo on site but DeCarlo 
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interrupted and would not listen. DeCarlo stated Rich had not 
been served and the TRO was not valid until then. Pictures were 
attached, Kenny alleging he took them, showing workmen pouring 
and working in concrete in presumably the disputed area. 
Also filed was an "amended" proof of service signed by 
Shultz, indicating the person served on August 27, 2005, was a 
"co-tenant" rather than "wife." It was dated September 26, 2005. 
Plaintiffs requested an order to show cause and that the 
September 28, 2005, scheduled arbitration be cancelled until 
defendant submits to the jurisdiction of the panel. 
The court signed the order to show cause, setting the 
hearing October 5, 2005, at 9:00 a.m. The court ordered that 
service could be made on Rich and Snuffer by mail and the other 
two named persons were to be served. The order stated "Since 
defendant now objects to the jurisdiction of the Arbitration 
panel, the court ordered arbitration is cancelled until further 
notice; and . . ." 
Defendant Rich through Snuffer then moved on September 28, 
2005, to continue the October 5 hearing. The court scheduled a 
phone conference for 9:15 a.m. October 3, 2005, and rescheduled 
the hearing until the same date, October 5, 2005, at 1:30, and 
the court indicated it would hear all issues and determine what 
it could. 
On September 29, 2005, plaintiff filed a response to the 
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motion to continue, indicating no objection if the TRO remained 
in effect and the other parties agreed. 
On September 30, 2005, defendant Rich filed a "renewed" 
motion to dismiss. It contained additional grounds for 
dismissal. Snuffer indicated in the motion he was appearing 
specially for the limited purpose of the motion to dismiss. He 
alleged that arbitration had occurred on September 28, 2005, and 
no court involvement was required. He attached a document 
entitled an "Interim Award" by arbitrators Kent B. Scott, David 
W. Slaughter, and Steven K. Gordon. 
That document recited those persons had been appointed under 
the Declaration and the September 21, 2005, agreement of the 
parties. It indicated that on September 28, 2005, Snuffer was 
present for Rich but plaintiffs were not present, despite notice 
and agreement to participate. 
In the award, it was noted the parties agreed to arbitration 
in this case. The rejection of a variance sought by Rich was 
stated to be unreasonable and he was entitled to a variance. He 
was allowed to proceed with the addition under the current plans. 
Rich was awarded attorney fees as the prevailing party and an 
affidavit was to be submitted concerning those fees. As 
additional comments, the panel stated that the parties empowered 
the panel by their agreement. 
The Written Comments of the panel indicated that by entering 
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into the agreement, the parties empowered the panel to hear the 
matter. Then, plaintiffs herein told the panel the court had 
cancelled the arbitration. The comments indicated that the 
parties acknowledged they would agree to arbitrate all issues in 
this case that is before the court and acknowledged the 
appointment of the panel. On September 23, 2005, a preliminary 
conference was held between the parties and the panel and no 
objection was expressed to the panel. Defendant herein, through 
counsel, indicated he had reservations about the court's 
jurisdiction but had no concerns about the panel's jurisdiction. 
Hearing was scheduled for September 28, 2005, and pre-hearing 
issues were discussed, as well as motions, discovery, exchange of 
witness and exhibit lists and pre-hearing briefs. Defendant 
added language about reservations about the jurisdiction of the 
court, but not the panel. On the afternoon before the hearing, 
plaintiffs' counsel made a request to cancel the arbitration 
based on the fact that defendant had objected to the jurisdiction 
of the panel. The arbitrators indicated that was not true, 
defendant had not objected to the jurisdiction of the panel. The 
comments then suggest that before the panel could consider the 
request or invite a hearing, plaintiffs obtained an ex parte 
order cancelling the court ordered arbitration. The day before 
the hearing the panel received the order of the court cancelling 
the arbitration. The panel then determined the hearing should 
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proceed and the panel should hear plaintiffs' request to cancel 
and matters related to the panel's jurisdiction. 
On the date of hearing, Snuffer was present for Rich and the 
panel called counsel for plaintiffs, who on the telephone refused 
to discuss the matter, stated he would not participate because 
the court had cancelled the arbitration and that he would state 
his position in writing. Rich indicated he was not objecting to 
the panel's jurisdiction. Later plaintiffs' counsel sent a letter 
stating he considered the arbitration court ordered and the panel 
had no jurisdiction to hear the matter. The panel indicated that 
although the court ordered the arbitration, it ceased to be 
court-ordered when the parties signed the agreement to arbitrate. 
Thus, the panel justified its action by stating the hearing was 
not pursuant to court order, but was pursuant to agreement, 
consistent with the Declaration, which granted jurisdiction to a 
panel for arbitration. Both sides paid for one arbitrator and 
agreed to split the cost for the third member. 
Also on September 30, 2005, defendant moved to dissolve the 
restraining order. He argued that the arbitration was complete 
and there was nothing for the court to do and the matter was now 
moot. No bond was posted and defendant claims a bond must be 
posted and that such is mandatory. 
Also on September 30, 2005, defendant responded to the order 
to show cause. Defendant claims it is false that defendant did 
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not agree to arbitrate, and defendant did participate in 
arbitration under the contract, the Declaration and the pre-
arbitration agreement presumably, and not pursuant to court 
order. Defendant again claims the court has no jurisdiction over 
Rich and cannot order anything concerning Rich without service on 
defendant personally. It was argued Snuffer and Reich are not 
parties but are counsel, DeCarlo is not a party, and the 
arbitration was conducted under contract not court order. 
Further, the TRO is invalid on its face. 
Defendant makes these arguments and asserts DeCarlo is not a 
party, and neither are defendant's attorneys. Because DeCarlo is 
not a party, an order cannot be directed at him according to 
defendant. Defendant asserts also he did not go to the 
arbitration as a result of the court's order, but as a result of 
an agreement. No summons was served and so the court cannot 
order Rich to do anything according to him. 
In an affidavit filed October 4, 2005, Joseph E. Tesch, 
counsel for plaintiffs, asserts the Panel did not call him on 
September 27, 2005, to indicate the Panel was going to go forward 
and conduct an arbitration hearing. He asserts on September 28, 
2005, a Panel member called him and stated the court, this court, 
was without jurisdiction to cancel the arbitration hearing. The 
Panel then told Tesch they intended to proceed without him, after 
Tesch indicated the court had ordered the arbitration and the 
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court had then cancelled the arbitration. 
Also on October 4, 2005, plaintiffs filed an opposition to 
the renewed motion to dismiss and an opposition to the motion of 
defendant to dissolve the TRO. 
Also on October 4, 2005, defendant filed a reply memorandum 
in support of his motion to dismiss. Filed with the reply was an 
affidavit of DeCarlo wherein he asserts defendant did not give 
him a copy of the TRO and while plaintiff Kenny attempted to give 
DeCarlo a copy, DeCarlo refused to read it. He states that Kenny 
is a party and cannot serve papers. He asserts the work has now 
ceased after he was served with the Order to Show Cause, and 
defendant's damages are accruing. 
Also attached is an affidavit of Deborah DeCarlo, who states 
she is the daughter of defendant Rich, and that her mother, the 
wife of Rich, died approximately ten years ago, and Rich does not 
cohabit with anyone and resides alone in California. 
DISCUSSION 
1. Motion to Quash. 
The court is faced now with competing affidavits about 
whether that service of the summons was complete on August 27, 
2005. The affidavit of Deborah DeCarlo is made, in large measure, 
without personal knowledge. She could not know, as a resident of 
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Utah, whether there was a person, a woman, at the residence of 
Rich on August 27 and September 22, 2005, as the process server 
asserts. Certainly she has personal knowledge about whether her 
father is married or regularly cohabits. The court is not 
suggesting he does cohabit, but the court does credit the 
affidavit of the process server, with its presumption of 
regularity, that he is a non-interested process server and served 
the summons as indicated. There is sufficient indicia that the 
woman, whoever she may be, resided there as required by Rule 4, 
URCP. 
On the morning the court is issuing this ruling Rich faxed 
an affidavit. The court is tempted to disregard it as untimely, 
but the court will consider it. Rich, evidently now in Indiana at 
least according to the notary seal, states no one resided in his 
residence other than himself, Mr. Snuffer was engaged only to 
challenge jurisdiction, Rich had not been served, his son found a 
summons on the porch and one in the mailbox, and the court has no 
jurisdiction. 
Parenthetically, in a statement not lost on the court, it 
was represented that Rich was a former attorney with the military 
and is familiar with these matters and knows that there is no 
jurisdiction over him until he can be served. There have been 
several representations that Rich was out of the country at 
various times, that he travels a great deal, and this affidavit, 
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as noted, was signed in Indiana. 
The court directly asked defendant twice on October 6, 2005, 
if he believed the court needed an evidentiary hearing to hear 
the process server and any other witnesses to make a credibility 
determination about whether service was valid under Rule 4. The 
question was not answered by counsel. Such a hearing would be a 
benefit to the court without doubt but would amount to further 
delay and defendant claims he is being damaged by the delay 
because the building season is rapidly disappearing in this 
county. 
It is defendant challenging the court's jurisdiction. Given 
the presumption of regularity and the notion that litigation is 
not to be delayed inordinately by such matters or by attempts to 
avoid service (the court is not saying that is occurring), the 
court believes it is defendant's burden to overcome the 
presumption of regularity and provide evidence that service was 
not proper. Defendant has done that to the extent of defendant's 
affidavit. Some of his affidavit (my son checks my home every 
day) is not admissible and is not considered. Still, the court 
does not believe it is making a credibility determination based 
on affidavits. Based on the affidavit of Shultz that the woman 
was in sleep attire and stated she was awakened by Shultz, the 
court believes that qualifies as residing. The affidavit of the 
daughter does not defeat that as the daughter could not know, 
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residing in Utah, whether a woman was there on the dates 
indicated. Simply put, given the competing affidavits and 
without an ability to determine credibility, the court again 
extends the invitation to defendant for an evidentiary hearing 
where the court can hear from any and all witnesses relating to 
this motion and the service or lack thereof. Absent that 
hearing, the court believes the presumption of regularity from a 
dis-interested registered process server who provides great 
detail overcomes the affidavit of defendant. 
As to the other arguments for the invalidity of the service, 
the court finds them without merit. The summons served did 
erroneously state an answer must be filed within 20 days. Rule 
12(a) allows thirty days to answer when service is completed 
outside of the state of Utah and 20 days when service is within 
the state. However, that does not merit quashing the summons. 
An extension could be sought to file an answer and would be 
granted if asked for in this case. In any event, no answer has 
been filed but a motion to dismiss has been filed. The court 
will allow 30 days for an answer if the case gets to that point. 
The misinformation conveyed in the summons does not go to the 
heart of the basis for service, and that is notice. It does not 
affect the core reasons for the timing of a response. 
As to the failure of notation on the summons served, 
defendant is simply wrong. Current Rule 4 does not require such. 
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A prior Rule 4(j) did require such notations on the summons but 
that is no longer the rule. 
Defendant argues counsel did not appear generally on 
September 16, October 6, or perhaps in the future. However 
counsel clearly knew of the hearing, as did defendant. Rule 
12(b) has eliminated the need for "special" and "general" 
appearances as "no defense or objection is waived by being joined 
with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive 
pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of 
such motion or objection." In short, all of the claims about 
special and general appearances are without merit entirely. 
As to notice, the court did not and would not, under the 
facts of this case, issue a TRO without some notice to the 
opposition, absent compliance with URCP, Rule 65A(b)(1)(A) and 
(B). That happened and Snuffer appeared. The court fully 
believes, in following the law, that notice is to be provided. 
The court does not believe the rules are to be used, however, to 
defeat substantial justice. 
The motion to quash is RESERVED until further hearing as 
discussed below. The court simply cannot determine, based on the 
competing affidavits, whether service happened as plaintiffs 
claim or if it did not happen properly under the rules. 
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2. Motion to dismiss. 
Defendant has, in the view of the court, attempted to have 
both sides of the argument here. He insists he wanted and still 
wants arbitration but took steps, in the view of the court, to 
halt that process which would have and could have and should have 
been an end of this case. 
In opposition to the request for a TRO, defendant argued in 
open court that arbitration was required and the court had no 
jurisdiction under the Declaration of 1971 because arbitration 
had been demanded and was required before court intervention. In 
part based on that argument, and in part based on the willingness 
of plaintiffs to submit to arbitration if the court required it 
even though plaintiffs argued arbitration had been waived, and in 
part because this case involves, in the words of someone, a "war 
over five feet" of property, the court believed arbitration was 
wise and would most readily and speedily resolve the issues 
involved before construction went too far and before the 
construction season was lost. 
Thus, the court ordered arbitration as a part of and as an 
extension of the TRO. The court simply equitably stopped further 
work, and tried to get the parties, all seemingly competent, well 
off and adults, to get together with someone neutral and work out 
this issue involving a building three fee four inches closer to a 
property line than someone wants. The court did NOT RULE whether 
-20-
arbitration had or had not been waived, the court DID NOT rule 
whether the court had jurisdiction. Obviously in issuing any 
order the court assumed it had jurisdiction but there was no 
ruling on that issue. The motion to dismiss was not decided but 
the court had to rule on the TRO request. The act of issuing 
the TRO obviously assumes the court had jurisdiction to some 
extent, however, and to some extent assumes arbitration had been 
waived. Because of the emergent nature of the TRO hearing those 
issues had not been fully briefed and the court had not had time 
to fully consider those issues. The court issued the TRO as an 
equitable measure with the clear intent that work stop, the 
parties arbitrate, a result would be achieved speedily, and if 
that failed the parties would return to court and the issues of 
jurisdiction, waiver of arbitration, and any other issues, would 
be considered and resolved. Unfortunately, those well intentioned 
plans did not materialize and the case, beyond even the above 
issues, has taken on a life (or death) of its own. 
Upon more careful examination now it is apparent that the 
court had and continues to have jurisdiction. The court ordered 
arbitration, and if that was not successful, the parties were to 
contact the court and further proceedings, relating to 
jurisdiction and a possible preliminary injunction, would be 
explored. Nothing in law has removed this court's jurisdiction 
and nothing in the facts of this case has removed this court's 
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jurisdiction. 
Defendant wanted to arbitrate and plaintiffs did not because 
they argued defendant had waived arbitration according to the 
arguments held September 16, 2005. The court ordered arbitration 
as part of the solution to the problem the parties were involved 
in. The later "agreement" signed by counsel for the parties to 
arbitrate was based on court order. 
The parties then began that process of arbitration, hired 
and paid for them, and signed an agreement to arbitrate. When 
plaintiffs signed the agreement to arbitrate with the panel, they 
affixed language that "Counsel for the parties acknowledge and 
agree that the above referenced matter may be arbitrated in 
accordance with the Utah Revised Uniform Arbitration Act and 
accept the arbitration panel as on the terms and as provided for 
in this letter. Agreed subject to Plaintiffs' Right to seek 
attorneys' fees and costs since the arbitration is simply an 
extension of the court proceedings in the Third Judicial Court at 
No. 050500425." 
To the language of the agreement that "counsel . . 
Acknowledge and agree that the [matter] may be arbitrated in 
accordance with the Utah Revised Uniform Arbitration Act and 
accept the arbitration panel as on the terms and as provided for 
in this letter" defendant's counsel then wrote in a handwritten 
addition: "On condition that this does not waive any right of my 
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client; who objects to the jurisdiction and sufficiency of 
service of process. There are pending motions to dismiss before 
the Court which are under advisement. My appearance does not 
subject my client to the Court's jurisdiction. See Exhibit 3 
attached." The court is not aware of what Exhibit 3 was. 
Based on that language plaintiffs interpreted, correctly and 
wisely in the court's view, that defendant was willing to have an 
arbitration panel examine the issues, but if that panel action 
was unfavorable to defendant, defendant could still claim the 
court had no jurisdiction to order the arbitration or enforce the 
arbitration award and so the arbitration was not effective. 
Defendant and the panel have interpreted the language 
inserted by defendant differently from the court, and incorrectly 
in the court's view. They deem the additional language is merely 
preserving arguments as to the court's jurisdiction. Whatever 
issues existed about jurisdiction are not for the Panel to 
determine but for the court. 
However, the court's jurisdiction was at that point 
irrelevant. If the parties submitted all issues to arbitration, 
the TRO was meaningless as all issues would be resolved in 
arbitration and there was no reason to be concerned about the 
court's jurisdiction whatsoever. Defendant clearly inserted that 
language in the "agreement" for a purpose and preserving an 
argument as to court jurisdiction was irrelevant and was 
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unnecessary, as noted, under Rule 12 (b) . This inserted language 
was not needed in the face of Rule 12(b). All of defendant's 
arguments and affidavits and discussion about "preserving" 
jurisdictional arguments are without merit under Rule 12 (b) . A 
"special" appearance is meaningless under that Rule. 
For that reason Rich had notice under our rules. That is 
also the reason the court allowed the Order to Show Cause, 
discussed below, to be served on counsel as that is notice in 
this case. 
Further, the court believes the inserted language fairly 
could be considered as a mechanism by defendant, when considered 
in conjunction with other arguments asserted as a further attempt 
to obfuscate and delay and continue work on the project. Had 
arbitration been engaged in, as ordered by the court as part of 
the TRO process, defendant could argue under that insertion he 
made that the panel decision was invalid because the court had no 
jurisdiction to order the arbitration, even though defendant 
claimed he wanted arbitration. The inserted language by counsel 
caused plaintiffs to believe, again correctly in the view of the 
court, that defendant was attempting to seek arbitration but 
attempting to avoid it if it was unfavorable to him. It could 
and did reasonably appear as a tactic to avoid resolution of the 
issues. Even if there was an award it must be confirmed by the 
court, and defendant left it open to argue the court had no 
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jurisdiction and so any award may not be confirmed. As noted 
repeatedly, it was simply unnecessary under Rule 12(b) to 
"reserve" a jurisdictional argument. 
Where defendant and the Panel erred is in believing that 
because the parties signed an "agreement'' to arbitrate that the 
arbitration was not court ordered, but pursuant to that 
agreement. Plaintiffs signed the agreement ONLY BECAUSE the 
court ordered them to as part of the TRO process. That is clear 
from the record and the language inserted by plaintiffs in the 
"agreement." The court ordered arbitration before a preliminary 
injunction hearing, believing it was the most efficacious means 
to solve an immediate problem. Plaintiffs believed and argued, 
correctly the court now rules, that arbitration had been waived. 
Plaintiffs did not believe arbitration was necessary under the 
Declaration as it had been waived as untimely demanded. 
An "agreement" to arbitrate is enforceable except upon any 
ground that exists at law or equity for the revocation of a 
contract. UCA 78-31a-107(1). 
Thus, for the Panel to take upon itself the position that it 
had jurisdiction because the parties "agreed" to it and that the 
court had no jurisdiction to cancel arbitration was completely 
incorrect and was indeed a rejection of or disobedience of a 
court order. The Panel could have and should have sought 
clarification from the court before acting in the face of an 
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order that cancelled arbitration. Again, the court's 
jurisdiction is not determined by this Panel, whatever they think 
their powers may be. The Panel, for some unexplainable reason, 
instead took it upon themselves to hold an arbitration hearing 
even when one party stated that the court had cancelled 
arbitration, they Panel was aware of that order, and that was the 
reason for non-participation by plaintiffs. 
There was in fact no "agreement" to arbitrate for two 
reasons. First, arbitration was done because the court ordered 
it even though it is now clear it had been waived and was not 
properly demanded. Second, the "agreement" to arbitrate is void 
because it is ambiguous and does not amount to a meeting of the 
minds. Defendant's insertion of additional "conditions" which 
effectively would allow him to claim the arbitration was not 
binding was NOT agreed to by plaintiffs. There was a failure of 
agreement on the necessary and essential conditions. Thus there 
was no contract or agreement at all. 
The Declaration was an "agreement" to arbitrate, but only 
under the circumstances and conditions within that document. It 
was waived as indicated below. 
Even if the demand for arbitration was timely, notice under 
Utah law of a desire to participate in arbitration must be in 
conformity with Utah law, UCA 78-31a-110, or in other words, must 
be by certified or registered mail, and the nature of the dispute 
-26-
must be set forth. That clearly did not occur in this case. 
There was no valid demand for arbitration nor was the demand for 
arbitration timely. 
The "demand" in the form of a letter from DeCarlo, was at 
earliest August 26, but probably August 29, 2005. Defendant knew 
of the decision of the Association Trustees July 21, 2005. The 
demand was not timely and arbitration was waived under the 
Declaration. 
Based on the representation of plaintiffs as to that 
additional language inserted by defendant, the court then ordered 
that arbitration be cancelled. How the Panel could interpret 
that unambiguous order cancelling arbitration as meaning only the 
court-ordered arbitration was cancelled, but not the "agreed-to" 
arbitration is beyond the court's thinking. The arbitration was 
completely and solely court ordered, as an accommodation to 
defendant in fact, and done for reasons that seemed to the court 
to be the most sensible and speedy way to resolve this dispute 
over less than five feet of property. The court may not order 
arbitration if there is no agreement to do so. The TRO issuance 
under the condition of immediate arbitration was, again, an 
accommodation to defendant and seemed a practical way to solve 
the issues. However, the arbitration was not based on a valid 
agreement to arbitrate because that desire for arbitration had 
been waived by the untimely request for such arbitration. Thus, 
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the arbitration ordered was the sole basis for plaintiff's 
participation and that order was improvident and incorrect. The 
claimed "agreement" signed by the parties, then, is not a valid 
contract or agreement based on these equitable principles and 
based on the clear notion in contract law that there must be an 
agreement of the parties, a meeting of the minds. There was not 
such when defendant added his conditions. 
The arbitration interim award is VACATED and is of no 
effect. The Panel had no basis to hear the matter under the 
facts of this case. The Panel improperly refused to postpone the 
hearing upon a showing of sufficient cause, namely, the court had 
ordered it cancelled. Plaintiffs properly refused to participate 
and told the Panel the reasons for such refusal, namely again, 
the court order cancelling the arbitration. 
The Declaration clearly states, Section 8.3, that any party, 
which includes defendant, desiring to arbitrate any controversy 
shall file written notice of that desire with the Association and 
any other party within 30 days of when he discovers or learns or 
has notice of such determination or action or decision of the 
association. As noted, defendant clearly knew more than 30 days 
before August 29, or August 26, 2005, that the Association would 
not grant a variance or waiver. There was thus a dispute and any 
notice of a request for such was thus untimely as filed. 
Arbitration was thus waived. 
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The court vacates that portion of the TRO which requires 
arbitration. Given the positions of the parties herein and their 
seeming inability to agree on anything, court orders are clearly 
the only possible resolution herein. 
Defendant suggests a re-referral for arbitration to the same 
panel. Plaintiffs suggest a re-referral to a different panel. 
The court declines to do so. Arbitration was seen as a practical 
means but as noted, given what the court perceives to be 
practices not in harmony with civil litigation, only orders will 
suffice to control the conduct evidently, and those do not seem 
very effective given interpretations of various participants. 
As to the arguments about other reasons for dismissal, they 
are all rejected as lacking merit. Defendant actually quotes the 
"mandatory" language of Rule 65A on at least two occasions, 
relative to the requirements for bond, but leaves out the 
language, well known to the court and obvious from even a casual 
reading, that a bond is not needed in all cases and is not in 
fact mandatory. Defendant quotes the "shall" provision but on 
each occasion leaves out the "unless" provision that such 
security is not needed if it appears that none of the parties 
will incur or suffer costs, fees, or damage as a result of ay 
wrongful order, or unless there exists some other substantial 
reason for dispensing with the requirement of security. 
At argument defendant argued the court did not at that time 
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set forth reasons for the waiver of the bond requirement. Of 
course defendant himself waived any claim to error when he failed 
to even argue the merits to the TRO, insisting wrongly under Rule 
12(b) that he was there only to contest jurisdiction. Defendant 
waived any claim to defect in the TRO as he did not raise any 
claims. 
Moreover, while the court did not address those reasons for 
not requiring security, and defendant did NOT request a bond in 
his arguments, it is apparent from the face of things herein that 
this Association, even if a TRO is wrongly issued, would be 
responsible for any damages occasioned by the wrongful issuance 
of the TRO. At the time the TRO was issued the court was dealing 
with a hole in the ground. Since September 16, 2005, evidently 
but the court is not finding such, concrete has been poured. 
Given the state of affairs at the time of the order, a bond was 
not and is not required because it appears that any damages which 
may result could be covered by the Association and those would be 
minimal. To argue that a bond is REQUIRED in all instances is 
misdirected and wrong and counsel should know that. Arguing that 
a bond is always mandatory is simply wrong. 
This court's jurisdiction is not foreclosed or eliminated by 
an interim award from the panel under the facts of this case. 
The award is invalid and vacated for the reasons stated above. 
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The motion to dismiss is DENIED. 
3. Order to show cause. 
The court will not currently rule on this request. Having 
been served DeCarlo and Reich were present. The court indicated 
those persons could leave as the court was not going to entertain 
the order to show cause. Despite that, come comments are given. 
Defendant in opposing the order to show cause is relying on 
arguments rejected by the court. The motion to quash and to 
dismiss have been denied. 
There is no requirement that a TRO be served on the person 
enjoined before it is effective. Where defendant got that 
argument is unknown, and no citation is given for such a 
proposition. The court ordered that work cease in open court on 
September 16, 2005, that defendant and his agents stop work. It 
was discussed and gone over several times. Arbitration was then 
to occur and hopefully the problem solved. For defendant to 
argue in his pleadings that DeCarlo was not a party and cannot be 
ordered to stop work is an offensive and specious argument. 
There would obviously be no such thing as a valid court order of 
most any kind, especially in a TRO situation, or for that matter 
any other situation, if a person enjoined said, "Well, I am not 
pouring cement, it is someone else, namely, my architect who is 
not a party." To even argue that is offensive. Mr. Rich and his 
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agents were ordered to stop work. DeCarlo knew that, was told 
that, and so that is imputed to Rich because he had counsel. The 
argument that to be valid it must be served on Rich is without 
merit. If Mr. Snuffer did not tell his client, then something is 
wrong. Mr. Snuffer in open court on October 5, 2005, stated in 
fact that he had not told Rich what the TRO said but said that 
he, Rich, could expect one to be served on him. Whatever 
consequences are to flow from that series of events, if in fact 
that is the series, remains for another day. Defendant argued 
October 5 that the court stated the TRO had to be served on 
defendant. In the September 16, 2005, hearing, the court was not 
talking about serving the TRO as nothing in Rule 65A requires 
personal service of a TRO before it is effective. 
Defendant is entitled to challenge the court's jurisdiction 
all he desires, and he has made it known for some unknown reason 
that an appellate court will examine the issue. Just what that 
statement is suppose to accomplish with this court is unclear. 
Still, while it is the order of the court and unless and until 
another court tells the court it is wrong about its jurisdiction, 
it is the order of the court. Work has been enjoined and Mr. 
Rich is not to claim he is not doing the work, someone else is. 
Those ordered to desist work, and those responsible to tell them 
so, should act as if court orders and judgments mean something, 
even if those orders are believed to be in error. Unless and 
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until a stay is granted, the court orders remain in place. No 
stay has been granted. 
The court need not, in a TRO such as this where construction 
is halted, name every possible worker who works on the job. 
DeCarlo knew he was not to work and evidently on the advice of 
counsel continued work. The court finds it unfathomable that 
DeCarlo would be advised of the TRO and on his own decide to go 
ahead with the work and have a crew pour cement. The court is 
not in possession of sufficient facts at this point to determine 
who told what to who after issuance of the TRO. The above 
comments are a guide to future behavior hopefully. 
Having said all of the above, the court is not acting now on 
the request for an order to show cause. The court ordered that 
the order to show cause be served on DeCarlo and Reich and that 
Rich and Mr. Snuffer could be served by mail. That was done. As 
noted above, despite the repeated statements of counsel that he 
was engaged only to deal with jurisdiction, and that is all he 
argued at,the September 16, 2005, hearing, and that he was 
engaged only to deal with the motions on October 6, 2005, Mr. 
Snuffer is counsel for Rich. He can challenge jurisdiction all 
he desires but notice to Mr. Snuffer is notice to Mr. Rich. Mr. 
Snuffer was present, as was DeCarlo and Reich. Mr. Rich was not 
and the reasoning behind that escapes the court. If there are 
-33-
consequences for failing to appear pursuant to an order to show 
cause served on counsel that will also remain for another day. 
Still, the court is not acting at this point on the request for 
contempt. 
The court is of the belief that if plaintiffs desire to 
pursue these allegations of contempt against any named parties or 
any others involved in the construction or arbitration, that can 
be accomplished at anytime in an amended request for order to 
show cause after further discovery reveals just who was told what 
and who ordered what conduct. Any future proceedings can be in 
this action even if this action terminates on the merits. 
The request for contempt is RESERVED. 
As noted, the court does not believe arbitration is now 
viable. Accordingly, the next step is for the court to consider 
whether a preliminary injunction should issue. In open court on 
October 6, 2005, the court attempted, in the event that the 
motions of defendant were denied, to set a date for such an 
evidentiary hearing in case such a hearing was needed, the court 
having not determined how it would rule at that point. Neither 
party was very amenable, one having a busy schedule and the other 
not having his calendar present. 
-34-
The matter must be set IMMEDIATELY for an evidentiary hearing 
on request for preliminary injunction. Counsel need to contact 
the scheduling clerk immediately and a phone conference should be 
arranged immediately so a hearing date can be set. Rule 65A 
requires that a hearing be set at the earliest possible time and 
that such a hearing takes precedence over all other civil matters 
except older matters of the same character. The court is 
perfectly willing to schedule a hearing as soon as possible but 
the parties need to cooperate. If the rule requires the court to 
set an early hearing, the court will do so and counsel may well 
have to change their schedules so the rule can be complied with. 
The TRO remains in effect until that can be heard and 
resolved. The TRO is extended because of the history set forth 
above. Arbitration was to occur, events transpired as they did, 
and there have been motions dealing with jurisdiction. All of 
the foregoing are reasons for extending the TRO until a hearing 
can be arranged for a preliminary injunction. 
In addition the court will hear evidence relating to the 
motion to quash at this hearing. If defendant does not produce 
live testimony the court will rule in favor of plaintiffs on the 
motion to quash based on the presumption of regularity. If 
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defendant produces witnesses plaintiff should be prepared to do 
so also as if Rich testifies as his affidavit indicates that will 
overcome the presumption. If the process server testifies then 
the court will be required and able to make a credibility 
determination. The court will not schedule a prior hearing on 
this motion alone before the preliminary injunction, in an effort 
to speedily determine all issues. To schedule an evidentiary 
hearing on the motion to quash would delay the preliminary 
injunction hearing. For that reason, the hearing to be scheduled 
will consider the preliminary injunction as well as the evidence 
relating to the motion to quash. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other 
order is required. 
DATED this [J day of L/lv , 2005, 
BY ;THE COJJKf 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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JACKSON, Judge: 
Randy Theriot appeals the lower court's determination that it hi 1 
personal jurisdiction to issue a protective order against him on 
behalf of Jan Alicia Ringgold under Utah Code section 3 0-6-4.2. 
Regrettably, we were not favored with a brief from Ringgold We 
reverse and remand for further proceedings. 
The procedures for determining personal jurisdiction are fairly 
well entrenched. When personal jurisdiction is contested, "the 
plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction exists." Benton v. 
Cameco Corp., 375 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotations and 
citation omitted); see also Anderson v. American Soc'y of Plastic & 
Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1990). In deciding 
questions of jurisdiction, a court "'may determine jurisdiction on 
affidavits alone, permit discovery, or hold an evidentiary hearing.1" 
Phone Directories v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64,^2, 8 P.3d 256 (quoting 
Anderson, 807 P.2d at 827). 
"If an evidentiary hearing is held, the plaintiff has the burden 
of proving jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. "-^li- Kamdar 
& Co. v. Laray Co., 815 P.2d 245, 247-48 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
(citation omitted). A defendant challenging jurisdiction has a right 
to cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses and to present competing 
evidence. See State v. Cramer, 2002 UT 9,1)19, 44 P. 3d 690 ("Due 
process [under the Utah Constitution] includes, among other things, 
the 'opportunity to submit evidence, examine and cross-examine 
witnesses.'" (quoting Christiansen v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 163 P.2d 
314, 317 (1945))). 
In the present case, the lower court determined it had personal 
jurisdiction based solely upon the testimony of Ringgold. When 
Theriot attempted to cross-examine Ringgold, the court refused. We 
are somewhat puzzled by this refusal to allow Theriot the opportunity 
to challenge Ringgold's assertion of facts supporting personal 
jurisdiction. The court cautioned Theriot that "if you cross-examine 
you lose your special appearance, and the whole issue of jurisdiction 
becomes moot." In Utah, "[t]he distinction between general and 
special appearances has been abolished by the language contained in 
Rule 12(b) [of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure]," Brown & Assocs., 
Inc. v. Carnes Corp., 547 P.2d 206, 207 (Utah 1976), and "[a] party 
need no longer appear 'specially' to attack the court's 
jurisdiction," Clarkson v. Western Heritage, Inc., 627 P.2d 72, 74 
(Utah 1981) (Stewart, J., concurring) (citation omitted). See also 
Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 725 n.17 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("Today 
the distinction between general and special appearances has been 
effectively abolished by Rule 12(b)."). 
We conclude that once the lower court commenced an evidentiary 
hearing regarding personal jurisdiction, it should have required 
Ringgold to prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence 
after allowing Theriot to develop the facts through cross-examination 
and presenting competing evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the trial 
court's determination of personal jurisdiction and remand to allow 
the court to hear further evidence regarding jurisdiction.-^-
Norman n. Jackson, judge 
WE CONCI JR : 
Russell 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. Alternatively, "if [a court] proceeds on documentary evidence 
alone . , , the plaintiff is only required to make a prima facie 
showing of personal jurisdiction." Neways, Inc. v. McCausland, 950 
P.2d 420, 422 (Utah 1997) (citing Anderson v. American Soc'y of 
Plastic & Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1990)). 
Nonetheless, "the plaintiff must prove jurisdiction at trial by a 
preponderance of the evidence after making a prima facie showing 
before trial." Id. 
2. In order to prove personal jurisdiction, Ringgold must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that "there exist 'minimum contacts 
with the [forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not 
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'" 
MFS Series Trust III v. Grainger, 2004 UT 6l,1fl0, 96 P.3d 927 
(quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 
(1945) ) (alteration in original) . 
